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THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY*

By ROBERT ROSSOW

THE concept of a profession as a social institution is a rather nebulous one. It is sometimes used to refer to any clearly defined vocational group. More traditionally it refers to a "learned profession," the classic examples of which are divinity, medicine, and the law. The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Vol. XII, p. 478) defines a profession, in this sense, as "a vocation founded upon prolonged and specialized intellectual training which enables a particular service to be rendered." It is this meaning of the term that is here intended.

In the process of professionalization the members of a vocation organize themselves into a loose institutional structure that provides a certain amount of self-government, especially by establishing qualifications for membership and standards of performance, and a modicum at least of insulation from outside social pressures. The kind of vocation that lends itself to professionalization is one that uses special techniques which can be better defined, administered, and evaluated by fellow professionals, using reasonably objective norms, than by lay persons using non-professional standards. In these circumstances a profession performs an important service to the society at large by guaranteeing and improving the quality of performance. In this process the role of the profession is also delimited and defined, and its responsibilities to its clients specified, to the mutual benefit of both.

I. The Emerging Profession of Diplomacy

Today over 100,000 American civilians are employed overseas. Some are in commerce and industry, some in education, some are missionaries, some are journalists, and some are employed by government in a wide variety of capacities. As intercommunication and interinvolvement of the peoples of the world increase, the number and the variety of the functions of this group of Americans can be expected to increase accordingly.

As carefully observed and reported by Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams in their excellent treatise,[1] there is among these Americans

* This article was written at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif., where the author was a Fellow in 1960-1961.

[1] Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams, *The Overseas Americans*, New York, 1960.

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overseas a growing sense of confraternity and a significant community of experience and purpose, and there are certain identifiable and distinctive elements common to effective overseas performance. The writers go on to assert, however, that it is premature to conclude that overseas service is a new profession.

Considering only the present state of affairs, this assertion is entirely justified. It is the central thesis of this article, however, that the field is ripe for professionalization in the full sense of our usage of the term, and that the public interest would be served thereby. All that is needed is a sharper specification and definition of the professional role and function, and a somewhat more rigorous and discriminating cultivation of its special techniques. This can be accomplished, it is submitted, with as much precision and differentiation as, for example, in the case of the law.

It is certainly not to be envisaged that the professionalization will occur suddenly or dramatically. It will at best evolve over a period of decades. But the world of the future is going to need the peculiar services offered by this profession in increasing volume and urgency, and it will need the best quality. We must therefore lose no time in planting the seed and beginning the patient labor of cultivation.

We must settle at the outset on a descriptive label for this new profession, one that will identify the special professional service, regardless of the client for whom it is performed—whether government, business, or whatnot. At risk of rousing protest, the term "diplomacy" is proposed, for it alone of all the terms that have been used to describe this general field of activity refers to a technique rather than to the particular circumstances in which it is applied. Thus terminology using the adjectives "foreign" or "overseas" has centristic overtones, while that using "international" implies an undue and unnecessary connection with the institution of the national state. These may well be aptly descriptive of particular contexts within which the diplomatic function is performed, but the function itself is not necessarily confined to or defined by just those contexts. The term "diplomacy" is often, of course, used in a narrower sense to refer to the intercourse carried on between national governments at the Chief of State, Foreign Office, and Embassy levels. It is submitted, however, that the narrower usage does not preclude the broader, and that the connotative advantages of the latter outweigh the objections.

Moreover, there is advantage in maintaining a few traditional bonds, so long as they do not interfere with evolutionary progress and adaptation to new circumstances, and there can be no doubt that the new

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diplomacy has its origins in the old. In fact the very process of professionalization may be considered to have started hesitantly and gradually at the end of the Napoleonic period, as diplomacy began to be conceived less as a mannered art of courtly intrigue and more as a field requiring experience, skill, and broader horizons. The old diplomacy has been somewhat tainted, especially in the popular mind, with certain Machiavellian and elitist overtones. These, however, never were and certainly are not now characteristic of the best of the classical diplomatic tradition, wherein good faith, discipline, and loyalty have always been far more honored in both rapportage and negotiation.[2] It is a highly respectable and justifiably proud tradition and there is no need to deny or apologize for it. The qualities that it embodied are as valid for the new diplomacy as for the old.

Next, we must attempt to specify the essential and defining professional service. In doing this, we take as a basic assumption, confirmed both by practical experience and by the more rigorous methods of the behavioral sciences, that different peoples conceptualize themselves, their values, their institutions, and their situations in radically different ways. These tend to fall into patterns called "cultures" that are transmitted from one generation to another by the learning process, which begins almost at the moment of birth. Every man looks upon the world through lenses that have been thus culturally conditioned, and understandably considers his particular way of seeing and judging it the natural and normal way. When culture groups are fairly well insulated from one another, this causes no harm. In fact, social enterprise and activity are largely dependent on these culture patterns and the consensus they embody.

But when you have persons from different cultural backgrounds in frequent and significant contact, the possibility of misunderstanding and conflict is obvious. Until roughly the period of World War II the amount of this intercultural contact was comparatively limited, and national boundaries served as reasonably effective cultural cushions. Today, of course, the volume, complexity, and intensity of cross-cultural involvement and interdependence are increasing at a constantly accelerating rate, and it is almost truistic to observe that therein lies the source of many of the most perilous problems of our age.

Precisely and quite simply, the professional service rendered by the diplomat is *the minimizing of distortion and friction in cross-cultural communications and operations.* The service is available to a wide variety of possible clients, and in any number of functional specialties.

[2] Sir Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1950, ch. 5.

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Just as lawyers and physicians specialize within their professions, so too do diplomats. They can serve as overseas business executives, journalists, technical advisers, negotiators, economic analysts, foreign traders, and so on. But it is the professional service in its cross-cultural context that is the unifying and defining theme of the profession, overriding differences in subspecialty and cliency.

In rendering this service the diplomat finds himself operating *between* cultures, and sometimes in the midst of several simultaneously. To do this he must first break the crust of his own ethnocentrism, and in the process establish a stable balance of objectivity and attachment relative to his own mother culture. He must then acquire skill in "getting inside" foreign cultures to achieve the knowledge and understanding that will enable him to interpret them accurately and to operate smoothly in their milieus. In the past, experience has been relied upon as the principal teacher of this skill, and nothing will ever replace it or lessen its importance. But experience is a far better teacher if it is supported by disciplined training in more rigorous methods. We shall return to this, but first we must consider a bit more specifically the roles that the professional diplomat plays.

II. The Professional Role of Diplomacy

There is a prevalent tendency to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy and policy-making.[3] This results in part simply from imprecise usage, and in part from a confusion of roles. Professional diplomats often serve as policy-makers, just as lawyers not uncommonly serve as corporation officers and directors. The policy-making function should, however, be clearly distinguished from the diplomatic, just as the professional quality of the lawyer is distinguished from his role in the corporate management in the parallel circumstance. It is a distinction all too often blurred, as much today by the diplomats themselves as by the lay public.

The role of policy-making is by definition that of political leadership. In modern democracies, the reciprocal relationships between the leadership and the people, and the extent, limitations, and controls of the former's decision-making authority, are constitutionally defined. It is in the operation of these constitutional processes, in the democratic loop of responsibility, in the dynamic interplay between the leadership and the people through such media as the electoral system, the legislature, and the press, that national purposes and strategic objectives

[3] The tendency is not confined to the United States. See *ibid.*, pp. 12-14.

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are hammered out, and decisions made as to the allocation of national resources toward their achievement. It would be highly repugnant to the democratic philosophy of government to suggest that this vital policy-making role be delegated to a professional body.

Diplomacy has an important role to play relative to the policy process, but it is limited and should be specifically defined. To expect it to contribute more is not only to offend the democratic ethic, but also obscures the true location of the policy-making responsibility, which is with the political leadership. When this happens, relations between the profession and the political leadership and public are damaged, and trust and confidence lost, which in turn inhibits the proper exploitation of the professional services that diplomacy does afford.

The principal contribution of the diplomat to the policy process comes from his skill in *interpretation* between cultures. He utilizes this skill in two directions. He interprets and appraises for his client situations and developments in foreign cultural contexts, and he also acts as the advocate of his client in pursuing the latter's policy goals abroad.

His interpretive analyses of foreign situations are something more than straight intelligence. The latter is essentially empirical, dealing largely with things, situations, and events that are susceptible to observation, direct or indirect. Straight intelligence is very important indeed to the policy-maker, and the diplomat contributes his fair share to it. But it has very definite limitations, especially when it comes to the assessment of trends, intentions, attitudes, and patterns of motivation. Straight intelligence seldom speaks directly to these questions and, when it does, it is highly susceptible to illusion, false certainty, and plain error.

The diplomat, with his thorough and broad familiarity with the foreign culture concerned, and with his special skills and techniques in cross-cultural observation and analysis, can by deductive projection make highly accurate and reliable assessments of these subjective factors, which are virtually inaccessible by any other means. They cannot provide absolute certainty and should not pretend to. But when error does occur, it can almost invariably be traced to inexperience and lack of proper professional qualification.

Actually this kind of interpretive reporting has been carried on by diplomats ever since they acquired a reportorial function, and policy-makers have traditionally relied on it heavily and at times almost exclusively. With due allowance for occasional incompetence, the

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annals of diplomacy are ample testimony to the reliability of this reporting method. All we seek to do by professionalizing the function further is to identify it more clearly and distinguish it from straight intelligence, and perhaps also develop some more rigorous methods by the adaptation of scientific techniques.

Foreign policy decisions establish objectives, expressly or implicitly, most of which call for a particular posture or pattern of behavior, or its inhibition, on the part of a foreign government. It is therefore also the function of the diplomat in his role of advocate, to interpret his own government's position and actions, and the surrounding situation, to the foreign government in a way that will be maximally persuasive in inducing it to adopt the position desired by his client. Obviously his persuasive capabilities have limits, and in many circumstances no amount of persuasion will succeed. But by drawing on his familiarity with the foreign culture, especially its value and motivational pattern, he will get as far toward the objective as circumstances permit, and will insure against misunderstanding and unnecessary conflict.

Cross-cultural interpretation is therefore the basic professional function of the diplomat, but in carrying it out he performs even more critical services in the policy process than simple interpretive analysis and advocacy. For one thing, he monitors policy, reporting to the policy-maker how well the established policy-line is succeeding in the achievement of the desired goals. Quite commonly the means allotted will not result in the ends sought. Policy-makers do not often like to hear reports to this effect, though it is obviously important that they be made aware. Indeed the protection of the professional against the displeasure of the policy-maker in such circumstances is an important argument in favor of professionalization.

The most critical contribution of the diplomat is in the form of advice rendered when policy is in the process of formation. It is properly given in conditional propositions—"If you wish to accomplish foreign policy objectives *a*, *b*, and *c*, then it is necessary to do *x*, *y*, and *z*." This kind of advice he can render on professional authority. It must be emphasized, however, that in his professional capacity it is *not* his function to decide whether *a*, *b*, and *c* are the objectives to be pursued, or whether they are worth the price of *x*, *y*, and *z*; he has no professional basis for speaking with any special authority on the will of his own people, particularly since his attention is focused so much abroad. The making of these decisions is the ultimate responsibility of the political leadership, and even when such policy-making

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authority is delegated to professionals, the distinction between the portion of that authority that is based on professional competence, and that which rests on the delegation of extra-professional political responsibility should be clearly recognized.

The process of professionalization of diplomacy and the clear identification and definition of the special services it offers have been hindered and confused by the fact that a single type of consumer—national governments—has tended to dominate the market for professional diplomatic services, and has sought these services predominantly to serve the power interests of the state. This is as though most lawyers were tax advisers in the service of business corporations, and one attempted to define the role of the legal profession entirely in these terms.

There are certain political philosophies, in both the Hobbesian and the Hegelian tradition, which conceive the natural state of man to be a continuing struggle for power, a kind of eternal cold war. In this conception, diplomacy has but a single dimension—that of the power calculus—and consists essentially of the waging of war, by non-military means. This is not the place for philosophical debate, but let it be noted that this conception is the virtual contradictory of the conception of diplomacy here advanced, which rests on the assumption that friction and conflict are not the natural state of man but pathological conditions resulting to a great extent from the cross-cultural distortion which it is diplomacy's job to try to erase. In this latter view, the security and power factors are in no sense to be minimized or neglected, but it does suggest that international relations need not and should not be viewed solely in terms of power struggle, and that if the diplomat lets himself slip into the paranoid pattern of thinking of the power politician, he will seriously impair his professional competence.

Even in government service there is a wide spectrum of new kinds of functions being performed by the new kind of diplomat, functions requiring professional qualifications but related to power and security factors only indirectly at best. These are being performed in such fields as economic and technical assistance, cultural relations, and mass communications. Business may also be expected to have an increasing demand for a wide variety of professional diplomatic services as markets and productive operations expand in the world arena, and one can envisage a whole range of other non-governmental organizations operating across cultures, all of which will need diplomats to advise and assist them. Then, too, the number of international organizations and the variety of multi-national enterprises are in-

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creasing and further augmenting the demand. All this tends to break the national government's monopsony on the profession, and to suggest that the professional corps should be conceived in a much wider context than has been customary in the past.

In these new functions the roles played by the diplomat may not be so closely related to policy processes as was described above. Instead of skill in cross-cultural interpretation, it may be skill in collaboration in a foreign or mixed cultural environment that is called for. But the skill is nonetheless based on the same professional qualifications.

Finally, there are the supporting functions, especially in education and research. But these are so important that they require special consideration.

III. The Academic Challenge

There is a general disposition to look to the national government to take the primary initiative and responsibility for diplomatic training, and, as the major consumer, it should indeed do what it can to stimulate and facilitate it. But the government, *qua* consumer, has its own special interests which it stresses quite properly, but at the inevitable expense of a balanced professional approach. Moreover, in the environment of government are constraints and pressures that make it less than ideal for academic enterprise.

If the new diplomacy is ever to be soundly professionalized, the initiative and responsibility for developing and refining the distinctive intellectual technique on which it is based must be taken by the academic community. There is already in the latter a widespread recognition of the need to provide more and better educational offerings and facilities for those going into overseas service, and in the past fifteen years or so a remarkable and highly laudable amount of progress has been made toward this end.[4] But much more needs to be done, and the entire enterprise needs to be placed in sharper focus.

It has been argued that it is premature to consider training for overseas service as a new academic discipline in university organization. In one sense, this is quite true, for it involves neither a new field of study nor new methods different from those used by the older disciplines. But there is a difference here, and it is important to recognize and even institutionalize it. This lies in the fact that the new diplomacy is, in effect, the *applied* side of several of the standard disciplines whose usual emphasis is on *pure* research.

Certainly the pure side of learning is of vital importance. It is the

[4] Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams, *op.cit.*, Part IV.

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cutting edge of man's intellectual endeavor, and on the effectiveness of its techniques and the soundness of its findings the quality of practical performance will ultimately depend. But the quest for pure learning requires the inculcation of certain disciplined attitudes of mind, essential to its proper purpose, but inappropriate and even inhibiting when actual practical problems must be dealt with.

The pure scientist seeks accuracy above all else, and is prepared to sacrifice time to that end. He is meticulous in his methods, and quite properly seeks to guard them against improper use and incautious mixture with the methods of disciplines other than his own. He is able to select his fields of observation, and naturally and properly selects those wherein the methods at his disposal will give sharply accurate results. He is cautious in his conclusions and generalizations, preferring a posture of doubt to an untested and unreasoned formulation. This is in essence the rigor and discipline of the scientific method, the code of the pure scholar, on which rests the intellectual success of modern man.

But an exclusive or excessive orientation toward the pure side of learning can also have unfortunate results. It tends to lead to disciplinary parochialism, to the conversion of methodologies into ideologies, and to methodological possessiveness. It also contributes measurably to that wide and growing gulf that unfortunately exists between the world of science and scholarship and the world of affairs. Strangely enough, the social scientists have been among the worst offenders, reflecting perhaps a touch of scientific insecurity. There has been among them a general disinclination to modify their methods to meet the needs of application, while at the same time they have not been disposed to recognize and support a separate vocation for the task.

In practical affairs it is the problems that arise and must be dealt with that command and dictate the focus of attention. Conclusions must be drawn, recommendations made, and action taken, almost always on the basis of incomplete data and with at best limited certainty. One uses the best methods of judgment available, but they are seldom ideally suited to the task, and when there is nothing else to rely on, decisions must be made on the basis of intuition. The intuition may be completely uninformed, or it may be based on experience, in which case there would be a good bit of unstructured learning and method behind it. But at best it is hardly the most reliable basis of judgment. What is needed then is something between the perfectionism of pure science and the subjectivism of intuition.

It is our contention that a number of the methods and concepts from

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the research-oriented side of the social sciences and humanities can be modified and adapted to the needs of diplomacy. To carry out this task a body of scholars and educators must set themselves apart from those colleagues who are dedicated to pure science and, whether they call themselves a separate discipline or not, address themselves, not to exploring new frontiers of learning, but to the development of ways of applying existing methods to practical problems of diplomacy. They must come from all the pertinent disciplines, but they must be prepared to sacrifice some of their disciplinary loyalty to the practical needs of the problems posed.

What is called for is a division of effort comparable to that between the engineer and the physicist, between the physician and the biological theorist. The methods of the engineer and the physician are rigorous and sound, but there is a problem-orientation, a versatility, and a rough-and-ready pragmatism about them that gives them their utility in application, but that also distinguishes them from the perfectionism of pure research. It is exactly this kind of applied intellectual technique that must be defined and developed as the professional basis of the new diplomacy, and only the academic community can accomplish the task.

IV. The Curricular Base

Bearing in mind that we have defined the professional function of diplomacy as cross-cultural operations and interpretation, it is suggested that the professional curriculum should have two basic dimensions—methodology and area study. The first would consist of the direct study and development of techniques, adapted from the pure sciences, for observing, conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating cross-culturally. In the second, these techniques would actually be applied in multi-disciplinary area studies.

It must be remembered, of course, that the job of modification and adaptation of academic methods to the needs of diplomacy has hardly yet begun, so that at present we can only attempt a few suggestions in outline in the hope of pointing the way. The pertinent methods are those of the behavioral sciences—specifically, cultural anthropology, psychology, linguistics, sociology, social cybernetics, political science, economics, history, and philosophy. In organizing and adapting these methodologies to meet the requirements of professional diplomatic training and application, it is suggested that they can usefully be subdivided into three distinguishable subgroups according to their re-

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spective objects of study—culture patterns, social processes, and value systems. These are in effect merely three ways of viewing the same general field, but as each is based on its own set of concepts and methods, it is convenient to classify them separately.

Since the very definition of the diplomatic profession rests upon it, the culture concept should probably be the starting point of professional training. Anthropology is the disciplinary source of this concept, and should be called upon to present culture theory and related methodology duly adapted to meet the needs of application. In doing this, the usual anthropological emphasis on primitive tribes must give way to greater stress on contemporary and sophisticated cultures, and on processes of cultural change and modernization. This entire theme can and should be supported by materials and methods from other disciplines. Thus the historian can support the theme of cultural change. The psychologist can explain the effect of acculturation on the formation of personality types and on perception. The linguistic scientist can elaborate the role of language as the mold of culture and the vehicle of its transmission, and the problems that can arise in intercultural communication. This is merely to sketch some of the possibilities that the culture-oriented behavioral sciences afford, and it must be stressed that the objective should be to teach the student ways in which he can conceptualize, observe, and analyze in a multicultural context in the later course of his professional practice.

Since the diplomat in his cross-cultural operations is dealing almost entirely with social processes, he also needs competence in the methods that have been developed by the behavioral sciences for their study. Here the sociologist can contribute conceptual and analytical tools for dealing with social organizations, such as a comparative typology covering both traditional and legal-rational, or bureaucratic, structures, theories of social dynamics, and the useful notion of status and role. Social cybernetics in its turn can treat of the processes of social communication and control. Political science would cover the allocation of authority in society and decision-making processes, and economics would deal with the production and distribution of goods and services. All these processes are interrelated, and the professional who is going to have to deal with them practically should be able to look at them from all viewpoints. Thus the training approach should have unity in the objective field—social processes—but variety in the conceptual and analytical methods for dealing with it. Needless to say, the effects of cultural difference and change on social processes should constantly be stressed.

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The third subgroup of methods comprises those that deal with the comparative analysis of value systems or ideologies. It is true that value systems are integral parts of culture patterns, and are dealt with in the study thereof, but the characteristic method used in such culturological study is empirical description. The approach suggested in this third category would stress rather the logical structure of value systems, and lead ultimately to the development of a capacity for critical analysis. It is a field that has been aptly termed "philosophical anthropology," and it is not being adequately covered at present by the standard disciplines. The classical, Europe-centered philosophical tradition is of course well taught, but there is generally an inadequate appreciation of non-European systems, and of the connection between underlying culturally based assumptions and formal ideological systems. What is needed is more anthropologically minded philosophers with experience in non-European traditions of thought. Professor Northrop of Yale has best developed these methods,[5] and his work has actually been used with great success in several Foreign Service training projects. History and the humanities may also be drawn on here for supporting materials and methods. This study of comparative ideology is a particularly important phase of professional training, for it illuminates the logical connections between primitive cultural postulates on the one hand, and more rational ideologies and patterns of purposive behavior on the other, and it is only by awareness of these connections and their motivational significance that the diplomat can effectively interpret and influence policies and attitudes cross-culturally.

Finally, it is a small step from this kind of comparative, descriptive analysis of value systems in general to the critical evaluation of value systems, including one's own. It involves turning the same methods of analysis onto one's own ideologies and methodologies, to become aware of their underlying assumptions and logical ramifications, and of their strengths, their limitations and weaknesses, and then their critical comparison with others. This is an important final step, for without it the student is left floundering in a sea of cultural relativism, an occupational hazard that must be foreseen and guarded against. One must, on the other hand, also guard against dogmatism in evaluation—which is why the critical approach is suggested as best suited to the normative needs of the diplomat.

To recapitulate, we have recommended that the full range of methods

[5] F. S. C. Northrop, *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics*, New York, 1960, and *The Meeting of East and West*, New York, 1946.

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used by the behavioral sciences for the study of culture patterns, social processes, and value systems be drawn upon, and that the techniques be adapted to meet the needs of the diplomat in observing, conceptualizing, and analyzing cross-culturally, and finally in critically evaluating his own and other ideologies and methodologies.

Parallel with this study of methods, and affording examples and practice in their use, it is recommended that the student of diplomacy be given a great deal of area study, which would constitute the second basic dimension of the professional curriculum. This kind of multi-disciplinary approach to the study of distinctive culture areas is peculiarly appropriate for diplomatic training, as it constitutes the nearest academic analog to actual experience in a variety of foreign environments. It is suggested, therefore, that at least three or four foreign culture areas be covered during, say, a three-year professional course at the graduate level, and that at least one of these should be European and one Asian.

To cover so many foreign culture areas naturally requires a limitation on the depth and detail in which any one could be presented. Actually this is not too much of a drawback in professional diplomatic training, for it must be remembered that it is the function of the diplomat to operate *between* cultures, and sometimes—especially at the higher levels of responsibility—to operate among a number of them simultaneously. This implies that breadth, versatility, and balance are actually more important to him than depth and detail. It is true that in the journeyman stages of a diplomatic career it is normal to develop in depth a specialty in one area, or maybe two, and to spend a number of years dealing with them. Even here, however, the specialization cannot be total or exclusive. The pure scholar can profitably and appropriately devote a lifetime to the study of a single culture, but the diplomat cannot, without paying a price in loss of perspective and versatility that damages seriously his professional usefulness.

The multi-disciplinary area study approach can also be used most effectively in the study in depth of the home or mother culture. One of the most important and delicate tasks in professional diplomatic training is to break the student's crust of ethnocentrism without damaging the roots of loyalty and preference for the mother culture. He must be taught to objectify it and to see it as of the same fabric as other stranger cultures, but he also needs an even greater understanding and attachment to it than do his peers who will not be leaving its environment. This task, it is suggested, can best be accomplished

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by using the area study technique vis-à-vis the home culture, but in much greater depth and detail, perhaps as an area study carried on over the entire professional course, parallel with the foreign area studies, and using the same methods and approaches.

Before leaving the question of the professional curriculum it may be well to note the importance of a good and broad grounding in such fields as geography, history, government, economics, and the humanities, before even undertaking the professional study recommended. The curriculum suggested above is not to be viewed as a substitute for such orthodox subjects, but rather as a focalizing supplement directed to the particular needs of the diplomatic profession.

Training in foreign languages is also an obvious necessity for the professional student of diplomacy, though it does not occupy quite the central position that is popularly supposed. It is a necessary tool, and every professional student should have "broken the tongue" in a world language in the course of his education. The study of exotic languages and "the language of the post" might well be left to later, however, when the study of the language and its use are closer together in time.

It has not been our intention here to offer specific and detailed suggestions on course structure or academic mechanics, but simply to advocate as a broad and basic pattern for professional diplomatic training the dual emphasis on methodologies and on area studies or fields of application. This kind of multi-disciplinary, pragmatic approach, which stresses the development of skill in the use of techniques for dealing with practical problems, rather than the accumulation of knowledge or the carrying-out of pure research, is that recommended as best suited, when augmented by practical experience, to develop the quality of professional diplomatic performance to its optimum.

Perhaps the day will come when every citizen is trained to operate cross-culturally, when we will have a sort of mass diplomacy. When that day arrives, civilization may be considered to have come of age and we will have no need for diplomatic specialists.

In the meantime, however, we must rely on the members of a professional group—the new diplomats—to function as the ball-bearings on which the wheels of international relations roll. While each diplomat has his own special orientation to his mother culture and his own loyalty of cliency, together the diplomats of the world constitute an international freemasonry dedicated to peace and the community of all peoples. As such they are one of the main hopes for a saner world.

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The diplomats cannot solve the problems of mankind, but they can help to reduce unnecessary conflict and misunderstanding, and to assure that issues are at least clear and real, and not based on phantom, myth, or mismatched codes. Theirs is obviously a critical function in this perilous age, and humanity owes it to itself to assure that their performance is facilitated and supported, and its quality cultivated.

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THE CHANGEABILITY OF A DICTATORSHIP

By ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON

Dictatorship is destiny.

THE following reflections have been occasioned by the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Their purpose is to try to grasp the nature and to gauge the extent of the change between the Russia of today and that of Stalin's time. Naturally, no more can be done within the scope of a brief paper than to indicate some of the areas that may be relevant in this connection and to arrive at some provisional conclusions. In looking for those areas, various curiosities and incongruities of the Moscow Congress may serve as guiding beacons.

I

Some of those incongruities are more conspicuous than others. Thus, no one could possibly fail to notice the strange fate that befell the main business of the great gathering. Ostensibly, the Congress had been convoked in order to discuss the new Party Program, "the program for building the Communist society."[1] Once more the vision of the ultimate goal was to be conjured up. The consummation of long yearnings, the redemption of ideological promises, the end justifying long and appalling miseries were pronounced to be within the grasp of the living generation. Much time was indeed devoted to the subject. And yet this is hardly what the Twenty-second Congress will be remembered for. There is little doubt that in the card catalogue of history the Congress will be filed under the headings of "Critique of Stalin, Stalinists, and Stalinism" and "Power Struggle with China." The nakedness of the latter was somewhat disguised by leaves fallen from Albanian fig trees. The former, by contrast, was moved from the twilight of secret meetings into the bright sun of full publicity. The past and the present had vied with the future and the day was theirs.

It is quite consistent with this result, though perhaps a trifle less obvious, that an attempt was made in the Program and at the Congress to extend the present into the future, as it were, by claiming that

[1] *Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Moscow, 1961, p. 6.

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the great change to come required absence of change in the meantime. Stalin, it was revealed, had no correct conception of the prerequisites of Communist society. He believed the road to be much shorter. In particular, he did not appreciate the necessity for first laying "the material-technical basis" for the Communist system. He did not understand that only "after having fully exhausted the progressive role of socialist principles was it possible to attain the full establishment of communist principles."[2]

As nearly as one can understand the meaning of such pronouncements, they purport to stress the necessity for continuing for the next twenty years the high rate of industrial growth and the stress on output of producers' goods, and for leaving essentially unchanged the very considerable inequalities in the income structure. Because Stalin failed to grasp those necessities, his last study on the *Economic Problems of Socialism*, once acclaimed as the work of genius, is now found to be woefully deficient and altogether unsuitable to "serve as the basis of the new program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."[3]

These strictures seem rather undeserved by the fallen idol. Stalin did specify a long list of preconditions that must be fulfilled—in accordance with Marx, he said—before "it will be possible to pass from the socialist formula . . . to the communist formula . . . ,"[4] and, what is more, he steadfastly kept asserting the "law" according to which a higher rate of growth of output of producers' goods than of consumers' goods is a necessary condition of economic growth. "Without the predominant growth of producers' goods it is altogether impossible to achieve economic growth."[5] As a theoretical proposition, the "law" was sheer nonsense, since a positive rate of growth can conceivably be achieved with a zero (or even a negative) rate of net investment. But as a principle of practical action it was eminently important, expressing the will to continue the policy of investment for the sake of investment while keeping down the levels of consumption as much as possible.

It is true, of course, that after Stalin's death his successors were unable to continue Stalin's policy in all its grim severity. The struggle for power that went on behind the smoke screen of collective leadership forced the participants to court popular favor by conceding some increases in the output of consumers' goods. The "Stalinist"

[2] Cf. the speech by Mikoyan, *Pravda*, October 22, 1961, p. 7.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism*, New York, 1952, p. 53.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

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Malenkov, who promised to fulfill the fifth Five-Year Plan for consumers' goods in four rather than five years, was overthrown by Khrushchev, allegedly because of Malenkov's failure to recognize the vital importance of heavy industry in the process of growth. But the "anti-Stalinist" Khrushchev continued Malenkov's policy of keeping the rate of growth of output of consumers' goods above that which had prevailed in the days of Stalin's rule. On the other hand, Khrushchev has faithfully retained Stalin's policy of letting producers' goods grow faster than consumers' goods. According to the long-run estimates for the next two decades, the share of consumers' goods in total industrial output is scheduled to fall from 32.2 per cent in 1960 to 25.7 per cent in 1980.[6] "Heavy industry," Khrushchev added, "always played and will continue to play the leading role in the growth of output."[7]

Almost exactly nine years before Khrushchev's performance at the Twenty-second Congress, his hapless rival, Malenkov, then the heir apparent of the Kremlin, was presenting the main address to the Nineteenth Congress. Stalin's previously mentioned study had appeared a short time before and Malenkov's speech was interlarded with generous quotations from it. He stressed, therefore, the "predominant growth of producers' goods" and reminded the Congress that "Comrade Stalin has issued insistent warnings against frivolous haste in the transition to higher economic forms without prior creation of necessary preconditions for such a transition."[8]

This time it was Khrushchev and Mikoyan who continued the traditional line. Neither criticism of Stalin's detailed views about the road to communism nor the addition of further "qualitative preconditions" (such as growing "socialization of incomes") in the speeches of the present masters must be allowed to disguise a basic fact:[9] an economy of higher consumers' levels and general abundance would ill-agree with the continued existence of totalitarian dictatorship. The dictators, therefore, have a vested and vital interest in keeping the elusive goal within sight but out of reach. This means that as the

[6] Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda*, October 19, 1961, p. 3.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] G. M. Malenkov, "Otchetnyi Doklad XIX S'ezdu Partii o rabote Tsentral'nogo Komiteta VKP(b)" (The Report to the Nineteenth Congress of the Party on the Work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolsheviks]), *Bol'shevik*, No. 19 (October 1952), pp. 58 and 60.

[9] With regard to the "qualitative preconditions," many a Soviet citizen must have wondered whether the prospect of receiving gratis from the government a variety of things ranging from children's clothing to housing implied an improvement in the standard of living or merely a further limitation of the freedom of choice.

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Soviet economy develops, more and more stringent preconditions for the advent of the Communist society must be laid down. At the last Congress, Stalin was accused by Mikoyan of having unduly simplified the transition to communism.[10] But if there was one thing for which Stalin could be trusted, it was for a fine sense of the mechanics of exercising power. If he were still alive and in power, he could be relied upon to add some complications to the alleged simplifications and to see to it that the eternal goal would remain *on* the horizon but also would move *with* the horizon.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the reasons for the savage vehemence with which the present rulers of the Soviet state have turned against the past—which after all is also their own—and against some of their former associates. Continuation of the power struggle within the Communist Party, connections between the opposition to Khrushchev and the Chinese government, above all the dire need of any dictatorship to have enemies to combat, to say nothing of rankling memories of past humiliations and rivalries—all these, severally and together, are some possible reasons for what happened at the Congress and in its aftermath. The ejection of Stalin's body (assuming that no mere import from, or imitation of a product of, Madame Tussaud's had been on exhibition in the mausoleum); the change of the name of a city the battle for which has been deeply engraved into recent history as the great turning point of the last war; the revelation of some flagrant cases of inhuman cruelties committed by Stalin and his associates (even though what was presented was no more than a few well-selected samples, and the horrible statistics of murders in the cellars of the secret police and deaths in remote prison camps, which must run into many millions, have been withheld)—these events could not help capturing the imagination of the world. But the rapidly unfolding change in some areas must not blind us to its absence in others. The elements of stability are no doubt less dramatic, but they may be more important for grasping the nature of the present-day government in Soviet Russia and for plotting the course it is steering. In fact, the question must be raised whether the sound and fury of de-Stalinization is not accompanied by a powerful process leading in the opposite direction, one of the functions of the former being to deflect attention from the latter.

From what has been said above, it would seem indeed that very little has changed in the attitude of the Soviet rulers toward the establishment of communism. Khrushchev quite naturally inherited

[10] Cf. Mikoyan's speech, *loc.cit.*

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from Stalin the position that—*mutatis mutandis*—had been preassigned to both of them in Ivan Karamazov's *Legend*. As said before, it does not require searching study to see the stability of that position as well as to perceive its natural corollary—i.e., the grand line of economic policy to be pursued. Nevertheless, some telling details have perhaps failed so far to receive the attention they deserve. Thus one should not overlook Khrushchev's momentous reference—dropped in passing—to the need to observe strict "proportionalities" in economic development and to the "important role to be played in that respect by the recently formed enlarged economic regions and the councils that have been organized in those regions for co-ordinating and planning the work of the *Sovnarkhozy*."[11] The last-named are the National Economy Councils, about one hundred of which were set up in May 1957 and endowed with far-reaching competence in administering the industry of the individual regions. Since the *Sovnarkhozy* assumed the functions formerly exercised by the economic ministries in Moscow, their establishment was an act of radical decentralization of industrial organization.

It was and, to some extent, still is popular to explain this change as a natural result of the preceding economic growth: Soviet industry, it is said, has reached, quantitatively and qualitatively, a level at which it has become so complex as to defy and defeat centralized administration. It is quite probable that Soviet industrial enterprises work more efficiently if they receive general guidance and supervision from a local center rather than from Moscow. It is even conceivable that maximum efficiency would be reached with the minimum of direction from above, be it central or local. But it is not at all clear that from the point of view of the Soviet government such gains in efficiency are not more than offset by other factors.

First of all, decentralization under conditions of continuing scarcities of consumers' goods almost inevitably shifts the activities of many enterprises towards better satisfaction of the needs of the local population and away from the production of producers' goods; there was plenty of evidence of how difficult it was for the Soviet government to obtain secure knowledge as to what was really going on within the individual enterprises. It is true that the *Sovnarkhoz* finds itself closer to the enterprise and may know more about its inner workings; but it is also true that the local authority has much less incentive to uphold the national plan and is naturally much more interested in its own region.

[11] Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda*, October 18, 1961, p. 6.

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It would be most surprising if, for instance, the regional authorities failed to tolerate various barter transactions among the enterprises within the region. Such barter transactions, deflecting goods from their planned routes, are bound to enhance regional autarkies. Dealings of this sort may indeed have served to lessen the rigidity of the plan and by the same token to alleviate difficulties in inter-plant supplies—that perennial weakness of the Soviet economy. This presumably was the reason why they were not stamped out by Stalin and his secret police, even though their existence must have been gall and wormwood to the central planners and to the dictator himself. Within the centralized framework, however, their extent could be held in check. At all times, the various barter transactions, apart from being a source of illegal enrichment for the managers, also tended to affect the composition of output in favor of consumers' goods, which were transmitted to local consumers in various ways—often in the form of effective incentive or merely "popularity" wages paid by the managers of industrial enterprises.

Furthermore, decentralization inevitably diminishes the reliability of statistical and other information that is made available to the central planning authorities. Khrushchev has had plenty of opportunity to complain bitterly about the deceptions practiced on him by local agricultural authorities. It would be improbable in the extreme if very similar problems had not arisen in the field of industrial reporting. There is little doubt that, since the decentralization, Soviet industrial statistics as published by the central authorities must be taken with even greater caution than before.

It is therefore not surprising that the dangers and hazards of decentralization began to be discussed in the Soviet press almost as soon as the measures concerning industrial reorganization were initiated. An old word, *mestnichestvo*, which in the sixteenth century was mostly used to describe the order of precedence of Russian *boyars* at official functions and became charged with the connotation of squabbling pettiness, has been revived in new semantic guise to mean "localism," the remembrance of its old derogatory meaning readily merging with the new disparagements.

If the Soviet government is so keenly alive to what must appear to it as the negative features of decentralization, the question arises as to why decentralized organization was introduced in the first place. Are we really to believe that it was done in order to increase the efficiency of Soviet industry and that the undesirable consequences of the new arrangement were simply underestimated by Khrushchev? Such

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an error is highly improbable because of the long preceding history of local evasions of the central plan. There was a body of painful experience that any Soviet leader was unlikely to ignore. It is therefore much more plausible to assume that decentralization was introduced, in full knowledge of the risks involved, as a temporary measure designed to accomplish a specific purpose—the demolition of the bureaucratic staffs in the numerous economic ministries. Those staffs had been largely built up by, and were loyal to, men who turned out to be Khrushchev's enemies. The establishment of the *Sovnarkhozy* should therefore be considered as the first step on the devious road to the creation of a new bureaucracy loyal to the victorious group. The setting up of the new councils in the enlarged regions was the second step.

These councils are expected "to co-ordinate and to plan." Altogether, seventeen of them have been established. While the original regional councils have been preserved, there can be no doubt at all that important functions of the latter have been—or will be—transferred to the new councils. It is curious to see attempts in the Soviet press to present the new organizations as something that has been in existence in Soviet Russia for almost forty years.[12] These claims of continuity are, of course, unjustifiable, even though their political purpose is fairly obvious. This *is* an important innovation, a thorough upheaval of a fairly recent and much praised reform. It is in fact not unlikely at all that, after some period of lingering uncertainty, the *Sovnarkhozy* will disappear altogether. The newly created units, it should be noted, are large enough *not* to enjoy whatever advantages of proximity to individual enterprises were available to the smaller units. On the other hand, they are still too far removed from the center of government to satisfy the needs of the dictatorship. The present arrangement, there-

[12] Cf., e.g., *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, July 1, 1961, p. 2. It appears that the joint ordinance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and of the Council of Ministers establishing the regional councils was passed sometime in May 1961. As this manuscript goes to press (March 1962), one must note that *Pravda* (February 23, 1962) at length broke its silence on the subject ("in response to readers' inquiries") and devoted twelve columns and an editorial to a discussion of the reform. Though the *Sovnarkhozy* are praised as the "most practical form of industrial organization," they are criticized because of both "localist" tendencies and inability or unwillingness to eliminate excessively long hauls. The paper is obviously anxious to soften the blow. The same issue contains selected replies of functionaries of the *Sovnarkhozy* to *Pravda*'s questionnaire on the reform. It is noteworthy that all the replies carefully refrain from answering the question as to how, in the opinion of the respondent, the reform will affect the activities of the *Sovnarkhozy*. The delay in discussing the reform and the character of the discussion seem to testify rather clearly both to the importance of the change and to the existence of considerable opposition to it.

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fore, may be safely regarded as an intermediate one. The reinstitution of economic ministries in Moscow in one form or another may be expected to occur as the final step in the complex maneuver. If this interpretation is correct, what on the face of it appears as de-Stalinization may well upon closer examination emerge as a considered step on the road to re-Stalinization.

There is an inveterate tendency to approach Soviet developments in terms of long-range historical speculations gleaned from Western experience. These speculations stress the dominant role of the economic or, rather, the technological factor and its determining impact upon the course of events. This is a comforting view. Naturally, technology is the area in which the differences between Soviet Russia and the West are at a minimum. It is tempting to think that "in the end" all other parts of the Soviet body social will adjust themselves to the requirements of technology. In this fashion, the Russian evolution seems to become comprehensible. Whatever the strange deviations, the final outcome will be a society closely resembling that of the West. W. W. Rostow's thought moved along similar lines when he tried to accommodate Soviet Russia within his universal scheme of economic development.[13]

The trouble with this sort of view is its failure to understand the *modus operandi* of a totalitarian dictatorship and, in particular, the mechanics of the exercise of power within such a system. Once the role of power is properly evaluated, it becomes extremely likely that under the specific Russian conditions a decentralized industrial structure would be untenable even if the local authorities were not trying to circumvent or to distort the general intentions of the government. For dictatorial power tends to erode unless it is maintained intact through an incessant series of acts of command followed by corresponding acts of obedience. It is for this reason that dictators so often allow themselves to fall prey to the *fascinatio nugacitatis*. The concern with detail, including the trifling detail, is irresistible. This is the force that caused Napoleon to keep dispatching orders from his battlefields to the far corners of subjugated Europe—from the plains of Russia to the Kingdom of Naples—in order to assert his will regarding the importation of a parcel of textiles or the establishment of a small machine shop. Decentralization means delegation of power and delegation of dictatorial power means its diminution. If decentralization and dictatorship are found side by side, it is safe to predict

[13] W. W. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth: An Anti-Communist Manifesto*, New York, 1960, pp. 93-105.

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that in the long run one of them will give way. In this particular case, the run has not been very long.

Two areas of Soviet policies have been touched upon so far. In one—that of basic economic policy and attitudes toward establishment of a Communist society—the main principles of Stalin's era seem to have remained unchanged. In the second, it appears that the change that did take place was deliberately made as a prelude to its unmaking at a later date; the change, as it were, was a prerequisite for return to stability. But there is also a third area where the change that occurred was spontaneous rather than a well-premeditated political maneuver. This area is Soviet literature, and it is instructive indeed to take a somewhat closer look at its treatment at the Congress.

II

In a beautiful and proud poem, Friedrich Schiller once described the neglect of German literature at the courts of the German princes. No Augustan or Medicean age, he said, had ever smiled upon the poets of the German *settecento*. The great work was not created in the shadow of the throne. The result was a free art defying and scorning the trammels of imposed rules.[14] This poem is of considerable historical moment. Written at the pinnacle of German literary history, it is informed by a high sense of independence and achievement. It is very tempting to accept it as the voice of the German *tiers état*, extolling freedom from the State and rejecting *l'art poétique*, that literary analogue to Colbertian economic regimentation. Indeed, there may be much plausibility in such an interpretation.

The Soviet experience, however, is very different. The "proletarian"

[14] Kein Augustisch Alter bluehte,
Keines Medizeers Guete
Laechelte der deutschen Kunst.
Sie ward nicht gepflegt vom Ruhme,
Sie entfaltete die Blume
Nicht am Strahl der Fuerstengunst.
Von dem groessten deutschen Sohne,
Von des grossen Friedrichs Throne
Ging sie schutzlos, ungeehrt.
. . . . . .
Ruehmend darfs der Deutsche sagen,
Hoeher darf das Herz ihm schlagen:
Selbst erschuf er sich den Wert.
Darum steigt in hoeherm Bogen,
Darum stroemt in vollern Wogen
Deutscher Barden Hochgesang.
Und in eigner Fuelle schwellend
Und aus Herzens Tiefe quellend,
Spottet er der Regeln Zwang.

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art in Russia cannot complain of neglect and indifference by the State. The history of the past decades offers convincing testimony to the contrary. And the present time is no exception. While setting the pace of the country's further economic growth, sitting in judgment on Stalin and selected Stalinists, and settling down to a war of attrition with Albania, the Congress still found time to listen to a number of speeches dealing with the Soviet literary scene. What then were the attitudes revealed in those speeches and in what respects do they differ from those prevailing during the lifetime of the now defamed and de-monumented tyrant?

The very first discussion speaker, following Khrushchev's two impressive demonstrations of durative oratory, was P. N. Demichev, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the Communist Party—in other words, the city boss of the capital. He dealt with some problems of economic development of the city and its housing problems, formulating as the "immutable law" of Soviet economic growth "the achievement in the interest of society of *maximal* results at *minimal* costs." From this piece of time-honored logical illiteracy, Demichev moved over to discuss alcoholism, delinquency, and rowdyism—which served as a rational approach to the problems of Soviet literature:

"A great role in the formation of the new man must be played by literature and art. In the last few years, their importance in the Communist education of the people has kept growing. There is an undeviating process of consolidation of the creative forces in the service of party principles. This is the result of the powerful impact of our building up the Communist society; it is the result of the wholesome creative atmosphere which surrounds the life and work of our people. This is due to the Party, to its Central Committee, and personally to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who with much care and attention has been educating writers and painters and helping them to reach a deeper understanding of complex phenomena of life and to correct their mistakes before it is too late. It is a pleasure indeed to notice that contemporaneous themes have taken leading positions in all genres of literature and art. Many a work of art has been created in which the heroic deeds of Soviet people, their thoughts and their yearnings, have been imprinted."[15]

This is a most satisfactory picture, suggesting an unprecedented flowering of the Russian literary genius. Nine years ago, addressing himself to the same subject, Malenkov said while Stalin listened: "A

[15] *Pravda*, October 20, 1961, p. 2.

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most important, an indispensable, part of Soviet culture is literature and art. We have attained great achievements in the development of Soviet literature, theater, and movies. This is clearly demonstrated by the Stalin Prizes which every year are awarded to many talented figures in those fields."[16]

This, too, was praise, but it was brief and restrained. It was not surprising, therefore, that Malenkov continued with a couple of passages that were not laudatory at all. They deserve to be quoted at length:

"Nevertheless, it would be incorrect not to notice behind the great achievements of our literature and art very considerable shortcomings. The point is that, despite all success in developing literature and art, the ideological and artistic level[17] of many works is still insufficiently high. In literature and art there still appear many mediocre, nondescript, and sometimes simply trashy products that distort Soviet reality. The many-sided, bubbling life of the Soviet society is depicted in the work of some writers and painters in a listless and boring fashion. There are still some defects in as popular an art form as our cinema. We know how to produce good films of great educational significance. But such films are few. Our cinematography has all the opportunities for producing good and varying films, but those opportunities are poorly utilized.

"It is necessary to remember that the ideological and cultural level of the Soviet man has risen immeasurably; the taste of the Soviet man is formed by the Party, which in the process of education uses the very best works of literature and art. Soviet people do not tolerate anything that is nondescript, non-ideological, or not genuine. They expect much from our writers and artists. In their works our writers and artists must scourge the vices, the drawbacks, and the pathological phenomena that exist in our society; they must reveal in positive artistic images the new type of men in all the magnificence of their human dignity; in so doing, they will further the creation within our society of characters, customs, and traditions that are free from the vicious cancers grown by capitalism. But our novels and short stories and our plays and movies still avoid certain creative forms, such as, for instance, the satire. It is incorrect to think that Soviet reality offers no targets for the satirist. What we need are Soviet

[16] Malenkov, *loc.cit.*, p. 43.

[17] It should be noted that in Russian, which lends itself to Greek-like compounds, the word used is *ideologico-artistic*; the language itself, as it were, revealing through a forced unnatural union the real crux of the problem.

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Gogols and Shchedrins[18] whose satirical fire would burn out of our life all that is negative, that is decaying and dying, and retards our progress. Soviet literature and Soviet art must boldly show the contradictions and conflicts of our life. It must skillfully use the weapon of criticism as an instrument of education. . . . Our painters and writers . . . when engaged in their creative work of producing artistic images must remember that the typical is not only what one can see frequently; typical is what reveals most fully and clearly the very essence of a given social force. For a Marxian-Leninist the typical is by no means some statistical average. . . . The problem of the typical is a political problem. . . . The duty of our writers, painters, composers, and movie workers is to study more profoundly the life of the Soviet society and create considerable artistic works that are worthy of our great people."[19]

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the preceding quotation is the unconsciously self-satirical character of the loud clamor for satirical command performances; Malenkov spoke at a time when it was difficult indeed to write satire in Russia. The new examples of satirical art in Soviet Russia—in particular, the two novels by Ilf and Petrov, and Zoshchenko's short stories—had been withdrawn from bookselling and booklending circulation after the last war and were unknown to the younger generation. One is uncertain as to which was most naïve in Malenkov's text—the urgent invitation to the writers to be bold; or the serene assurance that Soviet life was not so perfect as to be out of the satirist's reach, coupled with the severe admonition not to concentrate too much upon unpleasant reality, which might indeed be all-pervasive and yet "not typical" at all; or, finally, the belief that dictatorial exhortation and appeal to duty could produce works of art along with machine tools and diesel locomotives. Nothing can surpass the naïveté of the hard-boiled. Stalin's regime had destroyed Russian literature. Its path was strewn with the dead bodies of poets and novelists. *Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione quaerentes?* Who could stand Malenkov complaining of the downfall of Russian art? The answer to the great satirist's question is that the Romans could not, but the Russians did.

Let us return to the Twenty-second Congress, to Demichev and his praise of Soviet authors so carefully and so effectively trained in Khrushchev's courses in creative writing. The unwary reader is all

[18] The reference is to N. V. Gogol (1809-1852) and to M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin (1826-1889).

[19] Malenkov, *loc.cit.*, pp. 43-44.

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ready to attribute the satisfactory position of Soviet literature to the break with the Stalinist past. But disappointment is just around the corner. For Demichev also let his praise be followed by complaint and stricture. He, too, deserves to be heard fully:

"But our reality which hastens toward communism expects even more from art and literature. In our immediate proximity, in mills and factories, on state farms and collective farms, in scientific laboratories and on construction sites, toil thousands of men who have covered themselves with glory. They are the builders of communism. Their lives deserve to be depicted colorfully and vigorously. Nevertheless, in literature, on the screen, on painters' canvasses, we sometimes observe nothing but pale, inexpressive shadows; characters drawn outside of time and space. In particular, there are the complaints leveled against those working in the most popular of arts—the cinema. Studios in Moscow and elsewhere have issued a number of good pictures, but very often we get films that are weak both ideologically and artistically."[20]

This is striking indeed. So far the correspondence between the two speeches in structure, substance, and even vocabulary is very close. Did Demichev, too, then proceed to issue orders to the writers, painters, and movie producers to engage forthwith in bold, creative, preferably satirical, activities? He did nothing of the sort:

"The Party," he went on to say, "has always emphasized that the political and ethical education of the people proceeds in the course of unrelenting struggles with the poisonous bourgeois influences. Against the background of our rich spiritual life and of our achievements in literature and art it is particularly intolerable that certain immature writers, painters, composers—young people, as a rule—suffer from such diseases as pseudo-innovationalism and formalism in art. True, their number is infinitely small, but if the illness is not stopped at its incipience, it may become dangerous. . . . [carried away by] a grotesque play of colors and shadows, by pretentious rhymes and sounds, some of our creative workers are prevented from perceiving the emaciated hopelessness and the ideological vacuousness of the contemporary bourgeois culture. And there are also some people who are trying to cover absence of talent and industry with a screen of pseudo-innovationalism. And the most surprising thing is that some of our considerable writers and art specialists fear to appear old-fashioned; they flirt with those seekers after novelties and try to speak their language. Those mistakes in the creative activities of writers and painters stem from inadequate knowledge of life. It is

[20] *Pravda*, October 20, 1961, p. 2.

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impossible to write of Communist labors and of the great accomplishments of Soviet people simply by observing reality through the windows of one's Moscow apartment or through brief creative inspection trips. . . ."[21]

This is a fairly complex situation, at least on the face of it. At the same Congress at which Malenkov is denounced as one of Stalin's henchmen, laden with full measure of guilt for the dictator's heinous crimes, a high Party official makes pronouncements on art and literature that appear to have been cribbed from Malenkov's speech delivered under Stalin's auspices. Of course, it makes no difference whether in fact an act of plagiarism was committed (permissible, for the rest, under the laws of warfare as a trophy taken from the defeated enemy), or whether it was the spiritual affinity reinforced by the standardized jargon that produced the bewildering result. But the confusion becomes complete when it is realized that the plagiarism, if it be one, had to remain abortive: the end of Malenkov's statement could not be included in Demichev's speech *because it would have been much too liberal* for the needs of those who had been so eagerly engaged in pillorying Stalin's rather illiberal policies. The point is that even as it was denouncing the misdeeds of the past, the Congress proceeded to mount an attack against contemporary Soviet figures in the literary field.

Demichev's speech had sounded the clarion call. Its notes were then repeated and varied upon by other speakers. In particular, E. A. Furtseva, who occupied in the Soviet Cabinet the position of "Minister of Culture," insisted that the main reason for the large number of "mediocre and simply weak works" produced lay in the remoteness of writers from the life of the people. She went on to divulge "very important data," showing that "For instance, in the Russian Federal Socialist Soviet Republic [i.e., by far the largest part of the USSR], out of a total of 2,700 writers, no less than 1,700 resided in Moscow or Leningrad." And she proceeded to advocate a dispersal of that concentration by urging the writers (and painters) to betake themselves to virgin lands in the east and other remote corners of the country.[22]

The leader of the *Komsomol* (the Union of Communist Youth), S. P. Pavlov, claimed that Soviet youth welcomed books and films which contain "the great truth about the Soviet man" and present "heroes in whom one wants to believe and whom one wants to imitate." But Soviet youth, he explained, reject works in which primary

[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Cf. *Pravda*, October 22, 1961, p. 2.

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attention is devoted to the adventures of a pitiful, tiny group of "scrofulous youths." Pavlov then referred to the journal *Yunost'* (Youth), in which, he said, those strange tendencies had become pronounced, and he also upbraided some movie directors who had shown unwarranted haste in deciding to film two novels published in *Yunost'*.[23] Similarly, M. A. Sholokhov, a central figure in Soviet literature and, on the speakers' tribune of the Congress, a faithful reproduction of Sholokhov's own creation—the clowning old Shchukar'[24]—turned serious for a moment to refer to Furtseva's "truly horrifying figures" concerning the writers' preference for residence in the large urban centers and preferably in Moscow, and he too stigmatized *otryv ot zhizni*, the writers' isolation from real life, as the main source of their literary inadequacies and shortcomings.[25] These similarities are hardly coincidental. There is little doubt that they reflect obedience by the speakers to a common set of instructions. The purpose of those instructions was well summarized by Propaganda Chief Il'ichev, who after having provided some further revelations of acts of censorship and suppression committed by Stalin went on to say: "The contemporary situation presents the ideological workers [sic!] with higher and qualitatively different demands. What are these demands? First of all, ideological work must make the greatest possible contribution to the creative upsurge which the whole Party is experiencing at present. Propaganda and agitation, the press, radio, television, popular lectures, *literature and art*—the whole ideological front must be converted into a more active factor for transforming all sides of life of Soviet society in the spirit of Communist principles."[26] Thus the Russian novelists and playwrights—the ideological workers—need not live in fear of neglect. They will not be left alone and the Soviet government will redeem the promise of the new Party Program "to take unrelenting care to assure the flowering of literature."[27]

III

As one reads the oratorical efforts which have been summarized in the preceding section, one cannot help wondering what reaction these speakers produced in the minds of the delegates to the Congress and, particularly, in the minds of the many millions of readers of the Soviet

[23] *Pravda*, October 25, 1961, p. 5.
[24] Cf. M. Sholokhov, *Podnyataya tselina* (Virgin Land Under Plough), Moscow, 1960, Book II, *passim*.
[25] *Pravda*, October 25, 1961, p. 7.
[26] *Pravda*, October 26, 1961, p. 3; italics added.
[27] *Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, op.cit.*, p. 131.

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newspapers that, day in and day out, carried the stenographic records of the proceedings. Naturally, the thoughts expressed were not new to them. They had heard them stated many times in the course of the decades. They also have come to know full well that repetitiveness is an apparently indispensable technique of totalitarian policy, and they must still remember how for many years the festive Proclamation for the First of May contained an entirely unchanged formula —uncharming in its simplicity—requiring the writers and the artists to continue producing works of great artistic value. Moreover, the slogan used on this occasion in recent times has changed very little.[28] And yet the incongruity of the situation and the tristesse of the involuntary humor were only underscored by Sholokhov's deliberate gaiety and could not possibly pass unnoticed. As Stalin's crimes were told and the story of atrocities unfolded, one victim of the dictatorship remained altogether unmentioned: the unprecedented decline of Russian literature; the transformation of a great art stemming from a great tradition into a mechanical process of mass-fabricating standardized products according to patterns prescribed by the dictatorship and varying in response to its changing needs. This was the inevitable result of turning writers into "ideological workers."

It should be quite in order at this point to select from the large number of usable cases just one illustration of this process of ordered creation. Nothing can serve the purpose better than a reference to F. Panferov and one or two of his novels. Panferov was a celebrated Soviet writer of considerable fertility and small literary gifts. He achieved his first big success in 1930 when he published the first two parts of his collectivization novel (*Bruski*), and added two more parts during the 1930's. After the war he wrote *Bor'ba za mir* (Struggle for Peace), a novel dealing with an automobile factory in the Urals

[28] Cf., e.g., *Pravda*, April 24, 1949, p. 1: "Workers in literature, art, and cinematography! Keep increasing the level of your workmanship. Keep creating new highly ideological artistic works, worthy of the great Soviet people." The 1961 Proclamation, too, invited the writers and the artists to "fight for high ideological character of [their] works and for artistic workmanship, for close inseparable connection of literature and art with the life of the people, with our age." (*Pravda*, April 9, 1961, p. 1.) The words "our age," it may be added, are a somewhat free translation of the Russian term *sovremennost'*, which literally means "contemporaneousness." It is interesting that the meaning of the term has been discussed in recent Soviet writings. The official interpretation is to regard as "contemporaneous" only novels, plays, films, etc., which depict present-day Soviet life. A broader and freer view includes in the concept "everything that excites us today," so that, for instance, *Othello* or *The Idiot* may make more "contemporary" motion pictures than jejeune scripts dealing with Soviet reality. Cf. Akademiya nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii Iskustva, *Yezhegodnik Kino 1959* (Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of History of Art, Cinema Yearbook 1959), Moscow, 1961, p. 11.

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which earned him the Stalin Prize of 1947. The heroes of that novel reappear in still another, *V strane poverzhennykh* (In the Land of the Defeated), whose action takes place in Germany; in 1949 this novel received the same high distinction. Thereupon Panferov quickly forged the third link in the chain, returning in 1949 to the Ural factory in his novel *Bol'shoe iskustvo* (The Great Art), about which something more must be said presently.

After the end of the war, Stalin's dictatorship became increasingly concerned with the independence and self-assurance of managers of industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union. In addition, the purges and the victorious war left the Soviet government without enemies, that much-needed grease for the wheels of smoothly functioning dictatorial machines. Naturally, there was the United States, but it was far away and its quality as an enemy was unduly abstract. A campaign against managers accompanied by a controlled wave of anti-Semitism seemed a very natural remedy. Panferov's novel rose to the needs of the hour. In its center, the author placed one Kokorev, who was being sent to the Ural factory to replace the former manager—the hero of the preceding novels—who was believed to have perished in a German prison. During the war, Kokorev had done wonders managing an automotive factory and supplying the urgently needed tanks and trucks. But after the war the negative qualities of the man—his egotism, his rude treatment of the workers, and his contempt for collective institutions—became an object of bitter criticism. His dismissal could have been a simple matter. Yet, in obedience to his political task, Panferov lets the process of showing up the inadequacies of the manager and getting rid of him pass through the following stages:

(1) Arrival in the factory town of an American woman who is a journalist and a spy and who for purposes of disguise wears a riding dress and carries a horse whip.

(2) A conversation between the woman and Kokorev, the manager, in the course of which she tells him that his brother, the owner of a large steel mill in the United States, is dying and wants Kokorev to go to America in order to take over the plant.

(3) A meeting of the factory committee at which the workers' complaints against the manager are discussed. At the meeting, which follows closely upon the manager's conversation with the American spy, a member of the secret police reports the overheard contents of that conversation and adds "as though by the way" that the manager's

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real name is not Kokorev but Rosenzweig, whereupon the manager is beaten up by the workers.

(4) Several police examinations of Rosenzweig, who is shown as using idioms and mannerisms that are usually regarded as Jewish.

(5) Further revelations by the secret policeman, who has discovered that the manager's true name is not Rosenzweig after all, but Nielson: a native American, he had bought his Russian passport from the son of an anti-Soviet *émigré* (a former owner of a sugar factory) by the name of Rosenzweig.

(6) Thereby the Jewish episode is finished, "the enemy of the people"—as Kokorev-Rosenzweig-Nielson is called—disappears, and the novel ends with the miraculous return from a German prison of the positive hero of the previous novels, who used to be the director of the factory and who answers to an undisputed and irreproachable Russian surname. He is joyfully received by the workers and by his wife, whose reputation Kokorev, the perfidious enemy of the people, had tried to ruin by casting aspersions on her marital faithfulness.[29]

The novel clearly demonstrated that managerial arrogance could well serve as *prima facie* evidence of espionage and in a non-committal way planted in the readers' minds some germinating ideas regarding connections between Jewishness and treasonable propensities. To use a favorite Soviet expression, it was "ideologically well-horseshoed." There is no doubt that this collection of patent absurdities, written in the flattest possible language, and having no literary value whatsoever, is an excellent example of the average Soviet novel of the period, and not *only* of that period.

Five years passed after the first publication of the novel. In the interval occurred the death of Stalin. It was preceded by the Jewish doctors' plot and was followed by their rehabilitation. The atmosphere in 1954 differed in some respects from that of 1949. Open anti-Semitism was no longer desired and, in addition, the industrial manager was no longer the prime target so far as the government was concerned. Other enemies were emerging to satisfy the system's needs. In the struggle for power within the ruling group, the discussion had shifted to the merits and demerits of the bureaucrats in the economic ministries in Moscow.

In 1954, when a second edition of Panferov's novel was published, the situation in some respects was still obscure, but Panferov had no difficulty in engineering the appropriate changes. First of all, the

[29] For the preceding, see the first edition of the novel: Fedor Panferov, *Bol'shoe iskustvo*, in *Oktyabr'*, XXVI, No. 11 (November 1949), pp. 3-143.

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suggestive Rosenzweig episode was eliminated. Furthermore, the main onus was shifted from the shoulders of the manager to his assistant, who had maintained relations with the United States; he was the native American by the name of Nielson and had bought a Russian passport from a certain Popov. But the manager—Kokorev, now without aliases—is still dealt with severely: it was from his safe that his assistant had abstracted some secret documents and had smuggled them abroad; Kokorev must bear the full measure of responsibility for having trusted the wrong man and so he is solemnly punished by dismissal from the factory, expulsion from the Communist Party, loss of six medals, and withdrawal of the previously accorded titles of "general" and "hero of socialist labor." In addition, he suffers a heart attack.

In this form the novel could be reprinted in an edition of Panferov's collected works in 1959. The additional changes that had to be made by then were minor. In 1954 it was still in order to let some undisputable verity (e.g., "Learning is always good") be preceded by a pious: "As Stalin says." In the 1959 edition, the authorship of the truism was no longer revealed.[30]

But Panferov did not stand still. He continued to change with the times. In 1960, shortly before his death, he published the fourth volume in the series, *Vo imya molodogo* (In the Name of Youth).[31] There he was ready to attack the policies that had been pursued by the economic ministries in Moscow as a "peculiar form of feudalism," impervious to control and supervision and designed to extract from the State as much as possible. "Only people infected to the core by lust for power . . . could oppose so furiously the creation of the *Sovnarkhozy*."[32]

The elimination of Stalin's name was accompanied in this novel by a positive reference to the new power: "One could gauge the speed of the country's life from the actions and speeches of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. All his speeches were good in themselves; they were free from undue simplifications, they were reasonable and cordial, calling upon every honest person to dedicate himself to the last drop to the great general surge for the construction of the material and spiritual basis of the communist society. But even apart from this, the speeches and the activity of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev—who already began to be lovingly referred to by the common people as 'Our Nikita'—were amazingly many-sided."[33]

[30] Cf. F. Panferov, *Bol'shoe iskustvo*, Moscow, 1954, p. 306; and Fedor Panferov, *Bol'shoe iskustvo*, in *Sobranie sochinenii* (Collected Works), v, Moscow, 1959, p. 314.
[31] In *Oktyabr'*, xxxvii, Nos. 7 and 8 (July and August 1960).
[32] *Ibid.* (August 1960), p. 11. [33] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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Once more Panferov's lucky ideological horseshoes proved firmly nailed. One can be fairly certain that if he were able to prepare yet another edition of this novel now, the oblique criticism of Stalin in the preceding quotation would give way to some very direct pronouncements. There may be some legitimate doubt as to the propaganda value of Panferov's implausible concoctions. But there can be no doubt that the aim of the official policy, as revealed at the Congress, is to preserve the character of Russian literature as it existed under Stalin—i.e., pegged at the level so perfectly gauged by the aforesaid concoctions.

It must be kept in mind, however, that the point at issue is not simple "preservation." For certain very significant changes in Russian literature did take place after 1953 when Stalin had been called to his account. One aspect of those changes probably is the publication of works by the victims of Stalin's terrorism—i.e., by those who perished in the cellars of the secret police or the concentration camps, and by those who survived after long years of enforced silence. The extent of the liberalization must not be exaggerated. Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* is still inaccessible to Soviet readers except in typescripts that pass from hand to hand. Nor have Mandelstam's poems seen the light of day. Neither his earlier, merely premonitory *Tristia* nor his later real *Tristia*, written in the despair of his own exile, have been published. But there have been two editions of a slim volume of the poetry of Akhmatova, who was allowed to indicate in a preface that she had never stopped writing.[34] A collection of Babel's short stories appeared; so did a novel by Bruno Yasenski. After years of suppression, the Soviets reissued the satirical novels of Ilf and Petrov, as well as a single volume containing some of the more placid short stories of Zoshchenko. It will be remembered that Akhmatova and Zoshchenko were singled out by Zhdanov in 1946 in his infamous condemnation of writers and poets. Those destroyed or muted by the Soviet dictatorship (leaving the field free to the cacography of the Panferovs) had been remarkable original talents. The return of their works to the shelves in bookshops and libraries is no mean occurrence. Even absurd editorial prefaces criticizing the satirists for being too subtle, and at the same time defending them—or, rather, defending the editors themselves—against any suspicion of disloyalty, cannot detract from the significance of this resurrection.[35]

[34] Anna Akhmatova, *Stikhotvoreniya* (Poems), Moscow, 1961, p. 10.

[35] Il'ya Il'f and Evgenii Petrov, *Sobranie Sochinenii* (Collected Works), Preface by D. Zaslavskii. Also B. Galanov, *Il'ya Il'f i Eygenii Petrov, Zhizn' i tvorchestvo* (Life and Work), Moscow, 1961, pp. 132, 191-92.

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Moreover, there has been a relaxation of the strict injunctions against the treatment of love life in literature except in the form of a union of two highly virtuous people whose private feelings and actions are thoroughly collectivized and at all times kept in strict accordance with the rules of dictatorial morality. By being permitted to acknowledge the existence of some irregularities in the marital life of otherwise very "positive" heroes, the post-Stalin literature was rendered somewhat more human. The new freedom was eagerly seized upon,[36] revealing a surprising coarseness of mores hidden beneath the varnish of the earlier writings.[37]

Finally, and most importantly, literature in some measure has become the vehicle for expressing certain views of general political significance—trying to feel out, as it were, the limits of the possible. In this category falls, e.g., the poetry of Evgenii Evtushenko, who claimed once to possess "the talent of fearlessness"[38] and whose name was never mentioned at the Congress, but whose physical, sartorial, and poetic irregularities, as well as unwholesome popularity, were the obvious target of some acrimonious remarks.

In the same category belong the rather short novels that have been appearing chiefly in *Yunost'*, the journal that was named and specifi-

[36] Cf. this writer's "Reflections on Soviet Novels," Section II, in *World Politics*, XII (January 1960), pp. 165-85. It might be in order to mention at this point that a parallel process took place in Soviet cinematography. In Soviet writings on the subject, it is freely stressed that the Twentieth Congress (1956) marked a turning point. After that date "attempts to substitute . . . sham idyls for real conflicts" were abandoned, and interest in "the ordinary common man and his everyday life" became a characteristic feature of motion pictures produced in the second half of the 1950's. *Yezhegodnik Kino 1959*, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

[37] Even a writer like Panferov could not resist the temptation to discuss in his latest novel, *Vo imya molodogo*, some interesting aspects of feminine anatomy and to report various conversations held in matrimonial and adulterous beds, while still dealing with the pernicious greed for "original accumulation of capital" (a Marxian concept that he revised to include such things as acquisition of a small house) and with the no less pernicious tendencies in abstract art. V. Kochetov, who, among Soviet writers, is the undisputed leader of the back-to-Stalin movement, fully agrees with Panferov on the social evils produced by private home ownership, but refuses to go quite so far in matters of sex. With regard to the latter, he prefers a cautious negative method. Thus he likes to place a high Party functionary in close proximity to an attractive woman (whose charms have been prominently displayed by the author) and then to tell in fair detail all the things which the functionary might have done if not restrained by virtue and position. This unhumorous Soviet version of M. Busch's delightful story, *Der heilige Antonius von Padua*, has appeared in Kochetov's novel, *The Secretary of the Obkom*, which is his most recent effort to freeze over the "thaw" in Soviet literature. This novel, which incidentally contains a thinly disguised vituperative caricature of the poet Evtushenko, was published in the summer of 1961; a few months later Kochetov was awarded the Lenin Prize for his contributions to Soviet literature. Cf. *Sekretar' Obkoma*, in *Zvezda*, No. 8 (1961), p. 55; also *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, February 6, 1962, p. 1.

[38] Cf. *Yabloko, Novaya kniga stikhov* (The New Book of Poems), Moscow, 1960, p. 6.

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cally attacked at the Congress. The heroes of most of these novels have been adolescents and young men. None of the novels seems to be a piece of great writing, but very many of them are true "novels" in the etymological sense of the word. They are permeated by a spirit of frankness and freedom from the deadwood of standard types, characteristics, problems, and situations that appears altogether new against the background of the nauseating sameness of the official literature. There is a simplicity, an immediacy, and a naïveté about the writing in *Yunost'* that is most refreshing. This is reflected in the language and the style. Thus one of the novels that evoked official displeasure at the Congress[39] tells its story in a manner that is an obvious but possibly unconscious imitation of *Huckleberry Finn*. Accordingly, there is no hesitation in *Yunost'* about employing the atrocious but often very colorful slang used by young people. As happens so often, the true rendition of speech leads to a truthful rendering of its content. The young personages exhibited in the novels are rebelling against authority in state, school, and family. They want to escape from the boredom of compulsory virtues to be displayed while trotting along predetermined tracks of life. Hence the novels themselves are in the nature of controlled rebellions.

Some of the actions described are in the category of frank rowdyism. They show that the Soviet Union, like every country that went through the last war, is burdened with the legacy of that war. The juvenile delinquents in the United States, the English Teddy boys, the French *blousons noirs*, the German and Austrian *Halbstarken*, the Italian *teppisti* or *ragazzi di vita*, and the young *Khuligany* in Russia may be taken to be phenomena that are closely related in both causes and symptoms. It is revealing to be shown in Soviet novels the seriousness of disciplinary problems in Soviet high schools—e.g., the pupils' nasty habit of ruining an hour of instruction by open rioting in the classroom.[40] Relations between high school boys and openly criminal elements, and molestations of couples in the streets by hoodlums, are candidly described.

But there is much more to this literature than exposure of the seamy side of Soviet life. The novels do deal with the thoughts, aspirations, and value systems of the young generation. When one of the youngster heroes says: "We have no theories!", when a young physician in another novel expresses his disgust of all those sickening "high-falutin

[39] N. Zeleranskii and B. Larin, *Mishka, Serega i ya*, in *Yunost'*, Nos. 7 and 8 (1959).

[40] The procedure has a special technical term to describe it—*sorvat' urok*—which has been taken over from pre-dictatorial political jargon, where it referred to the deplorable practice of noisily obstructing the mass meetings of political opponents.

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words," all those "verbal fetishisms," and his friend declares to have thought about the matter and understood that it was all "bluff," their views are an open challenge to a state that forces every one of its subjects into an ideological strait-jacket. For "theories" and the "high-falutin words" obviously refer to the totality of official values. The young people are eager to escape from it all. Hence many of these stories deal with running away from home and school, from discipline and duty. Thus not only in style, but also in content they are Huckleberry Finn stories. This does not necessarily mean that the flight carries them beyond the point of no return. They may eventually make their peace with the system. But they do proclaim their right to seek and to err and to hack out their own paths. They refuse to be wholly impounded by the tasks of economic development; they wish to withdraw from the "greyness" of Soviet dogmas into the eternal philosophical problems of life and death. Theirs is a flight from pressure to conform, and a fleeting scene of a small crowd in the park gathered around a loudspeaker emitting the hackneyed phrases of official patriotism becomes a disgusted protest against *Gleichschaltung*: "The faces in the listening crowd somehow are all identical." So does the expression of indignation on the part of a young man at the customary way of voting at Soviet meetings, when hands are raised mechanically while people's thoughts are far away: "Are we some kind of robots, or what?"[41]

These are quite new tones. To write in this fashion means much more than a mere widening of the range of topics that can be treated in literature. It is very different, therefore, from the previously mentioned innovation of Soviet *erotica*.

There is no simple relationship between the interests of a dictatorship and public treatment of sex. A very strong dictatorship will tend to be very restrictive for a number of reasons. Sex offers a predestined field for prohibitions and injunctions and by the same token a natural area for self-assertion of dictatorial power. Moreover, the dictators are

[41] Cf., for the preceding, the second novel that suffered official disparagement at the Congress: Vasilii Aksenov, *Zvezdny bilet* (Ticket to the Stars), in *Yunost'*, No. 6 (1961), pp. 6 and 20, and No. 7 (1961), p. 52. Also Vasilii Aksenov, *Kollegi* (The Colleagues), Moscow, 1961, pp. 6, 18. Let us add that it would seem tempting but hardly warranted to relate the fermentation in Soviet Russia to the exploits of the beat generation in the United States. There is no "raggedy madness and riot" about the Soviet youth. They do not seem to include any "holy goofs" of Dean Moriarty's ilk. Nor is there much doubt that the Soviet writers have a sense of touching upon problems that pervade the young generation throughout the country, while Jack Kerouac, for instance, is quite conscious of dealing with peripheral oddities. For the preceding quotations, see Jack Kerouac, *On the Road*, New York, 1957, pp. 194 and 254.

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likely to assume that any looseness in matters of sex may loosen behavior in other areas, and in particular may affect the political discipline of the ruled. Besides they may fear lest preoccupation with sex effectively deflect attention from tasks set by the state. But a dictatorship that has been weakened, say, by a prolonged succession crisis may welcome some injections of prurience into literature as the lesser of two evils—i.e., as an alternative to treatment of political problems and some opposition to the dictatorial system and to the conformity of behavior which it exacts. It is therefore not quite clear to what extent the rediscovery of sex life in recent Soviet literature is the result of a spontaneous response to the opportunities of the post-Stalinist period; and to what extent it is a shrewd governmental device to direct that response into the least undesirable channels. The fact that Panferov became a major contributor to the subject naturally would make one incline to the latter supposition.

But what about the future? Must we assume that the liberalizing attempts will be nipped in the bud—that *Yunost'*, for instance, will receive the pedagogically trained supervisor for whom there was a clamor at the Congress, and thereafter will quickly publish a series of novels featuring model youngsters worshiping Khrushchev while decrying "the cult of personality"? Must we assume that the Congress has spoken and that *Roma locuta, causa finita est*? A categorical answer to these questions would seem at least premature.[42]

At one of the last sessions of the Congress, A. T. Tvardovskii replied to some of the criticism directed against literature. He spoke of what had been accomplished since the "turning point" of the Twentieth Congress, at a secret session of which Khrushchev had made his first anti-Stalin speech. He mentioned the many whose "literary name" and whose place in the history of Soviet literature had been restored. But he also insisted on saying frankly that some habits of thought, literary practices, and manners of writing formed under Stalin still persisted; that "boldness, straightforwardness, and truthfulness" were often lacking; and that one could discern "immoderate bragging" about the positive aspects of Soviet life, a desire to "varnish the picture" and to avoid discussion of imperfections and disabilities. Tvardovskii argued that literature should not be confined to depicting

[42] This passage was written in November 1961. As the manuscript goes to press (March 1962), one must note that the character of *Yunost'* changed perceptibly beginning with the November 1961 issue. Moreover, the editor of the journal, V. Katayev, has been replaced by Boris Polevoy, whose record provides every assurance that the journal will be safely prodded back into the pinfold of Soviet conformity. (Cf. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 27, 1962.)

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life in factories and on collective farms; that literature may legitimately deal with very personal sides of the everyday life of men and women, their joys and griefs, "with life as it exists in all its complexity." And he went on to suggest that the domicile of a writer may not be the prime factor in determining his quality.[43]

That a truism of this kind can be presented as a liberating truth once more reveals what four decades of Soviet rule have done to Russian literature and to Russian spiritual life. But the important point is something else. The sessions of the Congress went on for many days; hour-long speeches were made; millions of words were spoken. And yet in all that verbal flood, with two exceptions, one could not discover a solitary incident of argument and counterargument, of anything resembling a debate, even a trace of differing opinion. One of those exceptions does not properly count in this context, being the Chinese dissent on Albania. The other exception, produced by a native Russian and possessing such a high scarcity value—a tiny island in an ocean of conformity—was precisely Tvardovskii's defense of the rights of a freer literature.

How should one appraise Tvardovskii's action? Was it an act of suicidal boldness, of magnificent civil courage? Tvardovskii has been editor-in-chief of the journal *Novyi Mir*, which has acquired a somewhat liberal reputation. The journal published, for instance, Ehrenburg's carefully balanced memoirs in which the praise of Mandelstam and Babel—the victims of Stalin—is nicely counterpoised by the author's rejection of *Doctor Zhivago*. But no one would accuse *Novyi Mir* of undue recklessness, and Tvardovskii knows well from long experience the fears and circumspection that guide the pens of Russian writers. His long epic poem, "Horizons Beyond Horizons," has gone through some very important changes. To the 1954 edition of the poem there was added a moving description of Stalin's death: "unfathomable sorrow," "silent grief," "a beloved father," "the happiness of having been Stalin's contemporary," "the cruel day and hour when disaster struck"—all the solemn paraphernalia of an official dirge were mixed into the poem, imperceptibly tempered by a brief concessive clause admitting that "at times" Stalin's "ruthless *pravota*"—infallibility[44]—was "hard to take."[45] But in the new edition that appeared after the Twentieth Congress the chapter on Stalin was thoroughly revised. "A son of the Orient," he was said to have exhibited the features of a "ruth-

[43] *Pravda*, October 29, 1961, p. 7.
[44] Literally: "His being right."
[45] A. T. Tvardovskii, *Stikhotyoreniya i poemy* (Lyrical and Epic Poems), Moscow, 1954, pp. 589-90.

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less and cruel *nepravota*"—fallibility[46]—and there was a quick reference to Stalin's crimes, the slightest possible hint that Stalin's death may have been hastened by powers other than fate or nature. But there was also a forcefully expressed unwillingness to forget that it was Stalin's foresight that had built the factories and moved them into trans-Uralian safety; that it was his will that had inspired the country in the fateful years of the German war; and the conclusion that no one had a right to sit in judgment on Stalin—least of all the poets who had sung his glory and had been crowned with his laurels.[47]

Possibly now, after the recent Congress, a still further revision, less judicious and more judicial, will appear. One may wonder why Tvardovskii had to refer to Stalin's death at all in the early version of the poem. Was it in response to an outside order or to an inner compulsion, some sort of a hypnotic trance? Was it simply a conditioned reflex, or did it result from a long habit of thought or, rather, from its suspension? Whatever the explanation, under conditions of totalitarian rule the question which André Gide addressed to his *confrères* nearly fifty years ago: "Il est donc si difficile de se taire?" clearly must be answered in the affirmative. At any rate, Tvardovskii does not seem to be a man to rush blindly into a mortal fray. The Congress rewarded his speech with strong manifestations of approval. One may assume that he will get away with his refusal to conform. But will the Russian literature retain its precariously established right to deviance? This is much less predictable.

IV

The Twenty-second Congress has been an important landmark in the history of the post-Stalinist dictatorship. It has greatly enhanced the consolidation of that dictatorship. This, no doubt, must be seen as Khrushchev's personal triumph. It would be futile to belittle the importance of the personal qualities of the leader in such a system. In particular, it makes good sense to attribute much of Stalin's terror to Stalin's *daimon*. So far, the absence of a comparable phenomenon in today's Russia has been the most decisive mark of momentous change. In this, as in some other respects, Russia has traveled far since the days of Stalin. At the same time, however, it is tempting to assume that there are certain stability conditions of a totalitarian dictatorship that are less personal and more objective in nature.

[46] Literally: "His being wrong."

[47] A. T. Tvardovskii, *Sobraniye Sochinenii* (Collected Works), III, Moscow, 1960, pp. 340 *et seq.*

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To function properly, a dictatorship, as has been said before, needs enemies, preferably of the tangible kind. The public dethronement of Stalin has created a reservoir of Stalinists which it will take a long time to exhaust, particularly if Khrushchev continues to abstain from Stalin's unwise propensity to commit irreparable acts, so that one and the same person can be purged several times over, as was Molotov in 1957 and then again in 1961. It may be assumed that the conflict with China, once brought into the open, will keep bursting forth periodically. And, finally, there is still the cold war with the West.

In addition, a dictatorial government must perform what in the eyes of the population appears to be an important social function that either could not be performed at all or not nearly as well in the absence of dictatorial guidance and pressure. The postponement of the advent of "Communist society" beyond the foreseeable future means that the government will continue the policy of high investment, and it remains to be seen whether or not Khrushchev's government will resume Stalin's policy of systematic underfulfillment of the production plans with regard to consumers' goods. Furthermore, one may expect that the reversal of the decentralization movement will continue and increasingly assure the dictators of an opportunity to issue innumerable permits and prohibitions directly affecting individual lives and concrete situations all over the country, and in this way to exercise their privilege of ruling and of being obeyed.

The stability of a dictatorial government of this type is greatly enhanced by veneration of the dictator's wisdom and energy, as well as of his fatherly benevolence. It is a good thing for his eye to be "exceedingly kind and gentle. A child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him," as Ambassador Davis once wrote of Stalin.[48] There has been enough rewriting of past history in Russia to represent Khrushchev as one of the major engineers of victory in the last war; there has been a sufficient number of quotations from Khrushchev's speeches in learned books in various fields of scholarly endeavor; the glorifications in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* have been faithfully echoed in the provincial press, and the stream of personal adulation of Khrushchev at the recent Congress showed that in this respect also the wind hath returned upon its circuits, and still another stability condition of the dictatorship has been fulfilled. One can safely assume that Khrushchev's protest at the Congress against the "cult of his own personality" will not change the nature or direction of ineluctable processes.

[48] Joseph E. David, *Mission to Moscow*, New York, 1941, p. 357.

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And then there is the requisite of an ideology that at least has the appearance of being monolithic. There can be no doubt that the complex enterprise of debating and adopting a new Party Program was embarked upon mainly because of the desire to rebuild the ideological structure, some parts of which had fallen into disrepair after Stalin's death, and in the process of reconstruction to imprint upon the edifice the individual features of the new architect.

Could literature expect to remain a lone anomaly in a system that is being so vigorously propelled back to normalcy? The deviant tendencies that have been discussed in the preceding sections may seem paltry when viewed from the intellectual remoteness of a democratic country. Under Russian conditions, they have a considerable significance which is first and foremost political. No one since Stalin's death has uttered such plain criticism of the system as have the unheroic heroes of some recent Soviet novels. This, after all, is well in accordance with the great nineteenth-century tradition of Russian literature. Although a "gentry literature," it was even farther removed from throne and court than the German literature of the preceding century. Much of it, though by no means all, was a literature of social critique and political accusation. Tvardovskii's admonition at the Congress to Russian writers to remain faithful to their great predecessors of the past century[49] may therefore be charged with more political meaning than appeared on the surface.

In the light of such considerations, the dispersal of the writers from Moscow and Leningrad appears less absurd. It may be missing the point to argue that the artistic value of literature is likely to grow rather than decline in the atmosphere of mutual stimulation and encouragement that exists in the large cities. It makes little sense to mention the historical role played by Moscow and St. Petersburg in this respect or to refer to Chekhov's advice to young writers, including Gorki, to go to the capital and live among literary people. For the problem is an exquisitely political one—to wit, to get rid of a deviant group that may become quite dangerous politically. There have been signs and near-miracles. Enthusiastic gatherings of thousands to listen to recitals of poetry with libertarian overtones would be disquieting to any police state, even if those gatherings did not create bad traffic problems in the streets of Moscow requiring the regulating intervention of mounted police. What was therefore discussed at a Congress was in fact a mild form of camouflaged exile. Sending Russian writers and poets into remote parts of the country is, of course,

[49] Cf. *Pravda*, October 29, 1961, p. 7.

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a policy of which Stalin was a most effective adept, but by no means the originator.

It thus seems reasonably clear what the Soviet dictatorship fears and what it wants with regard to literature. If it can have its way, literature once more will be *gleichgeschaltet* and by the same token another stability condition of totalitarian dictatorship will be fulfilled. Once this has happened, it would again become possible for the government to clamor with impunity for more boldness in literature, as did Malenkov in 1952.

Whether and when and how completely that goal will be reached must depend on the future strength of the regime, which, of course, remains an unknown. The factors that have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs may be very important, perhaps even indispensable in the long run for the maintenance of the dictatorship. Yet it is fairly clear that they cannot suffice in themselves. Much must depend on forces that act and react far from the light of publicity, through the councils of the ruling group, the loyalties—and disloyalties—of the higher bureaucracy, and the leadership of the army and the secret police. Surprises are always possible. Perhaps the temptation to indulge in metaphorical borrowings from different and more precise contexts and to speak of stability conditions should have been resisted. Nevertheless, looking over the road that has been traversed during the past nine years, one can only marvel at the vigor and the persistence of forces that have tended to preserve unchanged or to restore the traditionally essential elements of the Soviet system.

To paraphrase Heraclitus, one might repeat the motto chosen for this article and say that dictatorship, rather than the dictator's character, is destiny. In other words, the dictatorship must be as it is or not be at all. Its long-run changeability appears limited indeed. This, however, can be no more than a very tentative conclusion. In particular, one should not rely upon it too heavily when speculating about the future of Russian literature. On the other hand, after the experience of the last few years and after what happened at the 1961 Congress, it may be safely assumed that the vicissitudes of Russian literature in the years to come will offer excellent opportunities for testing the validity of that conclusion.

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RUSSIA AND THE TURKISH STRAITS

A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem*

By J. C. HUREWITZ

THE USSR placed on the agenda of the Big Three wartime conference at Yalta in February 1945 the question of the Turkish Straits. Of this 200-mile natural channel, less than 60 miles—the Bosphorus coming from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles going to the Aegean—are true straits, joined by the inland sea of Marmara. Ever since 1841 the transit of naval vessels through the Straits has been regulated by international agreement. The latest regime was established by a convention signed at Montreux in July 1936, authorizing Turkey to remilitarize the strategic waterway and, if it were "threatened with imminent danger of war" or actually engaged in war (Articles 20 and 21), to permit or disallow at its discretion the passage of warships through the narrows.

At Yalta, Joseph Stalin declared that this regime was outmoded and prejudicial to the Russian position. He proposed that the Montreux Convention should be revised so that Russian warships might move freely at all times through the Straits, since "it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat." Stalin's statement reopened a question that he had first raised with Churchill and Roosevelt at Tehran in November 1943 and in bilateral talks with Churchill in Moscow the following October. The Soviet leader then held that Japan played an even greater role than did the USSR under the Montreux Convention, which in any case was linked to the defunct League of Nations. The instrument had been concluded in circumstances of British-Soviet estrangement, observed the Russian leader, and surely the United Kingdom would not want "to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese."[1]

Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov in talks with the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow, Selim Sarper, in June 1945 elaborated upon the Soviet position. The Soviet government acknowledged that Turkey in World War II had acted with good will in defending the narrows.

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[1] *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Dept. of State [DS] Publication 6199, Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 903.

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But a nation of 200 million could not rely wholly on its neighbor's intentions in such a matter without also considering Turkey's military capabilities. In response to Sarper's direct inquiry, Molotov conceded that Russia wanted bases on Turkish territory.

Sarper informed the American Embassy at Moscow on 24 June 1945 that he suspected the Soviet Union of seeking to assimilate Turkey into the Soviet security system. More specifically, Sarper felt that the USSR was aiming to shut the Black Sea to the warships of states not in the Soviet orbit and to assure free access of Soviet warships to the Mediterranean. In Ankara early in July Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu confided in U.S. Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson: "We ardently wish friendly relations with Russia and . . . are fully prepared to discuss [the] revision of [the] Straits Convention. [The] Matter of passage through [the] Straits is of more interest to [the] maritime powers than to us. Our concern is [the] safeguard of our territory. We will not accept Soviet domination."[2]

When the Soviet representatives raised the issue again at Potsdam in July 1945, Churchill stated that Turkey would never consent to the proposal for a Soviet base along the Straits and for exclusive control over the Straits regime by Russia and Turkey. The following dialogue then took place:

> MOLOTOV said that similar treaties had existed in the past between Russia and Turkey.
>
> CHURCHILL asked if he meant the question of a Russian base in the Black Sea Straits.
>
> MOLOTOV replied that he meant treaties which provided for the settlement of the Straits question only by Turkey and Russia. He referred to the treaties of 1805 and 1833.
>
> CHURCHILL said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties. . . .[3]

What the British representatives may have discovered they did not later disclose. At any rate, the Western Powers, while supporting Turkey's position, also agreed that each of the Big Three would engage in direct talks with Turkey on revising the Montreux Convention "to meet present-day conditions." A year of diplomatic exchanges ended in a stalemate, with the Soviet Union still insisting on sharing the Straits' defense with Turkey. Since then, the USSR has formally neither reasserted nor repudiated its claim. Nor is there any indication that

[2] *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945* (DS Pub. 7015, Washington, D.C., 1961), I, p. 1035.

[3] *Ibid.*, II, p. 258.

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the Soviet Union has given up its aspirations in regard to the Straits. It is therefore high time that the Russian claim to treaty precedents be exposed for what it is—a long-perpetuated diplomatic and literary fraud.

Before this piece of deception is ventilated, it would be well to fix in mind the precise nature of the Straits question in its historical context. As long as the Black Sea was an Ottoman lake, and the only approaches to it from open waters or from rivers flowed through the Sultan's territory or tributary principalities, he could—and did—decide freely what ships might visit what parts of his realm and under what conditions. Foreign war vessels had no excuse whatsoever for plying Ottoman inland waters, except on rare calls of courtesy or for repair, unless in time of war they sought to breach the Padişah's naval defenses. But at the Straits and in the Ottoman-dominated river mouths of the Black Sea, such attempted breach would have entailed overwhelming risks. The Sultan's closure of the narrows and the Black Sea thus need not have been—and probably was not—more than implicit. What his practices in regard to foreign commercial traffic in these inland waters may have been in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we do not really know, and in any case they probably varied. But by the eighteenth century, commercial ships arriving from the Mediterranean were seemingly permitted to traverse the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara only as far as Istanbul, at the southern end of the Bosphorus. From that point northward all trade with Black Sea ports apparently moved on Ottoman bottoms, as was probably true also of the riverine commerce with these ports.[4]

The moment Russia captured primary river exits to the Black Sea (such as those of the Dnepr and the Don—the latter connected to the Black Sea by its satellite, the Sea of Azov) and thus could validly claim riparian status, the basic situation was bound to change. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which in 1774 ended the six-year war with the Ottoman Empire, opened (Article 11) to Russian commercial shipping at one and the same time, not the Straits alone, but all other water lanes with outlets on the Black Sea. The right of free merchant navigation through the narrows was progressively conferred upon the other European Powers,[5] the Ottomans bestowing the privilege by

[4] See, for example, Great Britain [GB], *Parliamentary Papers* [*PP*], *1878*, C. 1953, Turkey No. 16 (1878), "Treaties and other Documents relating to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus: 1535-1878"; and James T. Shotwell and Francis Deák, *Turkey at the Straits: A Short History*, New York, 1950, pp. 14-16.

[5] Austria (1784), the UK (1799), France (1802), Prussia (1806), Norway, Sweden, Spain (1827), the US (1830), Tuscany (1833), and Belgium (1838).

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separate act in each instance upon the capitulatory state that requested it under most-favored-nation treatment. Indeed, the Ottoman government in 1822 notified all Powers that "the passage of the Bosphorus is closed to the ships of nations to whom the Porte never accorded the right of entry to. . . [the Black] sea."[6] Not until the Treaty of Paris in 1856 was the principle of commercial freedom made universal,[7] thereby resolving the question peacefully and in the best interests of all concerned.

The problem of the transit of war vessels was also resolved by agreement. The convention signed in London on 13 July 1841 (Article 1) expressed the Sultan's firm resolve "to maintain . . . the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire . . . [whereby] it has at all times been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and . . . so long as the Porte is at peace . . . [to] admit no foreign Ship of War into the said Straits." In the same article the European Powers pledged "to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared." The Sultan reserved (Article 2) "to himself . . . to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war . . . employed . . . in the services of the Missions of foreign powers."[8] The international regime thus established survived without major change until World War I: closure of the Straits in time of peace, full Ottoman discretion in time of war. The Tsar's displeasure with this regime lay in his failure to snatch the Straits from the Ottoman Empire between 1798 and 1840.

As an expanding Great Power, already possessing the world's largest single land mass under one government, Russia was struggling in the opening decades of the nineteenth century to break out of its almost landlocked bonds. For Russia, denial of the Straits kept the Black Sea a closed body of water. To fulfill its aspirations for projective naval power at the southwest corner of its growing empire, Russia therefore strove to establish itself on the Mediterranean. This dictated ownership of the Straits. Tsarist imperialism against the Ottoman Empire in these years, however, was of the creeping variety. The stages by which the Tatar khanates were shuffled into the Russian Empire well illustrated the technique. In 1774, after victory in battle, these Muslim principalities in and around the Crimea were merely

[6] Text in Turkey No. 16 (1878), p. 11.

[7] Articles 11 and 12, which were replaced by Article 3 of the Treaty of London, 13 March 1871; J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Princeton, N.J., 1956, 1, pp. 155 and 174.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

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detached from all forms of dependence on the Sublime Porte. Only nine years later were they unilaterally incorporated into the Tsarina Catherine's domain, and not until a triumphant second war in 1792 did she finally compel the Sultan to acknowledge Russian title to the territory.

It was one thing to annex Tatar khanates that were semi-independent to begin with, for they had surrendered to the Osmanli crown only their external, but none of their internal, sovereignty. It was something else again to seize the narrows, which coursed through Ottoman territory and alongside Istanbul (Constantinople), the capital of the Padişah's dominions. Seizure of the Straits could thus be accomplished only by making the Sultan a vassal or by destroying his realm. Russia in the last third of the eighteenth century had twice defeated the Ottoman Empire; but neither victory came easily. Despite its progressive decay, the Muslim state was totally unprepared to commit suicide or even to surrender any of the Padişah's patrimony, least of all his capital. Moreover, the subordination or destruction of the Ottoman Empire, with its still sprawling provinces in southeastern Europe, was bound to alter the balance of power on the Continent and hence could hardly fail to excite the hostility of the other Big Powers. If Russia proved shy in assimilating the Tatar khanates, it was certain to be doubly so in trying to take over the narrows.

In the attempt to dominate the waterway, then, the Tsar could seek to arrange with other interested Big Powers in Europe an agreed partition of the Ottoman Empire, with the Straits zone set aside for Russia. Or the Tsar could extract from the Sultan, as part-payment for a reciprocal favor, the right to share with him control over the narrows, in the hope that, once installed as co-director, the self-styled autocrat might relieve the Padişah imperceptibly of his remaining managerial responsibilities and ultimately wrest the deed to the real estate through which the channel cut, without stirring up European antagonism. The choices were not mutually exclusive, and the Tsarist regime for over a century shifted back and forth between the two and, since the policies proved ineffectual, became ambivalent. This ambivalence the Tsars bequeathed to the Commissars.

That Russia was far from confident in formulating its Straits policies or happy with the results, as it took in 1798-1806 its first tentative steps to procure mastery over the waterway and as it resumed the tactics in 1833-1840, could scarcely be gleaned from official Tsarist—and Soviet—Russian accounts of developments in this period. The classical Tsarist Russian work on the subject was by Sergei Goriainov, at the time

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director of the central imperial archives in St. Petersburg. *Bosfor i Dardanelly*, originally published in the Russian capital in 1907, appeared in French translation (*Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*) three years later. The book was based almost wholly on records—largely unpublished—in the Foreign Ministry at St. Petersburg. The author referred nowhere to available literature on the Straits question. Palpably intended as an official statement, the work was used as such. And although it was nothing but a political tract disguised as scholarship, for lack of alternative Russian documentation it was also used by Western and Turkish as well as Russian scholars.

Goriainov's thesis, derived from his manipulation of the facts, has continued since World War II to enjoy the USSR's blessings, as attested by the most comprehensive postwar Soviet study of the Turkish Straits problem. Entitled *Chernomorskiie prolivy: mezhdunarodno-pravovoi rezhim* (The Black Sea Straits: International Legal Regime), it was written by B. A. Dranov and published by the USSR Ministry of Justice in 1948. A lecture on the Straits question by Professor K. V. Bazilevich, issued as a brochure in 1946, followed the Goriainov line even more slavishly than Dranov.[9] In the 1950 edition of the *Diplomatic Dictionary*, edited by Andrei J. Vyshinskii, there is one unsigned entry on the Straits and another on Russo-Turkish treaties of alliance. Slanted and in part erroneous, the treatment is nevertheless more accurate—as far as it goes—than that of the St. Petersburg archivist.[10]

Philip E. Mosely was the first Western scholar to discredit one of Goriainov's central arguments: that the separate and secret article of the Russo-Ottoman treaty of defensive alliance, concluded at Hünkâr İskelesi on 26 June/8 July 1833, provided for shutting the Dardanelles to warships of third Powers and unlocking the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to those of Russia. Goriainov, admitting that the text was "defective" in this respect, rested his claim on "the sense of the treaty as a whole," which in confirming earlier Russo-Ottoman treaties allegedly also renewed the secret Article 7 of the Russo-Ottoman alliance of 1805. It was this article, argued Goriainov, that "accorded to Russian ships of war the right to pass freely 'in every instance' through the Bosphorus, from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean."[11] Mosely shows that such a blanket renewal of all prior Russo-Ottoman agreements, "if interpreted literally, would mean that many contradictory

[9] *O chernomorskikh prolivakh* [On the Black Sea Straits], Moscow, 1946, pp. 13-15 and 28.

[10] *Diplomaticheskii slovar'*, Moscow, 1950, II, pp. 463, 546-47.

[11] Serge Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, pp. 43-44.

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clauses of earlier treaties were automatically continued in force. It is the clauses of the treaty [not the blanket renewal] . . . which have force in international law. The 1805 treaty had been denounced in 1806 by Turkey, and clause VII of it has never since been appealed to in practice. Why was Goriainov so anxious to make valid this highly captious and . . . artificial reasoning? It may be guessed that . . . he desired to justify the historic urge to secure a 'Russian' solution to the Straits problem."[12] Carrying forward Mosely's study, which was limited to the 1830's, we may well question Goriainov's explanation of the nature and significance of the 1805 treaty and his supporting evidence.

Stripped to essentials, the Goriainov thesis held that, in secret clauses of bilateral treaties of defensive alliance of 23 December 1798 [3 January 1799] and 11/23 September 1805, both framed on Ottoman initiative, the Sublime Porte voluntarily consented to the principle of barring the Black Sea unconditionally to the warships of third Powers, as a means of promoting the "mutual tranquillity" of the signatories. Any attempted infringement of that principle the two allies would view as a hostile act. The Sublime Porte thus recognized, Goriainov contended, that Russia enjoyed "the right to defend its [Black Sea] coastal possessions on the same footing as the Sultan . . . who, by force of circumstances, could no longer consider himself the sole master of the entire Black Sea." Article 7 of the 1805 treaty, continued Goriainov, established the further principle that the Sultan, while continuing as owner, nevertheless shared the Straits' defense with Russia, and to this end the Sublime Porte pledged "to furnish every assistance to the passage of Russian war vessels through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles." This liberty was to be accorded "in every instance" under Article 7 of the 1805 treaty but particularly, under Article 4, to Russian war vessels bearing reinforcements and supplies to Russian garrisons on the Ionian Islands, which in 1799 had been captured by Russian and Ottoman naval forces and transformed into an independent republic under nominal Ottoman suzerainty and Russian military guarantee. The Sublime Porte, succumbing to French machinations, denounced the 1805 treaty before the end of 1806, argued Goriainov, but the precedents were nevertheless reaffirmed by the treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833.[13]

Yet it was precisely Article 7 of the 1805 treaty, so central to the

[12] Philip E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839*, Cambridge, Mass., 1934, pp. 12-13.
[13] Goriainow, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-10, 43-44, 87.

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Goriainov thesis, that was controversial. According to Goriainov, this article read as follows: "The two High Contracting Parties agree to consider the Black Sea as closed and not to permit the appearance therein of any flag of war or armed vessel of any power whatsoever, and if [any] should attempt to appear there in arms, the two High Contracting Parties undertake to regard such an attempt as a *casus foederis* and to oppose it with all their naval forces, as being the only means of assuring their mutual tranquillity; it is understood that the free passage through the Canal of Constantinople will continue in effect for the vessels of war and military transports of His Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, to which in every instance the Sublime Porte will furnish every assistance and grant every facility that may be required."[14]

In 1915 two Russian scholars, Baron B. E. Nol'de and Count Sergei Gagarin, separately and for different reasons criticized the Goriainov work. An international lawyer of high repute, Nol'de developed a position on the strategic waterway that must have been most unpopular at a time when his government was persuading its wartime allies to accept a Russian solution of the Straits question. Probably unaware of the archivist's falsification of the evidence, Nol'de simply dismissed the 1805 treaty as "stillborn . . . the result of a casual combination of the period of coalitions against the great Napoleon, entered into, to top it all, for only nine years." As Mosely was to do later, Nol'de was primarily pointing with some irony at Goriainov's freewheeling interpretation of the 1833 treaty.

Count Gagarin's analysis, on the other hand, catered to the prevailing attitude in Russia toward the Straits question. However, he called attention to the difference between Goriainov's Article 7 and the French translation of the Turkish text by Gabriel Noradounghian, the legal counsellor of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: "The two contracting parties, having agreed on the closure of the Black Sea, declare that any attempt by any power whatsoever to violate it shall be considered a hostile act against them. Consequently, they pledge to oppose with all their naval forces the entrance into that sea of every vessel of war and every ship carrying military stores."[16]

The absence from the Noradounghian version of the clause on free

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[15] B. E. Nol'de, *Vneshniaia politika* [Foreign Policy], St. Petersburg, 1915, p. 78; chap. 2 deals with the Straits.

[16] S. Gagarin, "Konstantinopol'skie prolivy," *Russkaia mysl'*, April 1915, pp. 105-6; G. Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, 1900, II, p. 76; English translation from Hurewitz, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

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transit for Russian naval vessels—so indispensable to the Goriainov thesis—did not excite Gagarin's curiosity. For Gagarin as for Goriainov, "The Straits were not only opened to Russian naval vessels but Turkey's obligation to assist [these vessels] by every means was assured."[17] Gagarin also noted an oversight by Goriainov: the Straits provision in secret Article 1 (as rendered by Noradounghian) which stipulated that "At the very least, the Ottoman Government . . . will make possible, for the duration of the war, passage through the Straits of Constantinople of vessels of war and transports that Russia may be obliged to send into inland waters."[18] This omission by Goriainov, as we shall see, was deliberate.

No Western scholar, it seems, has sought to explain the divergence between the Goriainov and Noradounghian texts. In an international legal analysis, Coleman Phillipson and Noel Buxton received Goriainov's claims without challenge, citing in full his version of Article 7.[19] Sir James Headlam-Morley, in a posthumous report on the Straits originally prepared in 1922 for the Foreign Office, which he served as historical advisor, leaned heavily on the Russian archivist's interpretation and, indeed, reproduced his version of Article 7 with no mention of alternative texts, about which the Englishman may not have known.[20] While more concerned with the treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and its consequences, Harold Temperley nevertheless stated that Article 7 "unquestionably does give Russian warships access to the Mediterranean."[21] Vernon J. Puryear endorsed without qualification Goriainov's account of the negotiations and significance of the 1805 alliance.[22] Boris Muravieff's approval of the Goriainov line led him to reproduce the Goriainov version of Article 7 in French in the narrative and in "the Russian original" in an appendix, because of "the extreme importance of . . . [its] stipulations."[23] In a work published

[17] Gagarin, *op.cit.*, p. 106. Gagarin concluded his two-part article with a warning that any solution of the Eastern Question, denying Russia "unlimited control over Constantinople and the Straits," would "not give Europe a durable peace"; *ibid.*, May 1915, p. 66.

[18] *Ibid.*, April 1915, p. 106; Noradounghian, *op.cit.*, p. 75; and Hurewitz, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

[19] *The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles*, London, 1917, pp. 32-37.

[20] *Studies in Diplomatic History*, London, 1930, chap. 8, especially pp. 220-24.

[21] *England and the Near East: The Crimea*, London, 1936, p. 413, n. 107, and p. 410, n. 78; also Sir Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841*, London, 1951, 1, pp. 305-6.

[22] *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, Berkeley, Calif., 1951, pp. 64-65, 100; also Piers Mackesy, *The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810*, London, 1959, pp. 154-55.

[23] *L'Alliance russo-turque au milieu des guerres napoléoniennes*, Neuchatel, 1954, pp. 197-202 and Annex XVII, p. 405; contrast with André N. Mandelstam, "La Politique russe d'accès à la Méditerranée au XX^e siècle," Académie de Droit International,

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by the Department of State at the time of the 1945-1947 Soviet-West dispute over the Turkish Straits, Harry N. Howard merely offered without comment the Goriainov and Noradounghian versions of Article 7; he did not include any of the secret clauses of the 1798/1799 treaty.[24] In *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* I, too, furnished both texts of Article 7 and in my prefatory comments followed the explanations by Headlam-Morley, Puryear, and Temperley; moreover, since I could not locate a copy of the 1798/1799 secret clauses, I omitted the public treaty as well, selecting only the United Kingdom's act of adherence to the Russo-Ottoman alliance.[25]

Cemal Tukin, author of the most comprehensive work in Turkish on the Straits question, used Ottoman archival materials and European literature. He examined in full the texts of the secret treaties of 1798/1799 and 1805 and pointed out that Article 7 of the later instrument is identical with Article 4 of the earlier. But even Tukin ignored Goriainov's extravagant claims regarding Article 7. Sensitive instead to Goriainov's assertion that the Sublime Porte had taken the initiative in erecting the two alliances, Tukin cited Turkish sources to argue that in both instances it was the Tsar who was pursuing the Sultan.[26]

If Western and Turkish scholars had not grasped the Russian game, why should the Soviet government give it away, more particularly since the USSR, by its own admission in invoking the "precedents" of 1805 and 1833, harbored aspirations at the Straits no different from those of Tsarist Russia? Little wonder that Dranov, writing under the imprint of the Soviet Ministry of Justice, gave his blessings to and indeed surpassed the extravagance of the Goriainov explication. Dranov alleged that the 1798/1799 alliance changed the Straits regime in Russia's favor, since the secret treaty "distinguished sharply between Black Sea and non-Black Sea Powers" and stressed the "special role of Russia—the greatest Black Sea Power—in the regime," by recognizing "that the forces of the Straits' owner did not suffice to defend the safety of the entrance into the Black Sea and [thus] the combined efforts of both Black Sea Powers were required."

In turning to the 1805 treaty, Dranov noted the discrepancy between

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Recueil des cours, XLVII (1934), pp. 599-800. A former Russian dragoman at Istanbul (1899-1914), Mandelstam devoted only a few lines (pp. 604-5, 607-9) to the 1798/1799 and 1805 treaties. He cited Noradounghian's Art. 7, significantly without mentioning the Goriainov variant, of which Mandelstam must certainly have known.

[24] *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (DS Pub. 2572, Wash., 1947), pp. 14-15; see also *Potsdam Conference Papers*, II, p. 258, n. 44.

[25] Hurewitz, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-67, 72-77.

[26] *Boğazlar Meselesi*, Istanbul, 1947, pp. 65-107; the Turkish text of Art. 7 (1805) appears on p. 106, n. 4.

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the Gagarin and Goriainov versions, but stated that "upon careful analysis [it] . . . proves not to be great and serious." Both texts, he argued, made Russia and the Ottoman Empire jointly responsible for the waterway's defense; and Goriainov's additional clause "in essence . . . does not change anything because the provisions concerning free passage . . . and the co-operation of the Turkish government are contained in Articles 1 and 4. We do not even mention that 'counteraction against the passage' of foreign vessels through the Straits implies the right of passage . . . for the vessels of the Power obliged to enforce this 'counteraction.' "[27] Dranov also ridiculed Nol'de's views on Hünkâr İskelesi as contrary to reason. How could Russia render its proffered aid to Turkey under the 1833 agreement, inquired Dranov, "if it is assumed that closing the Dardanelles, qualified in the agreement's secret article as an action 'in favor of the Russian Court,' is also extended to Russia, if Russian warships, defending the safety of the Straits, might not pass through the Straits in both directions? Is it not obvious that in this case the agreement becomes an empty shell, absurdity, nonsense?"[28] The Soviet government manifestly was banking on the fact that the masterpiece by Goriainov, having been accepted for so many years by so many non-Russian experts, was not going to be exposed as the fraud it was.

The odds favored the Russians. The patent treaty of 1798-1799 was published soon after it entered into effect; so, too, was the treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, including the secret article.[29] In 1912 Goriainov himself published in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry's almost forgotten journal, which was launched earlier in the same year, the authentic French text of the 1805 public and secret treaties together with a copy of the instructions to the Russian Minister at Istanbul. In 1961 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the second volume of a new series of Tsarist documents, reproduced these texts together with a photograph of the Turkish version and a Russian translation of the French original.[30]

[27] Dranov, *op.cit.*, pp. 63-67. [28] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[29] G. F. de Martens, *Recueil général de traités*, 1st ed., Göttingen, 1801, VII, pp. 214-18 [1798/1799]; and GB, *PP*, 1836, L, No. 85 [Hünkâr İskelesi].

[30] Russia, Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, *Izvestiia*, I, Bk. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 244-49; the instructions to Italinskii (pp. 235-37) do not furnish any fresh evidence on the Straits question. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 1st. ser., II [April 1804 to Dec. 1805], ed. by A. L. Narochnitskii, Moscow, 1961, No. 184, pp. 582-94; although the volume bears the publication date of 1961, it did not become available to the author until the present article was in galleys. It has therefore been impossible to incorporate all the material in the half-dozen other documents (Nos. 11, 39, 43, 45, 90, and 100) that shed light on the official Russian attitudes of the day toward the Straits and that confirm the accuracy of the present analysis.

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But neither the Tsarist nor the Soviet regime ever released the text of the earlier secret treaty. Nor did Goriainov or Dranov.[31] The very failure of the Tsarist regime to disclose in full the 1798/1799 instrument and its tardy publication of the 1805 treaty eloquently testified that the secret Straits clauses of both had led to a dead end. Had these stipulations developed—as Goriainov, Dranov, and Molotov maintained—into durable privileges for the Russians and durable commitments for the Ottomans, their prompt publication would have been dictated for precedential reasons, if for no others. The closest that the Tsarist government came to issuing the first secret treaty was a paraphrased summary in an officially sponsored history of the Russo-French war of 1799.[32] This Dranov cited as his source of the 1798/1799 arrangement.[33] As for the terms of the 1805 secret treaty, no Western scholars appear to have been aware of the 1912 publication; and until 1961 no Russian scholars, if cognizant of the published text, seem to have referred to it.

This accounted in part for the total silence on both "ancient treaties" in official British documentary collections: one comprising Russo-Ottoman agreements from 1774 to 1849 and issued during the Crimean War; and the other, of instruments on the Black Sea and the Straits from 1535 to 1877 and put out on the eve of the Congress of Berlin.[34] Even the noted British international lawyer, T. E. Holland, said nothing about the secret clauses in a special study of the treaty relations between the two Black Sea Powers in the eight decades following Küçük Kaynarca.[35]

Ahmed Asım, the principal contemporary Turkish chronicler of Selim III's reign, summarized in detail both instruments of 1798/1799 but mentioned neither one of 1805.[36] Not until 1882-1883 did the texts

[31] Of the seven pertinent articles in the two secret treaties (1-4 [1798/1799] and 1, 4, and 7 [1805]) Goriainov furnished the purported texts of only the last two; Dranov, only the 1805 trio in Russian translation of the Noradounghian French translation from the Turkish—which was itself a translation from the original French—plus the divergent Goriainov Art. 7.

[32] D. M. Miliutin, *Istoriia voiny Rossii s Frantsiei v tsarstvovanie Pavla I v 1799 godu* [History of the Russo-French War of 1799 in the Reign of Paul I], 1st ed., St. Petersburg, 1852, 3 vols., a work started by Lt.-Gen. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, who completed before his death in October 1848 only Part 1, comprising the first 13 chapters of Vol. 1. Part 1, chap. 10, mentions both the public and the secret treaties of 1798/1799 (Russ. ed., 1, pp. 111-12; Ger. ed. [München, 1856], 1, pp. 92-93); a more detailed summary of the two may be found in footnote 169 of both editions, where the author disclosed that he had consulted the original texts at the Foreign Ministry archives in St. Petersburg.

[33] Dranov, *op.cit.*, p. 63; also Sergei Zhigarev, *Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose* [Russian Policy in the Eastern Question], Moscow, 1896, p. 246; and P. H. Mischef, *La Mer noire et les détroits de Constantinople*, Paris, 1899, pp. 200-4.

[34] GB, *PP, 1854*, LXXII, No. 88, "Treaties (Political and Territorial) between Russia and Turkey, 1774-1849"; and note 4 above.

[35] *The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey from 1774 to 1853*, London, 1877.

[36] Ahmed Asım Ayntâbi, *Asım Tarihi*, Istanbul, n.d., 1, pp. 65-68.

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of the two secret alliances finally appear in Osmanli Turkish in the Sublime Porte's official treaty series, published by the Ministry of War.[37] But only Turkish scholars seem to have used these texts. The later secret treaty, but not the earlier, also came out in French translation from the Turkish[38] and in modern Turkish.[39] Since only one signatory released the earlier secret instrument in its own language and since neither party indicated the original language of negotiation or valid text of either treaty, there appeared no certain way of establishing authenticity by the published record.

Textual analysis apart, there remained many questions to answer. Why did the Russian government withhold the 1805 secret treaty for so long and fail to publish the earlier one altogether, if the precedents were so vital to the Russian claims? Why did Goriainov offer "textual" evidence from the 1805 but not from the 1798/1799 treaty, if the earlier instrument first enunciated the principle of Black Sea closure to foreign warships and if the second alliance grew out of the first? Would the answers to these questions explain why the Soviet government in 1945 said nothing about the 1798/1799 treaty? Did the Sublime Porte in fact consent to share the Straits' defense with its northern neighbor in the Napoleonic period?

Answers to these bedeviling questions were found in 1958-1959 in widely separated places. The problem of textual authenticity was the first to be resolved. At Istanbul, in the Prime Ministry archives, where are housed the vast bulk of the massive and as yet largely unworked imperial Ottoman records, I located the original instruments of the 1798/1799 alliance; and in the (Ottoman) Foreign Ministry archives, where are stored many of the nineteenth-century files on the Sublime Porte's external relations, I discovered the Russian ratified text of the 1805 secret treaty. However, such is the state of Ottoman archival collections of this period that the stages of negotiation of the two treaties and the manner of their execution cannot be reconstructed accurately.

Fortunately, the United Kingdom mediated the two Russo-Ottoman alliances and the recurrent disputes to which their implementation gave rise. While copies of the Russian draft proposals for the 1798/1799 and 1805 secret treaties were unearthed in the Public Record Office at London, the final instruments signed and ratified by Russia and

[37] *Muahedat Mecmuasi*, IV, Istanbul, 1298 A.H. (1882-83), pp. 19-27 (1798/1799) and pp. 41-48 (1805).

[38] Noradounghian, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 74-77.

[39] Nihat Erim, comp., *Devletlerarasi Hukuku ve Siyasî Tarih Metinleri*, Ankara, 1953, pp. 227-32.

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the Sublime Porte could not be tracked down there, despite Britain's adherence to the first alliance and its indispensable help in the creation of the second. With this exception, which proved unimportant in view of the discoveries in Istanbul, it was possible to assemble in London almost a step-by-step account of how the alliances were drawn up and carried out. More than that, contemporary British evidence on the unfolding of Russia's Straits policies came from a source consistently friendly to Russia in this period.

General Vasilii Tomara, the Russian Minister at the Sublime Porte and the Tsarist plenipotentiary, signed the Russian and French originals of the 1798/1799 alliance.[40] The Turkish originals, signed by Seyyid Ibrahim Ismet Bey and Ahmed Atif Efendi, the Reisülküttap (the Ottoman functionary principally but not exclusively charged with the conduct of external affairs), were missing, for they obviously had been exchanged for the instruments bearing Russian seals and signatures, in accordance with Ottoman diplomatic practice.[41] This would suggest that the Russian and Turkish texts were valid and the French was agreed.[42] The act of ratification of the 1805 secret treaty, with Tsar Alexander I's seal and signature, appears in Russian, signed at Breslau on 3/15 November 1805, and the treaty text appears in French, establishing beyond contention that this time the French text was valid.[43]

The Goriainov book, it will be recalled, cited the 1805 alliance only. Its version of Article 4 is almost identical in language and punctuation with the original. So, too, is his text of Article 7 up to and including the phrase "assuring their mutual tranquillity." In the absence of firm testimony, the source of his inserted clause on unlimited Russian naval transit through the Straits can only be conjectured. If, as seems logical, it was originally suggested by Andrei Italinskii, the Russian Minister at Istanbul,[44] this could not be corroborated in either Istanbul or London. However that may be, Goriainov adapted the text to suit his own ends. Before an explanation of his behavior is attempted, we might well take a close look at the Russo-Ottoman alliances.

The Russian contention that Napoleon's occupation of Ottoman Egypt in mid-1798 induced the Sublime Porte to implore Tsarist help

[40] Republic of Turkey, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Muahedeler Tasnifi, No. 418/1-3.

[41] Turkish texts, probably copies of the originals, in Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hatt-ı Hümâyûnlar Nos. 52804 (secret), 52808 (public).

[42] The instruments were first drafted in French, then translated into Russian and Turkish.

[43] Republic of Turkey, Dış İşleri Bakanlığı Arşivi (Istanbul), Dosya 886.

[44] In an alleged despatch of 23 Jan./4 Feb. 1805, No. 94, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St. Petersburg; cited by Goriainow, *op.cit.*, p. 6, n. 1.

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and that the performance was repeated in 1804-1805 under renewed circumstances of French expansion sounds persuasive but simply is not true. The Padişah, it is true, found in the French seizure of his territory a basis for common action with Russia. Yet the Sublime Porte did not immediately throw itself into the Russian embrace, because the memories of recent Tsarist aggrandizement in the Crimea at Ottoman expense were still too fresh. On the contrary, ever since Austria's defeat in the fall of 1797, Russia had been pressing the Ottoman government to join forces against an expansionist France. The Sublime Porte's resolve against co-operation with its northern neighbor was ultimately weakened by news of Napoleon's appearance in Egypt.[45] But even then the Sultan and his vezirs dragged their feet, refusing to formalize any defensive scheme with Russia without Britain's simultaneous participation.

Unlike Russia, the United Kingdom at that time had no clearly defined strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The significance for Britain's position in India of the continued survival of the Ottoman Empire was articulated only intermittently. Whitehall's Mediterranean policy in the early Napoleonic wars aimed, above all, to drive the French out of Egypt and Malta. Since the United Kingdom harbored no designs on Ottoman territory, the Sublime Porte suspected Britain less than it did Russia, and without Britain's decision to join the Russo-Ottoman alliance of 1798/1799, there would probably have been no alliance. What is more, the British government at this time saw no danger in the movement of Russian war vessels through the Straits. Indeed, any allied addition to British naval power in the Mediterranean was welcomed.[46]

In the end, having forged with Russia an alliance to which Britain became linked on terms of full equality for all signatories, the Ottoman government comported itself accordingly. It accepted Russian naval co-operation against France in the Adriatic but instructively did not invite the help of Russian land forces to which it was entitled under secret Article 6.[47] From Britain the Padişah procured military

[45] Thomas Naff, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the Great European Powers, 1797-1802" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1960), pp. 130-36, 238-48, 268-74.

[46] Cf. GB, Public Record Office, FO 65/40, Whitworth to Grenville, 3 and 6 Aug. 1798, Nos. 33-34; 78/20, Grenville to Smith, 14 Sept. 1798, No. 4; 78/24, Grenville to Elgin, 2 Dec. 1799, No. 5; 65/54, Warren to Hawkesbury, 13, 20, and 27 Apr. 1804, Nos. 23-25 and 29; and 78/42, Straton to Hawkesbury, 28 May 1804, No. 33.

[47] In negotiating this article, the Russians insisted that the Sublime Porte undertake to pay the costs of provisioning the forces; the Ottoman negotiator feared that, in default of such payments, Russia might demand territorial compensation. Sultan

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and naval aid in expelling French forces from Egypt and unlimited territorial guarantees. Though clearly framed against France, these guarantees might be invoked as well against Russia, whose thinly disguised imperial policies, even under alliance, gave the Sultan's vezirs pause. Russia, in turn, viewing the alliance as unequal, patronized and bullied the Sublime Porte. Quite apart from the common goal of containing France, the Russians still privately coveted Ottoman territory, especially the Straits, and tried to make the alliance serve both ends at once.

The Russian attitude sharpened Ottoman suspicions and rendered an unsteady partnership unsteadier. The alliance nearly fell apart in 1800-1801 when Tsar Paul I broke away from the coalition to join France against Russia's erstwhile allies in a variety of schemes, including one for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Tsar Alexander I, in 1801, returned to the fold. But the alliance for all practical purposes fizzled out in the Franco-Ottoman peace of Amiens (1802). For more than two years thereafter Russia, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire, each in rotation as the changing situation dictated, urged revitalizing the alliance system. That the Sublime Porte late in 1804, as Goriainov suggested, put forward the proposal actually leading to negotiations for alliance renewal is not borne out by the record. What does emerge is the fact that, after the talks were formally launched in February 1805, the Ottoman Empire was far less enthusiastic than Russia about resuscitating the old alliance or structuring a fresh one.[48] The negotiations, inconclusive until late in July, were consummated only because of the newly arrived British Ambassador's energetic mediation.

Indeed, as late as 3 September 1805, less than three weeks before the signature of the renewed Russo-Ottoman alliance, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, reported

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Selim III, however, instructed his plenipotentiary that "If I could be certain that they [the Russians] would bring and take their soldiers at our behest, I should not dwell on the matter of the supply fund." Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hatt-ı Hümâyûnlar No. 15008, Kaymakam Paşa to Padişah, 9 Cemazielevvel 1213 [20 Nov. 1798].

[48] At the start Selim refused to sign any secret alliance until France might declare war on the Sublime Porte or on Russia; Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hatt-ı Hümâyûnlar No. 146H, Padişah to Sadrazam, 1219 [1804-5]. But even in negotiating the public treaty, the Sublime Porte insisted on qualifying the invitation of Russian troops to Ottoman soil by having inserted in Art. 4—over the objections of the Tsar's minister—the following phrase: "the routes to be followed by these troops will be indicated in advance by the state requiring assistance." Such a qualification, the Sultan's representative argued, would enable the Sublime Porte to prevent "the passage of Russian troops through Wallachia and Sofia." *Ibid.*, No. 7104B, Reis Efendi to Padişah, summary proceedings of treaty negotiations, 17 Zilhicce 1219 [20 March 1805].

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on the authority of the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Adam Chartoryskii, the Tsar's willingness to accede to Ottoman conditions for treaty revision, provided there were no further delays. Otherwise, "the Court of Petersburg would for its own Security feel it necessary to order the march of a Russian Army into [Ottoman] Moldavia & Wallachia & the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea to sail for the Straights [sic] of Constantinople. Prince Czartoryski intends to remit a considerable Sum of Money to [the Russian Minister at Istanbul] . . . in the Hope that the Distribution of it, may induce those who possess the confidence of the Sultan to counsel a compliance with the Proposition of the Russian Government."[49] These instructions actually arrived after the conclusion of the treaty, with all clauses objectionable to the Sublime Porte deleted. However, the Russian attitude so late in the negotiations hardly suggested Ottoman fervor for the alliance. The Sublime Porte's confident belief in a reaffirmation of Whitehall's earlier guarantees doubtless eased Britain's mediatory role; and Britain's failure to adhere to the 1805 alliance, for reasons wholly accidental, contributed in no small measure to the Padişah's early denunciation of the latest Russo-Ottoman treaty.

Substantial units of the Russian Black Sea navy were in fact permitted to sail through the Bosphorus early in September 1798, nearly four months before the formal conclusion of the first Russo-Ottoman alliance. This permission was granted, not for defending the Straits, but expressly for mounting a combined Russo-Ottoman naval offensive against the French in the Ionian Islands and the adjacent mainland.[50] In taking note that Russian naval forces had already gone through the waterway, secret Article 1 left no doubt that this happened after agreement between the parties on joint action in the Mediterranean. For this same wartime objective, the Sublime Porte pledged to continue allowing Russian warships "to navigate the Canal of Constantinople." Article 2 stated that the Russian fleet would be available against the common enemy for the war's duration. The Sublime Porte for its part promised that these ships might return to the Black Sea at the close of hostilities and "so long as the war may last and the Russian Black Sea fleet may be stationed in the Mediterranean, the warships and other armed Russian vessels, in view of the need for procuring munitions or reinforcements, shall have free entry and exit through

[49] FO 65/58, Granville to Mulgrave, 3 Sept. 1805, No. 39.

[50] FO 78/20, Smith to Grenville, 30 Dec. 1798, No. 45, enclosing minutes of negotiations by Ottomans on 10 Sept. 1798 with Russians and British for naval action in the Mediterranean. See also M. P. Pisani, "L'Expédition russo-turque aux îles ioniennes," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, II (1888), pp. 190-222.

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the Canal of Constantinople. . . . The [Russian] warships and other vessels shall be subjected only to the single formality, at the entrance of the Canal either on the Mediterranean side or that of the Black Sea, of identifying themselves as Russian, following the particular procedure that shall be agreed upon with the Russian Minister at the Ottoman Porte."

This was not unconditional "free passage," as Goriainov and Dranov sought to convey. Rather was it passage limited to the immediate emergency and conditioned by the needs of war, by the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean on allied duty, by the demands for replenishing its supplies and ranks, and above all by the voluntary co-operation of the Sublime Porte, which neither surrendered any sovereignty over the Straits nor shared with others its defense. In brief, Russia might enjoy naval transit not as of right but only on Ottoman sufferance. That this was so is underlined by Article 3, which laid down that the passage of the Russian fleet and its free communication between the Black and Mediterranean seas "may not establish the right or serve as a pretext for claiming future free passage of war vessels through the Canal; this passage is solely reserved for the situation of a common war or the despatch of such aid as the Ottoman Porte might demand in virtue of the Treaty of Alliance and subject to prior agreement." Goriainov may scarcely be blamed for not wishing to disclose the Straits terms of the 1798/1799 alliance. Dranov, too, conveniently overlooked the limiting conditions, while Molotov simply did not refer to the instrument.

This still leaves for consideration Article 4, which stipulated the closure of the Black Sea to all warships and armed vessels "of any Power whatsoever," making Russia and the Ottoman Empire jointly responsible for resisting with all their naval might any attempted forced entry. Did not such proposed "counteraction" imply a share in the Straits' defense and, as Dranov argued, "the rights of passage through the Straits for the vessels of the Power obliged to enforce this 'counteraction' "? A superficial reading of the article, out of context of the treaty and the times, might support Dranov's inner logic. But for reasons of claiming a precedent, such a reading is inadmissible. To the Ottomans, Article 4 merely reaffirmed the existing situation, for no Power, not even Russia, was challenging the Sublime Porte's right of absolute discretion in locking or unlocking the Straits. The Ottoman government was giving nothing up. It was agreeing simply—for the duration of the war and, at the most, of the alliance—to shut the Bosphorus to foreign warships, those of Russia included, if the

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Padişah so desired. Should hostile warships nevertheless manage to penetrate the Dardanelles and reach Istanbul and then try to shoot their way into the Black Sea, the Sultan would really be in serious straits. In that event, he would find it reassuring to be able to invoke a treaty obligation—even one of Russia. But so remote was that prospect as to cause the Sublime Porte no uneasiness, and if the clause made the Russians happy, the Sultan and his vezirs did not object to its existence.

What satisfaction did Article 4 give the Russians? It did nothing but close the Bosphorus—not the Dardanelles—to the warships of other European Powers. It definitely did not open the narrows to Russian warships. Yet this article, together with the preceding three, was probably intended as the thin edge of the wedge with which, while barring the movement of warships of other European Powers through the Bosphorus, Russia expected first to pry open the waterway for unconditional use of its navy, then to claim a role in the Straits' defense, and finally to take full possession. Such a scheme would explain the significance of the Russo-Ottoman convention of 21 March/2 April 1800 on the seven Ionian Islands,[51] taken a year earlier from the French by Russo-Ottoman combined naval action. The former Venetian archipelago became (Article 1) a self-governing "Republic under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte." However, the Tsar promised "on his own behalf and that of his successors to guarantee the integrity of the dominions of the said Republic [and] to maintain its constitution as well as the perpetuity of the privileges which shall be granted to them [Russia and the Ottoman Empire]." Russian and Ottoman forces might be stationed (Article 5) in the Septinsular Republic as long as they were "required by the prevailing circumstances," provided that after the war the two signatories "shall . . . without fail withdraw their squadrons and their troops."

Here was a closely calculated move by the Tsar and his advisors. With Russian garrisons on the Ionian Islands for the war's duration—and, with a perpetual guarantee, the Russians could be expected to find pretexts for keeping their forces on or returning them to the islands after the war—it would be possible to continue sending Russian naval vessels through the narrows in both directions. In brief, if the Tsar were to dominate the waterway without first destroying the Ottoman Empire or arousing the opposition of the European Powers, Russia had to anchor itself firmly in the Mediterranean beforehand. The Sublime Porte (and the European Powers) would presumably be-

[51] French text in Noradounghian, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 36-41.

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come inured to the sight of Russian men-of-war sailing up and down the Straits, and the Russian government must have hoped that the practice would in time become customary and might then be claimed as a right.[52]

In the circumstances, Russia tended to observe the letter of the treaty stipulations on the Straits. Russian naval traffic never became heavy or sustained in the first phase of the alliance. Before its formal conclusion most of the Black Sea warships employed in the Adriatic campaign had passed through the waterway, and most of them returned to home base in September 1800. By the time of the peace of Amiens in 1802, only three Russian frigates remained in the Adriatic. One of them was sold,[53] and the two others returned to Sevastopol in 1803, one being sent back to the Ionian Islands almost immediately. On each occasion of passage, the Russian Minister at Istanbul notified the Sublime Porte in advance, and the units did not enter the narrows in either direction without Ottoman approval.[54] The movement was closely observed by the British Ambassador, who detected only one serious infraction of treaty rights. This occurred when the main body of the Russian fleet was coming back from the Adriatic. "I am extremely mortified to say," wrote Lord Elgin, "that a very . . . illiberal advantage has been taken of the good faith of the Turks . . . the Russians having brought back three ships from the Baltic Squadron . . . refitted in England, in lieu of three much worse ships, built in the Black Sea. It is well known, that the latter description of Vessels are very inferior to those built in the north."[55]

That Russia did not, at the time, believe that it enjoyed unlimited naval transit through the Straits is irrefutably confirmed by the new series of Tsarist Foreign Ministry documents. In October 1802 General Tomara, on the eve of his departure from Istanbul, requested Foreign Minister A. R. Vorontsov for permission, should the Sublime Porte allow "free sailing in the Black Sea to commercial vessels of all friendly nations," to demand that "our warships pass equally freely between the Black and Mediterranean seas." Vorontsov on 2/14 December 1802 advised Andrei J. Italinskii, the new Russian Minister to the Sublime Porte: "That there is at present no need for such a

[52] Cf. Mischef, *op.cit.*, p. 206, n. 2.

[53] R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853*, Princeton, N.J., 1952, pp. 427-28.

[54] FO 78/29, Elgin (Istanbul) to Grenville (London), 14 Apr. 1800, No. 41; 78/30, 23 Sept. 1800, No. 86; 78/31, 15 and 25, Mar. 1801, Nos. 27 and 36; and Anderson, *op.cit.*, p. 427.

[55] FO 78/30, to Grenville, 23 Sept. 1800, No. 86.

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demand, especially since, if it proved necessary for our warships to sail from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, *i.e.* Corfu [an Ionian island], it will be more appropriate at the time to obtain the Porte's permission, for which apparently there is no need to expect the least difficulty. Efforts to obtain such a privilege [full freedom of transit] prematurely, on the other hand, would, without any benefit to ourselves, set the precedent for others, and especially the French, to present the Turkish government with similar demands."[56] This helps explain why Russia was not pressing for unrestricted rights in this period—or, indeed, visibly abusing its restricted privileges.

Russian interest in using the waterway was reawakened early in 1804, when the Imperial government grew anxious over the French military build-up in Italy. In February, Russia invoked the 1798/1799 agreement for warships and transports that began trickling through the narrows for the Ionian Islands. But since the alliance had all but petered out and the French Ambassador was protesting, the Sublime Porte proved most unco-operative. In mid-April the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Admiral Sir John Borlose Warren, at Tsar Alexander I's request, took the unusual step of directly instructing the British Minister at Istanbul via Russian courier "to support the Russian Minister in his representations to the Porte" for permission "to send a considerable reinforcement of Troops and Ships of War to Corfu . . . to act as occasion may require if the French make any initial Movements. . . ."[57]

Russia's urgency was occasioned by worry over "The safety of the Seven [Ionian] islands until the arrival of [the] Russian forces . . . and . . . they were very desirous therefore that the letter I wrote to Lord Nelson might arrive in time to induce his Lordship to attend to the protection of the Seven Islands, and that the British naval force there should not be diminished."[58] Warren reported that the Russians were planning soon to send to Corfu most of the sixty vessels in the

[56] Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 1st ser., I [Mar. 1801 to Apr. 1804], ed. by A. L. Narochnitskii, Moscow, 1960, No. 139, p. 349. There is only one other Straits document (No. 180, pp. 432-33), in which Vorontsov on 16/28 May 1803 applauded Italinskii's reminder to the Sublime Porte to shut the Bosphorus to the warships of all nations: "We affirm our complete approval of this rule by not requesting any exception from it ourselves." For further evidence, see *ibid.*, II, Chartoryskii to Italinskii, 13/25 Aug. 1804 (No. 43, pp. 115-16), and to Vorontsov, 18/30 Aug. 1804 (No. 45, pp. 119-23).

[57] FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 13 Apr. 1804, No. 23. Cf. also Narochnitskii, ed., *op.cit.*, II, Nos. 43 and 45, pp. 115-16 and 119-23.

[58] FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 27 Apr. 1804, No. 29, report of conversation with Chartoriskii on 6/18 Apr. 1804.

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Russian Black Sea fleet, with some 20,000 troops.[59] Foreign Minister Chartoryskii confided in the Admiral that "Russia had much difficulty in transporting so large a body of troops, as the Turks were always jealous and occasioned some delay in their passage to the Mediterranean."[60]

The reinforcement of the Russian garrisons and fleet on the Ionian Islands to the stated level took well over a year. As late as August 1805 the British Ambassador reported that "2,000 Russian troops in recent days passed through the Straits to Corfu. A line of Battle ship with 1,000 Men on board is now in the Bosphorus; the Remainder of the Reinforcements, so as to make the whole number in the Ionian Republic amount to 20,000 Men, may be expected very shortly."[61]

Throughout this period Ottoman hindrance at the Straits increased, thanks to French diplomatic intervention, and with it grew Russian exasperation. The Russian Minister at Istanbul was directed in August 1805, before knowledge of successful British mediation reached St. Petersburg, if the Sublime Porte persisted in "obstinately" rejecting secret articles proposed by the Tsarist regime—permission for Russian and British forces to occupy Ottoman territory for the war's duration and the grant to Russia of the right to intervene on behalf of the Sultan's Greek subjects—"to let the Negotiation be continued during the remainder of the summer, [so] that the Reinforcements intended for Corfu might in the intermediate Time be able to Effect their passage."[62] There is little testimony here of Russian enjoyment of free sailing through the Straits, and even less of Russian self-assurance, for by then the Tsarist government must have become painfully aware of its vulnerability. Without freedom of movement through the Straits, the Russians would have had to support their Mediterranean units from the Baltic. Little wonder that Russia began to view the 1798/1799 Straits provisions as having worn visibly thin. From the end of 1804 through September 1805 it was not the Sublime Porte but Russia that pressed actively for alliance renewal.

This time, however, the conditions for negotiations were far from satisfactory. Not in occupation of any Ottoman territory, the French freely conducted obstructive diplomacy. The Russians, moreover, had not yet entered into a fresh coalition with the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Russian accord, signed on 11 April 1805, did not go into effect

[59] FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 13 Apr. 1804, No. 24.
[60] FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 20 Apr. 1804, No. 25.
[61] FO 78/45, Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 10 Aug. 1805, No. 10.
[62] FO 78/45, Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 4 Aug. 1805, No. 9.

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until 28 July, when Russia reluctantly gave up its demand that Britain surrender Malta. The Tsarist regime must earnestly have believed that possession of that island might fix Russia more securely in the Mediterranean than did the existing Ionian arrangement.[63] At Istanbul, British mediation had to await the arrival of the new British Ambassador in mid-July.

The three articles on the Straits in the Russo-Ottoman secret treaty, finally signed on 11/23 September 1805, represented, even on paper, no startling advance for Russia. Article 7, as already pointed out, was an exact replica of the 1798/1799 provision for the closure of the Black Sea. Article 4 stated that "for the entire duration of the presence of Russian troops on the territory of the Septinsular Republic, the Ottoman Porte shall facilitate the passage through the Canal of Constantinople of Russian warships destined to replace the naval forces in the said islands or to supply and relieve the troops stationed there." Whereas the original Convention of 1800 (Article 5) limited Russian and Ottoman military presence on the Ionian archipelago to the war's duration, the new secret treaty agreed that Russian troops "shall not be recalled until the situation which motivates their presence is overcome." Moreover, Article 3 of the 1805 secret treaty confirmed the 1800 Convention and widened Russian rights of intervention to embrace the former Venetian districts on the Adriatic mainland annexed by the Ottoman Empire. Finally, Article 1 of the 1805 treaty, after explaining that the renewed alliance aimed to contain France and restore the balance of power in Europe, went on to declare that "the Sublime Porte shall for the duration of such a war facilitate the passage through the Canal of Constantinople of warships and military transports that His Majesty the Emperor may be obliged to send into the Mediterranean." The privilege under Article 1 seemed designed to provide for any contingency in which the Ionian Islands might be taken from Russia and the Sublime Porte; or alternatively to enable Russia to reinforce military and naval units anywhere in the Mediterranean.

The 1805 alliance proved far more fragile than its antecedent. At the time of signature Russia was striving, almost desperately, to shore up its military and naval establishment on the Ionian Islands. For the buttress of this sole Russian base in the Mediterranean were assembled warships from the Baltic[64] as well as the Black Sea fleets. Ever since

[63] Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, 1922, 1, pp. 331-48 passim; Mackesy, *op.cit.*, pp. 46, 54, 67-68; and William Hardman, *History of Malta, 1798-1815*, London, 1909.

[64] Anderson, *op.cit.*, pp. 428-30, 438.

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early 1804 French diplomats at Istanbul maintained a watch on the Bosphorus, reporting to Napoleon every Russian military vessel that sailed north or south past the Ottoman capital. Through the French Embassy and in direct appeals to Sultan Selim III, Napoleon had endeavored to persuade the Sublime Porte to close the waterway to Russian traffic.[65] "If Russia has 15,000 men at Corfu, do you suppose that this is [directed] against me?" wrote Napoleon to Selim on 30 January 1805. ". . . Are you so blind as not to see that one day, either under the pretext of returning to Russia the troops at Corfu, or under that of increasing its forces [there], a Russian squadron and army . . . may invade your capital, and your empire will have ceased with you? . . . Awake, Selim. . . . Your true enemies are the Russians because they wish to reign over the Black Sea and they cannot do so without possessing Constantinople."[66]

As early as January 1806 Pierre Ruffin, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Istanbul, sent to Paris a copy of the recent secret Russo-Ottoman treaty.[67] By the late spring Napoleon took determined steps to nullify the Russian advantage, for he was no less anxious to keep potentially hostile naval power in the Mediterranean to a minimum than was Britain—with Russia in tow—to preserve naval supremacy. Early in May Napoleon named as ambassador to the Sublime Porte General Horace Sébastiani, who had served as trouble shooter in the Ottoman Empire before and after the peace of Amiens in 1802. "The aim of all negotiations," Foreign Minister Talleyrand on 21 June 1806 instructed Sébastiani, on the eve of his departure, "must be the closure of the Bosphorus to the Russians and the prohibition of the passage from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea of all their armed or unarmed ships."[68]

[65] Among pertinent Osmanlı documents are Turkish translations of guarded requests in 1804, spaced a month apart, from Gen. [later Marshal] Guillaume Brune, the French Ambassador, for closing the Straits and for not renewing the alliance with Russia and Britain; Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hatt-ı Hümâyûnlar Nos. 1506 and 1505. "These favors have been requested from Your Majesty [Selim] numerous times," bewailed Brune in the second mémoire, "both before and after the arrival of the French Ambassador in your country. Besides this, four different letters have been presented to Your Majesty on this subject. Your silence, however, has continued for exactly 45 days."

[66] I. de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères*, Paris, 1865, II, pp. 271-72.

[67] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Turquie, CCXI, to Talleyrand, 13 Jan. 1806, No. 47; although Ruffin mentioned the enclosure of the treaty text, I could not locate it.

[68] *Ibid.*, CCXII, 21 June 1806, No. 2; cf. Napoleon's instructions to Talleyrand on 9 June in *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, Paris, 1863, XII, No. 10339, pp. 449-50, and Napoleon's letter to Selim on 20 June, No. 10382, pp. 474-75; on French diplomacy in Istanbul, see Puryear, *op.cit.*, passim.

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In the summer of 1805 the Sublime Porte expected the United Kingdom formally to join the Russo-Ottoman alliance, as it had in 1799. This step, however, Britain never took, although it gave its blessing to the alliance and particularly to the Straits clauses, which Whitehall viewed as a means of propping up the allied naval position in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Office in London indeed failed to send a single directive to its outpost in Istanbul for more than a year, from 16 September 1805 to 14 November 1806. Still, the British Ambassador, Charles Arbuthnot, despite recurrent doubts of how his substantive decisions and diplomatic behavior were being assessed by His Majesty's Government,[69] remained faithful to his original instructions to work intimately with the Russian Minister in the "common" cause of containing Napoleonic France. When the Foreign Office finally rediscovered its man at the extremity of Europe, it counseled him—in line with his own recommendations—to offer peace or war to the Ottoman government, specifying as one of the conditions that "By treaty the Porte is . . . bound to permit the Passage of Russian Ships of War, with the necessary transports to convey stores and Provisions, thro' the Canal of Constantinople. . . . let the Passage of the Russsian ships be granted, free from Impediment, according to the Terms of the Treaty, and all Appearance of Hostility on the part of Great Britain shall immediately cease."[70]

With the United Kingdom first standing aloof and then siding with Russia, as the latter became progressively more minatory, the Sublime Porte lost even its original lukewarm interest in the alliance. Goriainov claimed that it was destroyed by French machinations. We can now see that Sébastiani, who arrived in Istanbul on 9 August 1806, found it simple to detach the Sublime Porte from any lingering fidelity to what had become a meaningless obligation. Sébastiani's manner was certainly more flamboyant than that of either Italinskii or Arbuthnot. But the Frenchman's browbeating tactics differed in no way from Italinskii's—or, for that matter, from those of Arbuthnot who, even before Sébastiani's arrival, had come to feel that the Ottoman government understood only the language of force. Incidentally, it is instructive that Russia early in 1806, at a time when it began to encounter stiffening Ottoman resistance at the Straits, nevertheless persisted in its singleminded scheme of attempting to establish the precedent of free transit in both directions. "But should the Court

[69] Cf. despatches to Fox, FO 78/51, 28 Aug., 8 Sept., and 30 Oct. 1806, Nos. 55-56, 80; FO 78/55, 15 Jan. 1807, No. 1.

[70] FO 78/52, from Howick, 20 Nov. 1806, No. 2.

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of Petersburgh," observed the friendly Arbuthnot, in commenting on Russian men-of-war sailing northward toward the Black Sea, "instead of instantaneously marching a powerful Army to the Frontiers, leave its Minister here without other instructions than the mortifying ones of suing for free passage for the troops which are to return from the Mediterranean, which return itself has given a most unfortunate idea of Russian Weakness, we must in that case be prepared for all the evil which can arise from Turkish pusillanimity when increasingly worked upon by French Arrogance & Presumption."[71] Before the year's end the Sublime Porte declared war on Russia, and by February 1807 war also broke out with Britain, following the ill-fated English naval demonstration at Istanbul under Admiral Duckworth.[72]

Soon after Napoleon's victory over Russia at Friedland in mid-June 1807, Tsar Alexander at Tilsit ceded the Ionian archipelago to France. The Tsar also pledged to return the Russian Mediterranean fleet to its Baltic and Black Sea bases. Damaged in an Atlantic gale in November 1807, the men-of-war heading for the Baltic took shelter in Lisbon, where in September 1808 they were surrendered to the British, who by then were at war with the Russians. The Black Sea vessels, whose return the Sublime Porte refused to sanction, were eventually transferred to the French.[73] Thus, the 1805 treaty, far from establishing a precedent for joint Russo-Ottoman defense of the Straits, presaged the end of the first serious effort by Russia to become a Mediterranean Power.

Without the Ionian archipelago or its equivalent, Russia could not pursue its tactics of familiarizing the Ottomans and the European Powers with the spectacle of Tsarist warships plying up and down the waterway. Without a Mediterranean base, in which Russia and the Ottoman Empire shared an interest, the Tsar could not persuade the Sultan to allow even limited naval use of the artery. In fact, the undignified expulsion from the Mediterranean set Russia's entire Straits scheme back for more than a quarter-century. And then Hünkâr İskelesi did not renew Russia's earlier right to restricted naval transit—not even on the basis of the Goriainov argument.

[71] FO 78/49, to Mulgrave, 6 Feb. 1806, No. 4.

[72] On 25 Jan. 1807, Arbuthnot, 36 hours after receiving Howick's instructions of 14 Nov. 1806, conferred for four hours with Mehmed Galib (the Reisülküttap) and three of his colleagues. The English and Ottoman conference minutes leave no doubt that by then Arbuthnot, his proposed policy of forceful demonstration having received Foreign Office approval, sided unequivocally with Russia. From that point on, given the difficulties of communication between Istanbul and London, an Anglo-Ottoman war was unavoidable; Başbakanlık Arşivi, Hatt-ı Hümâyûnlar No. 6971 and enclosure of FO 78/55, to Howick, 27 Jan. 1807, No. 9.

[73] Anderson, *op.cit.*, pp. 457-59.

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The Russian imperial archivist, it will be recalled, contended that Russia received from Hünkâr İskelesi more than had appeared on paper because of its alleged confirmation of the 1805 treaty. But the 1805 treaty authorized Russian naval use of the Straits only for reinforcing the Ionian garrisons or for Mediterranean combat in the war for which the alliance was concluded. The Ionian Islands, however, had passed in 1807 to French, and two years later to British, possession; and the Napoleonic wars had ended in 1815. What the Tsarist regime procured in 1833 was the Sultan's promise to close the narrows to all foreign warships whenever Russia was engaged in a defensive war. As Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode explained to Tsar Nicolas I in January 1838, until Hünkâr İskelesi,

> no *direct engagement* existed by which the Porte was held *toward us* equally to maintain the closure of the Dardanelles *in case of war* between Russia and other Powers.
>
> It is this gap that our Treaty of Alliance of 26 June/8 July 1833 served to fill.[74] [Italics in original.]

Nesselrode therefore strongly advised the Tsar against trying to get permission for units of his Baltic fleet to sail through the Straits into the Black Sea. "The maritime Powers," observed the Foreign Minister,

> have sought in vain to invalidate our treaty of alliance. Our efforts have succeeded in inspiring the Sultan with . . . courage to maintain his engagements toward us. . . .
>
> But in order to encourage the Porte to persist in this attitude, Your Majesty has always loyally adhered to the axiom neither to stipulate nor to demand for us this same right of passage . . . that it is in our great interest to see denied to all other Powers.
>
> The treaties oblige Turkey . . . *to close* the entrance of the Dardanelles to foreign flag[s] of war but these instruments do not oblige it in any way *to open* [that entrance] to us.
>
> The treaty of Adrianople, confirmed by that of Constantinople [Hünkâr İskelesi], stipulates explicitly in our favor the free passage of *merchant* ships only; but no stipulation authorizes us to demand the admission of our vessels of war into the Bosphorus. [Italics in original.]

Hünkâr İskelesi, however, was not destined to live long either. The United Kingdom was now a foe of Russian naval privilege at the Straits. As the greatest sea Power, Britain, after finally developing a firm and clear policy for the eastern Mediterranean, managed by 1840-1841 to internationalize the Straits regime with its provisions for closing the waterway to all warships in either direction, except light vessels serving the diplomatic missions.

[74] Translated from French text in Mosely, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

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What still requires explanation is Goriainov's original falsification of the evidence. Here we can only fall back on conjecture until the Russians themselves reveal the true facts. Mosely's observation that the Goriainov interpretation of Hünkâr İskelesi was probably intended to prepare the way for a "Russian" solution of the Straits problem would apply equally to the 1798/1799 and 1805 treaties. What is more, perhaps Goriainov's handling of the question was meant to strengthen Foreign Minister Aleksandr Izvolskii's efforts to persuade the European Powers to endorse Russia's claims to the Straits.[75] The Soviet government has given no indication of abandoning its designs on what it terms "the Black Sea Straits." Neither is there any reason to suppose that the USSR will drop the pretense that the realization of this aim is merely a reassertion of time-honored rights. Indeed, the latest edition of the Soviet textbook on international law, published in 1957, declares flatly: "In accordance with bilateral Russo-Turkish treaties signed in 1798, 1805 and 1833, Turkey undertook not to permit the passage through the straits of men-of-war of non-Black Sea Powers and not to hinder the passage of Russian men-of-war. Thus, the principle was established that passage through the Black Sea Straits was open to the men-of-war of Black Sea Powers (at that time Turkey and Russia)."[76] One cannot be certain, therefore, that Moscow will not resort once again to plain, old-fashioned imperialism to achieve its "manifest"—if frustrated—destiny at the Turkish Straits.

[75] W. L. Langer, "Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-08," *English Historical Review*, XLIV (1929), pp. 59-85.

[76] F. I. Kozhevnikov, ed., *International Law: A Textbook for Use in Law Schools* (English ed.), Moscow, n.d., p. 231; the work was prepared by the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and chap. 5, in which this discussion appears, was written by S. V. Molodtsov.

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ARMS CONTROL AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

By LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD

I. Introduction

THE notion of a world government is today—and perhaps for all time—a fantastic one. That it is thought of as even a hypothetical framework for political and military planning grows, curiously enough, out of contemporary doctrines on arms control and disarmament. Political scientists have generally come to despair of quantum jumps to world order as utopian and unmindful of political realities. But fresh minds from military, scientific, and industrial life, as they focus on the increasingly dangerous arms race, have sometimes found the logic of world government irresistible.

What has served to bring the problem of world government out in the open in the 1960's is the United States government's public acceptance of the notion of general and complete disarmament. But though international political authority is an inescapable inference from the language of current American policies, its detailed implications have rarely been made explicit in Western pronouncements.

The problem is of course not an entirely new one. The 1946 United States plan for the international control of atomic energy assigned the proposed international agency managerial control or ownership of "all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security," plus "power to control, inspect and license all other atomic activities." To carry this out would have required extraordinary powers at the center. But it was still some distance from that to the political control of the world as a whole implied in present American disarmament proposals. Throughout the postwar negotiating period, even when programs were advanced for drastic reduction and limitation of armaments, there is no record of any concrete suggestion or even discussion of a supranational political organization that would exercise effective control in the world.

Recent exchanges in the Great Power dialogue have now reopened the larger political question. On September 19, 1959, Premier Khrushchev announced to the UN General Assembly his plan for "general and complete disarmament" within four years. The American response was given by Secretary of State Herter on February 18, 1960, in a

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speech to the National Press Club. Mr. Herter said that the first goal of the United States in the forthcoming disarmament negotiations was the creation of a "stable military environment." To create such an environment, he urged certain arms control actions, such as measures to guard against surprise attack and to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons.

The second stage of Mr. Herter's counterproposal was general disarmament. Two American objectives existed in regard to the disarmament stage. The first was the creation of universally accepted rules of law, backed by a world court with effective means of enforcement—"that is, by international armed force." The second objective was disarmament itself—"to the point where no single nation or group of nations could effectively oppose this enforcement of international law by international machinery."

The theme set forth by Mr. Herter was continued in the two proposals made by the United States in the spring of 1960, on March 15 and June 27. Under the latter proposal, an International Disarmament Control Organization would be established within the framework of the United Nations in the first stage of disarmament. The second stage would include progressive establishment of an international peace force within the United Nations sufficient to preserve world peace under disarmament. And the Kennedy administration has carried over this theme, with its interior logic, into the disarmament plan enunciated on September 25, 1961, at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Here, then, is the basis in recent American policy for the notion of world government. It was not made explicit and, given the realities of domestic political life, may never be. But the United States position carried the unmistakable implication, by whatever name, of an international political authority sufficient in any event to keep the peace and with the power to enforce its judgments. By any reasonable semantic standards, this is a description of governmental power. Yet there is little evidence that we have thought through the political and military meaning of our position. In part this is because the question of feasibility is so overwhelming in today's world that the matter seems totally academic. The usual responses to the idea on the part of politically sophisticated people are so invariably negative that the only wonder is that the United States thought it would make good propaganda to enunciate it. And in part, alas, analysis too often follows policy.

But it is worth while for three reasons to try and see what we may have had in mind in our proposals. On policy grounds, it would be well to spell out with greater precision, if only for our own better

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understanding, that to which this country has committed itself. On grounds of sound scholarship, it may be worth while to apply analytical methods to a problem commonly approached on the basis of hunch alone. Finally, there is always the possibility that sophisticated people will turn out to have been wrong.

II. What a World Government Would Look Like

What, in the highly unlikely event that United States disarmament proposals and, consequently, an effective world authority were accepted, might that authority look like, within the bounds of reason and probability?

Limited in its scope, the authority has powers sufficient to monitor and enforce disarmament, settle disputes, and keep the peace. All other powers are reserved to the nations, as in the United States Constitution unspecified powers are reserved to the states. It possesses enforceable taxing powers to finance its political organs, its disarmament policing agency, and its international military force, which includes a nuclear component. The nations are disarmed to police levels. (The imperative reasons for an international nuclear capability will be discussed later in the article.)

Government powers are distributed to three branches. Without assuming that the Anglo-Saxon mold would necessarily be imposed on the new system, it can be assumed that primary functions would exist in some recognizable form, that they would be to some degree separated, and that each would be carried out through appropriate organs or agencies.

The legislative organ is enabled to make decisions, within the scope of the organization's powers for peace-keeping, on a weighted voting basis that combines population and capacity to contribute to the power of the system. A formula will have to be found that assures the United States (and presumably every other country) that vital decisions will not be made by any but the most substantial majorities, including the United States.

If the concept of realism can be applied to world government, this seems to represent minimum realism. For while there can be no individual veto, the Great Power veto will in this partial sense be extended into a limited world government. The precise formula for ensuring appropriate weight to the principal contributors while protecting the rights of the smaller nations has many possible variations. One way is through form. A bicameral legislature excels, through its upper house,

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at protecting the rights of the smaller units, while a unicameral body can do the same for the larger members by means of a dual vote.

Another way is through voting procedures. A qualified majority—two-thirds or three-fourths or even four-fifths—would be necessary to avoid control by a numerical majority that commanded only a minor fraction of the world's industrial power, financial ability, and so on. Further protection to the newly vulnerable great powers might take additional forms: for example, a legislative council in which the major nations would have a predominant vote (but no individual veto); a system of separation of powers among the branches of government as in the United States; or emphasis of the special position of the major nations in the executive branch.

The one design, however, that could not be applied successfully would be the Calhoun concept of the concurrent majority (in this case between the central authority and its constituencies) with its implied right of secession. "Effective control" has to mean the power to maintain the union.

The executive organ is operated by personnel elected by the member governments, with administrative services carried out by international civil service personnel. An executive council, like the legislative branch, gives special weight—but without individual veto—to the most populous, industrially developed, and strategically significant states. Safeguards in the form of political supervision and rotation of personnel discourage usurpation of power by a "Praetorian Guard."

Without the optional clause, all states are bound to submit to the jurisdiction of the World Court for both legal disputes and legal aspects of political disputes. Justice is administered by an expanded network of international courts with regional panels. States and international agencies, but not individuals initially, are subjects of international law. An equity tribunal system is created for both legal disputes and legal aspects of political disputes, along with greatly expanded mediation, conciliation, and arbitration services, use of rapporteurs, and judgments by the courts *ex aequo et bono*. The constitution provides for the enforceability of decisions of the courts, for execution of the decisions of the executive, and for the carrying out of the laws passed by the legislature. The central authority itself can be sued, but, like the United States government today, cannot be forced to comply with court judgments. A human rights court modeled upon the comparable court under the European Community is empowered to hear individual complaints of violations of a covenant of civil rights that would accompany the constitution. Permissive and voluntary organs of co-

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operation exist in the economic, social, scientific, and technological and cultural fields as they do now, without powers of compulsion except under special provisions dealing with essential services—health, public safety, and the like.

A crucial feature of the system is its universality. Unlike the conventional American view of the United Nations, membership in the new regime, far from being a privilege, is mandatory. All the countries now divided would be included. None of the individual problems reflected in today's divided countries would by themselves have to be finally solved in order to set up such an organization. But they would no longer be solvable by force—or so the new ground rules stipulate.

National governments continue to make, execute, and enforce domestic laws with respect to all areas presently *in foro domestico* except for the raising and provisioning of armed forces, the declaration and waging of war, and the unhampered research, development, and production of military matériel. These hitherto untrammeled rights are limited by the terms of the new international constitution to the right to maintain sufficient police forces to ensure domestic security. The formula for such forces is derived from the present size of local, civil, and state police, plus such national law enforcement personnel as federal marshals, customs agents, border patrols, security police, law enforcement agents, and investigators. (There are obvious discrepancies between states, depending on their internal security problems and practices.)

The international force, compounded appropriately of ground, sea, air, and outer space elements, consists of 500,000 men, recruited individually and wearing the international uniform. It controls a nuclear force consisting of 50-100 mixed land-mobile and undersea missiles averaging 1 MT per weapon. The force is stationed and deployed in territorial enclaves equitably allocated among continents and areas for minimum temptation and likelihood of seizure by any single nation. Ten air-transportable divisions trained for vertical envelopment, armed with the latest field weapons (including a modest supply of tactical nuclear weapons), and provided with transport and communications facilities should be able to counter an aggressive thrust across one nation's borders of the dimension likely under the circumstances. Beyond that, the strategic nuclear deterrent in the hands of the central authority would presumably deter conventional attack on a massive scale in the same fashion as in American hands it presumably deterred Soviet conventional aggression in Europe in the late 1940's and early 1950's. (The latter analogy rests of course on an unproved hypothesis,

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as does the whole doctrine of massive retaliation associated with preponderance in nuclear weapons.) We must also assume the force's ability to deal with guerrilla activities, but without high confidence.

The international force would be decreasingly capable of coping with higher levels of aggression involving several countries up to a point describable as true international civil war. It should, however, be understood that the choice is not between an international system incapable of coping with important threats and one that can deal successfully with every contingency in the spectrum. At one end of the scale, the present international system has some capacity to cope even with Communist menaces. At the other end of the scale, we can guess that there would be finite limits to the capacity of a supranational system to handle such maximum challenges as international civil war. A civil war, domestic or international, can gather such force as to end the preponderance at the center. The hypothetical system adumbrated in this article, while its capacities go significantly beyond those presently in sight, remains subject to the basic laws of political life.

The individual states are open to international inspection against violation of the disarmament agreement, with permanent inspection of power and research nuclear reactors, accelerators and other high-energy equipment, electronic industries, steel mills, aircraft and space-vehicle production, major energy-producing facilities, ports, railheads, marshaling yards, major airports and rocket-launching facilities, central budgeting, bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing agencies, principal research and development operations and installations, and various other key and strategic points in the national economy.

The international inspectorate also monitors the atmosphere for clandestine explosions, for underground nuclear tests primarily through robot seismic stations combined with on-site inspection of suspicious events, and against tests in outer space through sensing devices in internationally operated solar satellites. In general, space technology remains in national and in some cases and places (communications, broadcasting, transportation, messenger service, etc.) private hands, but under international inspection. The international authority owns and operates only those space vehicles required both as a military deterrence system and to monitor enforcement of the disarmament agreement. Satellite observation vehicles are equipped to observe optically, electronically, and with infra-red and other sensing and detection devices, and are serviced by an internationally operated ground detection and tracking network.

Largely because of the requirements of the disarmament program, a

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significant "UN presence" exists in all countries, consisting, *mutatis mutandis*, of technical assistance, political liaison, or even military personnel. The secondary functions of this presence include dissemination of impartial factual information as well as continuous liaison with local and national authorities.

III. The Role of Force in World Government

What is the basis for the apportionment of forces that I have suggested between center and parts? Here strategic analysis supplies tentative answers.

"Effective control" connotes a relative monopoly of political power, accompanied by preponderant military force, at the center of the system. The word "relative" indicates that the power relationship between the center and the parts is one of degree. Some examples illustrate the equation. In the United States the people have the constitutional right to "keep and bear arms"; the government monopoly is legally abridged to this extent. In the Congo Republic, during the most politically disturbed period, the central army was outnumbered by the provincial forces, putting into question the existence of effective central rule. In Kuomintang China the military power of the national government was often balanced by the military power of the warlords; the writ of the government hence could not extend uniformly through the country. Thus, under a supranational government, the degrees of relative power as between center and parts can occupy a wide range. The most logical combination of forces poses at once the question of nuclear weapons. One fundamental consideration supplies the answer here.

Modern science and technology are essentially irreversible. They can perhaps be slowed down or even stopped, either by some universal catastrophe or under a disarmament agreement that curtails the intensive allocation of economic and human resources to armaments. But the processes of fission and fusion and the design of engines of delivery cannot be unlearned. Moreover, assuming as we must that atomic power may become economical and fusion power—when harnessed even more so, under total disarmament all of these technologies will be practiced in their peaceable aspects. Thus, however comprehensive the disarmament agreements, however much political power is transferred to a world government, and even if no significant amount of manpower is actually working on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons or on constructing military aircraft, ships, rockets, or space vehicles, there will always remain implicit in technically advanced societies the

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capacity to turn again to the production and fabrication of engines of war, probably with fair rapidity.

The very logic of "effective control" requires placing in the hands of the central authority military forces adequate to deal with breaches of the peace and acts of aggression through whatever means are necessary to preserve a preponderance of power at the center, even against the contingency of clandestine production of nuclear weapons. The conclusion is inescapable that the central authority, in addition to its conventional military capacity, will have to offset the inherent possibility of evasion by being equipped with nuclear weapons, along with delivery systems adequate to deter any reasonable expectation of clandestine violation and consequent attempt to destabilize or even destroy the new system.

It can be seen that even under a radically designed system of authority in a disarmed world the problem of deterrence will persist, including some of the features that characterize it today. The situation facing the central authority would not be very different from that confronting the United States in its need to be equipped with forces, both conventional and nuclear, adequate to deter any likely combination of hostile forces. Indeed, this is the problem inside any society. But the special feature in the new situation would be an element of profound uncertainty. Today national military forces are designed to deter known quantities or qualities of war-making capability in the arsenals of other nations. But our postulated regime, even with a good inspection system, will be to a degree uncertain whether nuclear weapons are hidden or being secretly made, or some highly potent psychochemical agent being developed in an isolated laboratory, or some potentially commanding weapon secreted illicitly in the payload of a communication, weather, navigation, or other type of satellite. These possibilities, however statistically improbable, would pose anew the problem of deterrence, in a different calculus, both for the general authority and for individual countries such as the United States in making their own calculations.

This fact reinforces the need for adequate inspection systems to prevent a marginal lead secretly gained in one nation from destabilizing the disarmed world. For while one mad tribal ruler in the hinterland might not be able to bring the rest of the world to its knees with his secretly prepared poisons, twenty-five secretly produced rockets with megaton warheads could supply one nation with an inordinate amount of political and strategic power. Adequate inspection would be designed to preclude such a development. But deterrence from the

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center would be the second line of defense, deterring in the first instance from political threat, and ultimately from actual military use.

IV. The Problems to be Solved

It is sometimes assumed that if it were not for the Communists, the utopian design of a disarmed world at peace with justice would materialize. This assumption underestimates and possibly miscalculates the willingness of the other major countries to accept the revolutionary political changes implicit in current proposals for general and complete disarmament. The full meaning of that revolution is insufficiently understood.

For the United States, as well as for the other countries, a threshold will have been crossed from one historical condition to another profoundly different one. However many stages it passes through, however tacit or explicit the labels, however gradual or violent the process, there is a Rubicon that divides the Gaul of basically untrammeled national sovereignty from the Tuscany of meaningful supranational authority. Nothing could be more dangerous to sound thinking and planning than to elide this fundamental truth. By whatever process and under whatever name, the agency that is to control world affairs effectively requires in the most important ways the design customarily associated with government. A central authority with effective powers in the realms of disarmament and the settlement of international disputes, and with the capacity to deal with breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, and above all in possession of the most vital attribute of government—a preponderance of military power—is a government, however limited. To grasp the profound difficulty in securing American acceptance, one only needs to recall that the United States Senate took the lead in demanding the veto power in the UN Charter. Other Western nations such as France are more nationalistic than we. And the nationalist revolution in its purest form is only now sweeping the world south of the equator.

Even if American acquiescence in the implications of its own proposals could be assumed, it is surely unsafe to make the further assumption that the ideological and power struggle between communism and the West will not continue indefinitely. This throws into question any program requiring that both sides subordinate themselves, their power, and their ambitions to a supranational authority. That is of course the central dilemma of world politics today, and it applies with ultimate force to the proposition of world government. The logical trap is completed with the familiar paradox: given an unabated con-

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tinuation of Communist dynamism, the subordination of states to a true world government appears impossible; but if the Communist dynamic were greatly abated, the West might well lose whatever incentive it has for world government.

If, to test our hypothesis further, we assume that the West would favor a world under the effective control of the United Nations, the operative question is then how to transform and tame the forces of communism. Such a transformation is theoretically possible, but only under two conditions. The first is that through evolutionary processes Communist doctrine becomes drained of its messianic quality, forgoes its imperialistic ambitions, and comes to accept the notion of a higher authority—a notion totally antipathetic to its tenets. The other condition, which puts the possibility within a more foreseeable time span, is a crisis, a war, or a brink-of-war situation so grave or commonly menacing that deeply rooted attitudes and practices are sufficiently shaken to open up the possibility of a revolution in world political arrangements.

If we can for the sake of analysis make the further assumption that one or the other of these conditions has come about and that the Communists—both Occidental and Oriental—have consequently been brought to a significant mitigation of their doctrine, what kind of political environment could then be foreseen?

Remember, we are assuming a world in which relations between East and West are characterized by significantly higher degrees of mutual trust, internationalist spirit, and unaggressiveness. But there is little in history to justify the belief that without the Communist threat in its present form the world political environment would be inherently stable. We have postulated by necessity a willing acceptance of limited world government by the Great Powers. We then have to postulate further either its acceptance by or imposition on all other nations.

This at once sets up future instabilities. Today the prime foci of instability are actually in third areas, centering on economic disparities and nationalistic strivings for independence, factors which Soviet and Chinese policies purposefully exploit. There is no reason to assume the disappearance under limited world government of the dynamic factors —the intergroup competitions, the racial and ethnic tensions, and the economic disparities that permeate human history and create the conditions for political upheaval. History, short of catastrophe, is not discontinuous. To paraphrase von Clausewitz, limited world government is a form of international conflict carried on under other institutional arrangements than unlimited state sovereignty. Thus, as international

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stability is restored under benign forms of world order, detailed disputes of a chronic or secondary nature can be confidently expected to re-emerge. The new regime will thus be faced with a continuous agenda of problems stemming from political ambition, inequalities, avarice, irrational behavior, the inhumanity of man to man, and the use or threat of violence to achieve political or social ends. This prospect can be ruled out only by the untenable assumption that history will have run its course and an end put to its dynamic, refractory, and otherwise troublesome qualities. Thus a world government, even if it could be created, would be subject to continuing pressures, the most exigent of which could lead to civil war on an international scale.

The crucial difficulty then is to ensure that no large-scale civil war can take place to test the "union," for war on a major scale would gravely threaten the system. It would revive the production and, given the instability of such a situation, the probable use of weapons of mass destruction. In any event such a war would be no more tolerable under a world government than it would be today, and for precisely the same humanitarian, social, and economic reasons.

But here the model runs into one of history's most vexing dilemmas. War is the traditional means for changing the international *status quo*, in the absence of effective provisions for peaceful change. When war is not possible—and when no such provisions exist—the traditional consequence is injustice, which in turn breeds even more ungovernable instabilities and ensuing violence. Perhaps the most sobering consideration about world government is the nightmare prospect of world order at the price of world tyranny—a kind of global Holy Alliance to preserve the *status quo*. Flexibility and capacity to adapt to change in time and with foresight become absolute imperatives in view of the proposed nuclear monopoly in the hands of the central authority.

To achieve the necessary viability and durability, then, the world authority must solve the problem that has pervaded all modern history and accommodate the dynamic forces making for change, without allowing them to lead to war. Specifically the system must, through its legislative action, its executive implementation, and its judicial interpretation, allow for changes in fact, in law, and in the system itself. Without a genuine breakthrough in this realm of peaceful change in which man has by and large so far failed, with persistently tragic results, nothing else about the world order has any meaning in terms of either the efficacy of the system or the values by which we would wish to continue to live.

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V. The Prospects

Will any of this come about? Does it belong within any rational time span as we look ahead?

Under the first of our alternative conditions—the pacific evolution of the Communist world, including China—it is difficult to foresee a limited world government within twenty-five years at the earliest, fifty years more conservatively. If, however, one came about as a result of the second condition—a series of unnerving trips to or over the brink—it might happen at any time. It is this contingency that has the most relevance for the planner of both disarmament and world order, if he is not to substitute wishing for thinking.

If a world authority did become politically feasible, there is no dearth of applicable blueprints for its inner detail. There is no theoretical reason, for example, why the present United Nations could not be transformed by Charter amendment into an instrument of effective global power. Alternatively, the process could be a completely new start, in the way the Articles of Confederation were scrapped to write the Constitution. But it is not terribly important which method is used. The paramount issue is not, as some suppose, the difficulty of amending the Charter. It is to reach a political consensus about ground rules in the world. If this came to pass, it would surely be a secondary question whether to incorporate the changes in the present Charter or to write a new one. The overwhelming central fact would be the loss of control of their military power by individual nations. If this becomes achievable, the details will not be insurmountable.

Of the two paths, only the first—the longer-term evolutionary path—would be likely to follow the historical process of political community-building, involving a series of organic stages of consensus, value formation, and the experiences of common enterprise. Consideration of the other path, envisaging a grave crisis or war sufficient to bring about a sudden transformation in national attitudes through a series of traumatic shocks, raises large questions. Does it sufficiently lay the basis for genuine community, adequate to create a durable world order? Can it short-circuit the main course of history? We can only leave these questions unanswered. But their contingent nature reinforces the need for continuing policies aimed explicitly at achieving the foundation of consensus requisite for true community.

According to our reasoning, national disarmament is a condition *sine qua non* for effective supranational control. Yet the known diffi-

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culties of comprehensive disarmament are overwhelming. We can say that, perhaps as a consequence of a massive crisis, it may be neither inherently nor technically impossible to envisage a program whereby all nations scrap their armaments down to the police level, with a reasonable probability of detecting significant evasion or violation through inspection arrangements. But none of this implies that comprehensive disarmament is a political possibility in the foreseeable future even though it is technically feasible, and even though it is not unthinkable strategically, given adequate supranational surrogates for national arms. It *is* to say that effective international political control is not possible without it.

We can conclude that for both comprehensive disarmament and limited world government two problems are paramount. One is the historic quantum jump implied in centralization of military and political power in the world, a revolutionary concept that we ourselves may not have grasped or accepted any more than has our principal adversary. The other is the presently insurmountable difficulty of bringing into any unified, democratic, world-wide system the messianic forces of the Communist *imperium* so long as it is on the historic make. The very notion of a politico-military framework superior to both East and West today seems remote, for there has been doctrinal continuity between Litvinov's assertion that only angels can be impartial and Khrushchev's statement that there may be neutral nations but there are no neutral men.

The structure of a disarmed world can be perceived more easily than the fundamental building blocks of consensus and community that would have to underlie it. We can end only by speculating that if such a system ever came into being, even in grave crisis, it would thenceforth have its own inner dynamic. New forces could be set into motion that we cannot now comprehend, leading in the direction of constitutional and organic development that might bear as little resemblance to the planned first stage as the United States system in 1962 bears to the thirteen colonies under the Articles of Confederation.

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CIVILIAN LOYALTIES AND GUERRILLA CONFLICT

By CHALMERS A. JOHNSON

IT is not surprising that Western statesmen and students of politics everywhere have recently begun to give major attention to what are variously termed guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare, paramilitary operations, *la guerre révolutionnaire*, insurrectional warfare, resistance movements, and other, allegedly military, doctrines. Of course, irregular armed struggles are not a unique feature of mid-twentieth-century politics; however, they have occurred with great frequency in our time and, more important, they have resulted in baffling victories over vastly better armed, better trained, and more numerous forces. President Kennedy, in response to the apparent superiority in military doctrine possessed by Communist forces in Asia, has ordered the rapid expansion of United States "guerrilla and counter-guerrilla forces."[1] On a more prosaic level, the publication in a national Sunday-morning newspaper of excerpts from a celebrated pamphlet on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung suggests that "guerrilla warfare," along with "massive retaliation," has entered the popular Cold War vocabulary.[2] Before a great deal of money is spent training anti-guerrilla troops, however, American leaders would be wise to find out what is actually meant by "guerrilla warfare," and to determine whether military counter-measures—regardless of the type of training program pursued—are necessarily the appropriate response to it.

To approach the subject of guerrilla warfare as a purely military doctrine is to court disaster. The area of counter-guerrilla policy in which military considerations become relevant is extremely restricted and, even then, the most sophisticated military activities against guerrillas may prove to be fruitless if not pursued in conjunction with political measures. It might be recalled that T. E. Lawrence saw the problem of his war in terms of three categories of related variables: "the algebraical element of things, a biological element of lives, and the psychological element of ideas."[3] His breakdown is not necessarily accurate, only suggestive. What is significant is that he thought of

[1] Neal Stanford, "U.S. Prepares for Guerrilla Wars," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, XL (June 1, 1961), p. 139.

[2] "Mao's Primer on Guerrilla War," *New York Times Magazine*, June 4, 1961.

[3] David Garnett, ed., *The Essential T. E. Lawrence*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1951, p. 99.

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only a third of war as a military, or technical, problem. Because the political two-thirds of guerrilla warfare has been ignored or misinterpreted by many recent commentators, a major confusion has entered into much thinking about guerrilla struggles. Some writers have suggested that armies of the Western Alliance have lost to Communist guerrillas because the former were overequipped with inappropriate weapons (e.g., the Kuomintang, 1947-1949; or the French Expeditionary Forces in Indochina); other writers contend that "privileged" or "active sanctuaries" adjacent to the scene of guerrilla activity, and from which the guerrillas draw sustenance, are the key to the problem; still others pale at the effectiveness of Communist troops in China and Vietnam and gratuitously elevate Mao's strategic insights into a kind of secret weapon. However, all such criteria are open to exception. There are, indeed, certain general features—such as mobility and surprise—that constitute basic doctrine for the military one-third of guerrilla operations but, as we shall see, the ability of guerrillas to achieve surprise and to maneuver with great freedom depends upon the existence of other conditions that constitute the essence of a guerrilla situation.

Many writers feel that one military feature characteristic of all guerrilla warfare is the lack of established fronts. According to these writers, the freedom of guerrilla bands from fixed lines of supply and communications gives them the *sine qua non* of guerrilla victory: an ability to fight only at times and places of their own choosing. Lawrence has given poetical expression to this military "doctrine" in a famous and often repeated metaphor: "Translated into Arabic, the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one-hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing."[4] Actually, this was not the whole of Lawrence's doctrine, and certainly not the bedrock upon which it rested, but some writers have supposed that it was and criticized it.

[4] *Ibid.*

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W. E. D. Allen, for example, in a highly praised little book concerned with Wingate's Gideon Force (which invaded Abyssinia from Khartoum in the spring of 1941 and defeated the Italians), takes up Lawrence's tactical doctrine and finds it dated. Allen feels that favorable terrain—i.e., geography which interferes with the movement of heavy weapons and tanks and which affords cover and ambush sites to the guerrillas—is the chief prerequisite for guerrilla operations.[5] In his opinion, Lawrence's terrain was particularly unsuited to guerrilla warfare; and the development of aircraft has reduced the likelihood that Lawrence's operations could ever be repeated. Thus Allen regards Lawrence's doctrine of "war without fronts" as essentially irrelevant unless geography is in the guerrillas' favor or control of the air is achieved.

Allen's opinion concerning the influence of aircraft on guerrilla tactics was, of course, not shared by Lawrence himself and has been refuted by recent events. Lawrence commented on this subject: "I fancy that air-power may be effective against elaborate armies: but against irregulars it has no more than moral value. . . . Guerrilla tactics are a complete muffing of air-force."[6] And, in a more recent context, Bernard Fall notes that "In view of the French mastery of the air, the Viet-Minh troops had made a veritable fetish out of camouflage."[7] Our interest in raising these points is not to defend one view against the other; it is, rather, to illustrate that if we seek to identify the common denominator of guerrilla wars in terms of military tactics alone, only confusion results. Allen's own contention that guerrilla conflicts are determined by geography is strikingly refuted by an observation of Vladimir Dedijer (official historian of the Yugoslav Partisan movement and one-time editor of the Party journal *Borba*). In his diary entry for July 2, 1943, Dedijer wrote: "Men from Srem [the region between the Danube and the Sava in Serbia] are visiting Tito. . . . I have discussed the development of the rising in Srem with him. The geographical conditions are exceptionally unfavourable for partisan fighting. The area is level as the palm of your hand, bordered by two great rivers, divided by two trunk railways, and with little forest. Tito points out what a first class example it is of the relative *unimportance* of the geographical factor in the development of a rising. The basic factor is studious political work, the atti-

[5] W. E. D. Allen, *Guerrilla War in Abyssinia,* London, Penguin Books, 1943, p. 19.
[6] Letter to Col. A. P. Wavell (later Field Marshal Lord Wavell), May 21, 1923, in Garnett, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 260.
[7] Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy: Indochina at War, 1946-54,* Harrisburg, Pa., 1961, p. 60.

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tude of the mass of the people, and the fighting leadership—if these are right, the population will fight to the last man."[8] If Dedijer and Tito are correct, as I believe they are, then the mounting of a guerrilla movement as well as the possibility of guerrilla victory depends upon the loyalties of civilians in the area of operations.

Writers on guerrilla warfare, such as Allen, have failed to distinguish between what is universal in all guerrilla struggles and what are individual military aspects of particular guerrilla contests. As we shall analyze in greater detail below, the irreducible characteristic of successful guerrilla warfare is the close cooperation between full-time guerrillas and a population almost wholly in sympathy with the guerrillas' goals. Both Lawrence and Allen, the former explicitly and the latter implicitly, support this conclusion. The foundation of Lawrence's strategy against the Turks was to mobilize ". . . the ill wills of all the Arab peoples, combined with the active hostility of a few zealots."[9] Similarly, in Wingate's campaigns against the Italians in Abyssinia, the mass of irregulars, led by English soldiers, were Abyssinians who had engaged in guerrilla harassment of the Italians since the collapse of the main Abyssinian forces in May 1936. Italian reprisals, insults, and dislocations of the traditional Abyssinian way of life gave rise to a mass mobilization that Allen himself describes as the "patriot movement."[10] Wingate was fully aware that the element upon which the success of his endeavor rested was the loyalty of the Ethiopians. In his report on Gideon Force, he wrote: "*Given a population favourable to penetration*, a thousand resolute and well-armed men can paralyze, for an indefinite period, the operation of a hundred thousand."[11] Lest it be thought that the foreign origin of Wingate's own force negates this proposition, it should be recalled that the English cadres were accredited to the Abyssinians and legitimatized by the presence in the field with them of Emperor Haile Selassie.

The idea that guerrilla warfare depends upon and is a function of mass civilian mobilization is, of course, not new to writers on guerrilla warfare. The doctrine of *la guerre révolutionnaire* evolved in recent years by French Army officers explicitly recognizes the guerrilla-civilian nexus and bases its counter-guerrilla strategy upon this principle. Peter Paret has summarized French thinking on guerrilla warfare as follows: "Generally in modern war the civilian population does

[8] Vladimir Dedijer, *With Tito Through the War: Partisan Diary, 1941-1944*, London, Hamilton, 1951, pp. 341-42.
[9] Garnett, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 100. [10] Allen, *op.cit.*, p. 33.
[11] In Christopher Sykes, *Orde Wingate*, Cleveland and New York, 1959, p. 324; italics added.

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not constitute the main, and certainly not the first, object of attention. It is usually thought necessary to deal with the enemy's armed forces and his war-making potential before the population as such can be subjected to direct pressure. In revolutionary war this order is reversed. Revolutionary or insurrectional war has for its aim the take-over of power in the state—that is, internal conquest—made possible through the active help of a population that the insurgents have 'physically and morally conquered.' Military power plays a secondary role in such a contest; the decisive factor is the population, which is both the strongest force in the struggle as well as its primary object."[12]

Despite this clear perception of the underlying reality of a guerrilla situation, the French writers dissipate their insight as they develop their analysis. In focusing upon the link between active zealots and the population at large, they conclude that guerrilla-civilian cooperation is inevitably compelled by foreign agents and does not in any way manifest the wishes of the population. According to *la guerre révolutionnaire* theorists, the principal tactic employed by the agents of foreign powers in "conquering" the population is *terrorism*.[13] Some passing attention is given to the possible need for political and economic reforms but, generally speaking, contemporary French Army studies have failed to inquire objectively into the bases of mass social mobilization.

An emphasis upon guerrilla terrorization of an allegedly passive population leads directly to policy failures. It is supposed that successful counter-guerrilla operations involve the use of specially trained commandos who are, in effect, authorized to counter-terrorize the same population. Virgil Ney, writing in a similar vein to that of the French Army school, propounds this policy as follows: "In the twentieth century, terrorism has become an orthodox part of guerrilla strategy. . . . Terrorism is . . . the most powerful weapon at the disposal of the guerrilla leader. . . . The enemy [anti-guerrilla forces], in order to forestall casualties and prevent the demoralization of his forces, must be prepared to meet terror with terror. And yet such draconian measures are alien to a civilized power."[14] Unfortunately,

[12] "The French Army and La Guerre Révolutionnaire," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, CIV (February 1959), p. 59. For a thorough presentation of all aspects of the doctrine, see Michel Déon, *L'Armée d'Algérie et la Pacification*, Paris, Libraire Plon, 1959. One important French military source on this subject is Ximenès (pseud.), "La guerre révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales," *Revue Militaire d'Information*, No. 281 (February-March 1957), pp. 7-20.

[13] Déon, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

[14] "Guerrilla War and Modern Strategy," *Orbis*, II (Spring 1958), pp. 75-76.

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neither Mr. Ney nor French Army writers can point to a single case in which the principle of counter-terrorization has been effective in ending a guerrilla war.

In fact, such counter-measures can easily be shown to have quite the opposite result. German experience in Russia during the Second World War is only one case in point;[15] the American war against Aguinaldo in the pacification of the Philippines, 1899-1902, is another. A comment by General Arthur MacArthur during the latter conflict reveals what the Americans were up against: "When I first started against these rebels, I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. I did not believe that the whole population of Luzon was opposed to us; but I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipinos are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he represents."[16] The measures employed by United States forces included village-burning, blockade, reconcentration of civilians, and depopulation of various areas by military means. Yet the war continued even after the capture of Aguinaldo, and sporadic fighting occurred in many areas years after the official end of the war on July 4, 1902.

Japanese operations against Communist guerrillas in China during World War II offer a particularly valuable case study of the effect of terrorism against guerrillas. The Japanese command in China was never wholly unified; the North China Area Army in Peking administered a separate area and pursued different policies from the China Expeditionary Army headquartered in Nanking. In both areas the Japanese suffered from guerrilla attacks and from their own inability to distinguish a guerrilla from a villager. However, in north China a policy known as *sankō-seisaku*—the physical destruction of all life and property in an area where guerrillas were thought to exist—was implemented, whereas in central China a policy of establishing so-called Model Peace Zones was pursued. The policy of Model Peace Zones consisted of expelling the Communists from certain very rich agricultural areas and then, following this military phase, of integrating the cleared area into the Japanese satellite economy. Government was placed in Chinese—albeit puppet—hands and the population was led to believe that cooperation with the Japanese was a viable alternative. Over the course of the war, the policy in central China achieved a much greater measure of success. Japanese *sōtō* (guerrilla

[15] See Edgar M. Howell, *The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944*, Washington, D.C., 1956.

[16] Quoted in Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn*, New York, 1961, p. 311.

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mopping-up campaigns) were still under way in north China on virtually the day the war ended, and north China became the Communist stronghold in the succeeding civil war.[17]

While one can conclude from these and other case studies that anti-guerrilla terrorism will more than likely *spread* the mass mobilization upon which guerrilla movements thrive, it is true that guerrillas themselves have, in certain cases, resorted to terrorism against the civilian population. When this occurs, however, it is important to determine whether it is selective terrorism against alleged traitors to the movement, particular classes, or economic groups; or whether it is terrorism designed to compel support of an otherwise unpopular movement. There are, to my knowledge, no cases in which guerrilla operations have been successfully based solely on intimidation of the population.[18] When guerrillas resort to indiscriminate terrorism, this indicates that they do not have broad mass support, without which their movement flounders. Only a losing or degenerate guerrilla force will risk the loss of all mass support by forcing civilian cooperation at gunpoint.

It is equally clear that those writers who stress "active sanctuary" as the basis of guerrilla success are also generalizing from an erroneous conception. When Bernard Fall writes, "In brutal fact, the success or failure of *all* rebellions since World War II depended entirely on whether the active sanctuary was willing and able to perform its expected role,"[19] he is simply ignoring other equally brutal but nonetheless existent facts. The guerrilla victories in China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia did not depend upon the partisans' having unassailable sources of support or refuges within which they were secure. Moreover, in Indochina, the case with which Fall is concerned, he himself observes," . . . the French were definitely the 'aliens' and the Communist-led Viet-Minh forces could count on the instinctive support of the native population."[20] Active sanctuaries, as well as the existence

[17] For a full discussion of this history, see my *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945*, Stanford, Calif., 1962 (forthcoming).

[18] Russell W. Volckmann implies the possibility of forced loyalty from the population when he writes: "No resistance movement can flourish for long without mass civilian support. This support may be voluntary, induced, or imposed, but it is absolutely essential to the maintenance of large guerrilla forces for a prolonged period of time in a country overrun by the enemy." (*We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*, New York, 1954, p. 125.) Colonel Volckmann commanded the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon—a guerrilla corps operating during the period of the Japanese occupation. His own experience indicates that broad-based civilian support was voluntary; only Filipino agents for the Japanese and collaborators were objects of guerrilla attack.

[19] Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 294.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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of guerrilla bases are, of course, not figments of the imagination and may well have an important effect upon a particular conflict; but civilian loyalties within the guerrilla area still determine the effectiveness of such sanctuaries. The postwar guerrilla struggles in Burma and, to a lesser extent, in Greece illustrate conflicts in which active sanctuaries proved to be of limited value because, among other reasons, the population was itself resistant to the trans-border insurgents.[21] Again, with regard to Algeria, where the Morice Line (an electrified barrier) interdicts the Tunisian frontier, Fall concludes, "The war in Algeria, though far from being militarily as hopeless for the French as Indochina, nevertheless again shows the following equation: on the one hand 35,000 guerrillas with at best heavy infantry weapons; on the other hand 500,000 troops, including crack airborne divisions, 'heliborne' *SkyCav* outfits the Indochina fighters only dreamed about—in short, a luxury of matériel and manpower unequalled in French history for a force that size—yet a solution of the conflict by a decisive French military victory is not readily in sight."[22] Thus, it would appear that in preventing the spread of guerrilla war the Morice Line was of only secondary relevance to the Algerian struggle, as was the de Lattre Line around the Red River delta and the armored Ping-Han railroad of the Japanese in north China.

However, to say that sanctuaries or other military advantages possessed by the guerrillas are of secondary importance is not to say that they are of no importance at all. In our attempt to give definition to the phenomenon of guerrilla warfare, we have stressed the *primacy* of civilian loyalties; but this is not the whole of the definition. All guerrilla struggles are mass movements, but not all mass movements are guerrilla struggles.[23] Therefore, while it is crucial that the military

[21] See *Is It a People's Liberation? A Short Survey of Communist Insurrection in Burma* (Rangoon, Ministry of Information, Government of the Union of Burma, 1952), which shows how the rebels alienated themselves from the population (pp. 22-23); and Svetozar Vukmanović ("Tempo"), *How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece Met with Defeat* (London, Yugoslav Information Service, 1950), which criticizes the Greek guerrillas on the same score but from the opposite political point of view. For an objective study of the Greek war and a discussion of the question of privileged sanctuary, see Geoffrey Chandler, *The Divided Land: An Anglo-Greek Tragedy*, London, Macmillan, 1959, pp. 180-81 and *passim*.

[22] Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 297. The Morice Line was, of course, penetrated on occasion. See photographs of FLN operations against the Line in *New Statesman*, June 6, 1959, pp. 782-83. Nevertheless, the most effective French maneuver was "to cut off the nationalist fighters from their roots by preventing them from getting food and shelter from the peasant population" (*New York Times*, December 13, 1959, p. 2).

[23] There are obviously types of mass risings against governments other than guerrilla movements. Gwynn distinguishes at least three main classes of "disorders" in the experiences of British colonial troops: "1. Revolutionary movements organized and designed to upset established government. 2. Rioting or other forms of lawless-

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one-third of guerrilla war (using Lawrence's division figuratively) be understood as contingent upon the question of popular attitudes, this military segment can by no means be ignored. In fact, it can be much better understood as springing from guerrilla-civilian cooperation. The union of active zealots and mobilized population gives rise to those very features of guerrilla warfare—such as near-perfect intelligence, extreme mobility, freedom from logistic anchors, and surprise—that the true guerrilla force enjoys.

This becomes clear when one looks at the writings of individuals such as Lawrence, Mao, and Guevara. All of them stress the need for close ties between guerrillas and civilians because of the great military control this gives the guerrilla leader over the course of hostilities, regardless of the enemy's potential.[24] Nowhere is this more evident than in the realm of intelligence, an element stressed by Lawrence both as a military necessity and as a major prop for morale.[25] Knowledge of what the enemy is doing or staging at all times enables guerrillas to fight only at moments of their own choosing, to guarantee superiority at the moment of attack, and to escape anti-guerrilla mop-ups. The obtaining of such intelligence depends upon intimate guerrilla contact with the population, usually to the extent of creating a rebel "infrastructure." The military implications of guerrilla intelligence are obvious. Fall states: "It must be understood that practically all French troop movements in Indochina took place in a 'fish bowl.' Since practically no troop movements could take place at night for fear of costly ambushes, even the smallest movement of troops, tanks or aircraft was immediately noticed by the population and brought to the attention of Viet-Minh agents."[26] Similarly, the providing of food, shelter, communications, stretcher bearers, labor for mine-laying, and the like by the civilian population all go to make up that ubiquitous word

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ness arising from local or widespread grievances. 3. Communal disturbances of a racial, religious or political character not directed against Government, but which Government must suppress." It is only the first that may imply "guerrilla warfare, carried on by armed bands acting possibly under the instructions of a centralised organisation, but with little cohesion." (Maj. Gen. Sir Charles W. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, London, Macmillan, 1934, pp. 10-11.) The Boxer Rebellion in China and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, for example, should be considered as "communal disturbances" and not as guerrilla movements.

[24] It is common in large-scale guerrilla movements to distinguish mobile forces, full-time partisans restricted to a given area, and militia (organized civilians who leave their regular occupations for military activity only in emergencies). Chinese Communist usage designates these forces as *cheng-shih-tui* (regulars), *yu-chi-tui* (guerrillas), and *min-ping* (militia). Wingate's doctrine does not envisage armed forces other than regulars, but still stresses the need to have the loyalty of the population on the side of the raiders. See Sykes, *op.cit.*, pp. 324ff.

[25] Garnett, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 101. [26] Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 73n.

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of guerrilla catechisms: mobility. On this point, Allen concludes: "The advantage which a guerrilla leader must retain and exploit over regular forces is *mobility*. Mobility favours surprise, and surprise is the basis of irregular tactics."[27]

These and other principles of guerrilla fighting have in recent times been most fully explored in the works of Mao Tse-tung. His famous lectures delivered in the early years of the Sino-Japanese War to students of the Anti-Japanese Military-Political University (*k'ang-jih chün-cheng ta-hsüeh*), located near the Communist base of Yenan, and other pamphlets prepared earlier during the period of the Kiangsi Soviet, constitute the largest body of doctrine on guerrilla warfare in existence. The most important of Mao's studies on guerrilla warfare are *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*,[28] *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*,[29] *On the Protracted War*,[30] and *Problems of War and Strategy*.[31] His analyses fully bear out the understanding of guerrilla fundamentals established here. Mao continually stresses the need for close cooperation between guerrillas and the population at large: "Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation."[32] Similarly, one of the outstanding characteristics of his doctrine is the demand for rigid discipline and scrupulously correct behavior by fully mobile guerrilla troops in order to prevent their alienating the rural population through excesses.

The sensitivity of the Chinese to civilian loyalties is further revealed in their use of political commissars. Differing from the early Russian commissars, whose function it was to supervise ex-Tsarist officers in the Red Army, the Chinese *chengchih weiyüan* (political officer) had an educative function. His primary task was to heighten political awareness of the objectives of the war and of the means of achieving those objectives, both among the troops and among the civilians who backed up the troops. A Communist spokesman told the Yenan press party of July 1944: "No guerrilla army can fight successfully, or even last long, without the support of the people of the areas in which

[27] Allen, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

[28] December 1936. See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, New York, 1954, I, pp. 175-253. For a competent military history covering the same period as this work, see Gen. Lionel Max Chassin, *L'Ascension de Mao Tse-tung*, Paris, Payot, 1953.

[29] May 1938. Mao Tse-tung, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 119-56.

[30] May-June 1938. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 157-243.

[31] November 1938. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 267-81.

[32] "Mao's Primer on Guerrilla War," *loc.cit.*, p. 13.

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they campaign. Eighteenth Group Army [the Chungking designation for the Communist army] indoctrination is primarily aimed at training the troops to act in such a manner that they will gain this total support."[33] An indication of the literalness of Mao's aphorism that the relation between the guerrillas and the people is like that of fish to the sea is seen in the fact that the Japanese called certain of their north China operations "draining the water."

Despite the great richness of Mao's works on guerrilla warfare, the meaning of these works continues to be misunderstood in many quarters. Interpreters of Chinese guerrilla warfare commonly fail to consider the question of mass attitudes and, as a result, they tend to overestimate Mao's own role in producing a Chinese Communist victory. For example, one writer has said: "Mao Tse-tung has done for war what Lenin did for imperialism and Marx for capitalism: he has given war 'scientific schemata.' . . . [Mao] is the man who has written it down for others; the man who has presented the Communist revolutionary with the workable blueprint."[34] And, with even less caution, another writer asserts: "This 'scholar-soldier,' this man of intelligence, patience, strength, and faith in himself put his end-justifies-the means philosophy to work without scruples, morals, or ethics and strove steadily for power. Without Mao Tse-tung there would have been no Communist conquest of China."[35] However, as Mao's own long experience shows, no matter how well a leader perceives the nature of guerrilla tactics, his movement will flounder until he has a mass following. Mao Tse-tung was writing on guerrilla warfare as early as 1927, and the Red Armies in the Kiangsi Soviet were noted for their exemplary employment of his guerrilla methods; yet the Kiangsi Soviet was crushed in 1934. It was not until after 1937 that Mao's movement was able to capitalize upon his insights into guerrilla tactics; and then it was based on widespread Communist-peasant collaboration against the Japanese, which was ultimately strong enough to overwhelm the Nationalist government in 1949. Mao's "scientific schemata" for war span these two periods; the crucial development was the achievement of a mass basis during World War II.[36]

[33] "The 18th Group Army: Training, Medical Care and Supply," U.S. Office of War Information, General Intelligence Division, *OPINTEL Report No. 324* (December 15, 1944), p. 1.

[34] Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX (September 1955), pp. 322, 324.

[35] Francis F. Fuller, "Mao Tse-tung: Military Thinker," *Military Affairs*, XXII (Fall 1958), p. 139.

[36] The maximum population of the various districts under the direct control of the

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This brings us to the primary consideration in an evaluation of any guerrilla conflict: the potentiality of the population for supporting the guerrillas or the formal government, or for remaining passive. In determining this potentiality, one must bear in mind the particular configuration of guerrilla warfare—namely, armed operations by a relatively small number of full-time combatants against an objectively more powerful force. Guerrilla warfare is not synonymous with generalized insurrection, civil war (of the American or the Spanish variety), or general strike, in which all individuals of the war area may be regarded as overt participants. The condition upon which guerrilla warfare is predicated is that the civilian population is regarded by the defending force as neutral but is, in fact, hostile to the defending force. (Even if the population is known to be hostile, so long as the defending force grants it non-belligerent status the conditions for guerrilla warfare are established.) It is this presence of an overtly neutral but covertly engaged population that provides the "ocean" in which the "fish" maneuver and hide, thereby crippling the stronger force and depriving it of the advantages of occupation. The conversion of the "ocean" into a "desert" is, as we shall see, the primary consideration in anti-guerrilla operations.

The willingness of the population to support the guerrillas depends upon the intensity of its hostility to the guerrillas' enemies; it is not necessarily related to the ultimate goals of the guerrilla leadership—e.g., to the establishment of a Communist or other nation-state, or to the carrying out of a broad-based social revolution. The population will support the guerrillas if it is convinced that the guerrillas are operating effectively against the enemies of the people: e.g., agents of a

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Soviet central government in 1934 was estimated by Mao Tse-tung for Edgar Snow in 1936 as follows:

Kiangsi Soviet	3,000,000
Hupeh-Anhui-Honan	2,000,000
Hunan-Kiangsi-Hupeh	1,000,000
Kiangsi-Hunan	1,000,000
Chekiang-Fukien	1,000,000
Hunan-Hupeh	1,000,000
Total	9,000,000

Snow recalled that "Mao laughed when I quoted him the figure of '80,000,000' people living under the Chinese Soviets, and said that when they had that big an area the revolution would be practically won." (*Red Star over China*, Modern Library edn., 1938, p. 73.) By April 24, 1945, at the Seventh Chinese Communist Party Congress, Mao Tse-tung could announce that "China's liberated areas under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party have now a population of 95,500,000." ("On Coalition Government," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1956, IV, p. 259.)

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tyrannous or economically unjust government, foreign invaders, or colonial troops. The actual mobilizing influence is the hated condition—the presence of foreign troops, economic exploitation, and so forth—that alienates the population from the formal authorities. The guerrilla leadership, however, may well entertain objectives beyond the immediate removal of the people's burden. It may, moreover, transmit these objectives to the population by propaganda; and it may have its objectives made legitimate by successfully overcoming the enemies of the population in battle. But it must not be thought that long-range political objectives of revolutionary elites are the usual *reason* why a population initially gives aid to the guerrillas. As has been frequently observed, communism is more often the result, or beneficiary, of revolution than its cause.[37] Successful counter-guerrilla operations may well include the advancement and support of political objectives similar to, but distinct from, those of the guerrilla leadership (such as the creation, by a colonial power, of a popular national government that is willing to cooperate with the former colonial authority). But counter-guerrilla military activities divorced from a policy designed to remove, or mitigate, the basic causes of mobilization will surely fail.

In view of these facts, the nature of mass grievances must be considered in the development of any counter-guerrilla strategy, and the alleviation of such grievances has gone hand in hand with most successful anti-guerrilla campaigns. The suppression of the Communist-led Huks in the postwar Philippines is a well-known case in point. The economic and political reforms associated with the name of Ramon Magsaysay improved the life of the Filipino peasant and secured his integration into the political life of the nation—thereby cutting off the Huk zealots from their basis of support and driving them to employ terrorism against the population. The policies of resettlement and re-education of surrendered insurgents further added to the solution of what had seemed an almost endemic problem. These measures were, of course, accompanied by military operations against the Huks; but military suppression was not effective until used in conjunction with political and economic reforms. Probably the single most important factor in the Philippine government's favor was that it, itself, was not incapable of winning popular support. Thus, by incorporating the aspirations of the Filipinos into its own program, the government effectively emasculated the proposed policies of the Communists.[38]

[37] See, e.g., Harry J. Benda, "Revolution and Nationalism in the Non-Western World," in Warren S. Hunsberger, ed., *New Era in the Non-Western World*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957, p. 20.

[38] See Alvin H. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer to Communism*, Stanford, Calif., 1955; and Frances L. Starner, *Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry*, Berkeley, Calif., 1961.

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A less clear-cut but nonetheless instructive case is that of operations during the "Emergency" in Malaya. Guerrilla units in Malaya were formed (as in the Philippines) in response to the Japanese invasion. Japanese persecution of the Chinese, together with a conscious policy of pitting the Malay population against the Chinese, gave rise to a wholly Chinese guerrilla resistance movement.[39] The guerrillas did not succeed in gaining support across the ethnic division; nevertheless, as a result of the size of the Chinese community in Malaya (almost 50 per cent, exclusive of Singapore, where Chinese predominate), they still had widespread civilian backing. In 1948 this trained nucleus of guerrilla fighters was reactivated by its Communist leadership in order to wage war against the British colonial authorities. The Chinese villages on the edge of the jungle again supported the guerrillas, this time in the belief that they were defending Chinese rights against British pro-Malay policies. In broad outline, British strategy against this movement took three forms: in addition to strictly military operations against the guerrillas, (a) some half-million Chinese were resettled onto good land, which was isolated from and defended against active insurgents; (b) non-revolutionary Chinese leaders were urged to participate in the constituted government, thereby preventing a Communist monopoly on Chinese loyalties; and (c) plans were laid for the eventual independence of Malaya, thereby removing the colonial complication from a pluralistic community in which the groups were, and are, basically more complimentary than antagonistic. These policies were not pursued as part of a coherent plan, and British reprisals certainly lengthened the war at one time. But the overall result of British-civilian cooperation was the isolation of the guerrillas, thus eliminating the possibility of a guerrilla victory.

A third example of a type of "successful" anti-guerrilla operation is the suppression of Antonio Conselheiro's rebellion in northeastern Brazil (1896-1897), described in Euclides da Cunha's classic history of guerrilla war, *Rebellion in the Backlands*.[40] The significance of this example lies not in its symbolizing one kind of viable policy alternative; rather, it shows that the logical outcome of anti-guerrilla military operations divorced from any political measures whatsoever is the total destruction of both the active fighters and their sustaining popu-

[39] Willard H. Elsbree, *Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, p. 148.

[40] To call *Os Sertões* (translated as *Rebellion in the Backlands* by Samuel Putnam) a classic history of guerrilla warfare slights the moral, humanitarian, and scientific significance of this work, considered to be Brazil's greatest literary classic. It is at the same time, however, a major study of military history and of guerrilla conflict. See Euclides da Cunha, *Rebellion in the Backlands*, University of Chicago, Phoenix edn., 1944 and 1957.

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lation. And, as da Cunha has shown, this is not an easy thing to do. Antonio the Counselor was a religious fanatic who led the backwoodsmen of the São Francisco region in open rebellion against the Brazilian government at the end of the nineteenth century. The economic, geographical, racial, and religious bases of the *sertanejos*' (natives of the backlands) and *jagunços*' (the "actives" among the *sertanejos*) mobilization against the government are analytically distinct from the nationalist and Communist revolutions considered earlier.[41] Nevertheless, the conditions that developed around Canudos—Antonio's capital—were identical to those met with in more recent guerrilla conflicts: total hostility of the people to the anti-guerrilla forces; guerrilla knowledge of the difficult terrain, which was exploited with devastating effectiveness by them against the troops; ignorance of the basis of guerrilla warfare by the attacking forces; perfect intelligence on the side of the guerrillas, surprise and ambush; and the consequent demoralization of the anti-guerrilla army. Since the counter-guerrilla forces had no understanding of their adversary and had no intention of attempting to remove the causes of mass mobilization, the war assumed a scale of savagery and destruction entirely out of proportion to the numbers of guerrillas involved. Four expeditions were launched against the area held by Antonio and, as da Cunha laconically observes, Canudos never surrendered—the guerrillas were simply exterminated with great loss of life to both sides. Such a Pyrrhic solution must be understood as implicit in anti-guerrilla operations where complete identity between rebels and civilians is achieved and where solely military counter-measures are pursued.

Although it is easy to demand that counter-guerrilla policy incorporate political measures which will isolate the guerrillas and restore strategic initiative to the defenders, it is less easy to put such measures into practice. General political and economic considerations must be taken into account, such as the abilities of local elites, the nature of a country's economy, its class structure, and a host of other variables that can only be altered by long-term reforms. By the time guerrilla warfare has actually broken out, the conflict may already be lost to the defenders and require a negotiated or stalemate solution. Thus it would seem that prevention is the better part of cure. The recognition of this fact provides one further support for those foreign policy measures undertaken by Western governments that seek long-range solutions to endemic problems via controlled social change. More-

[41] Antonio Conselheiro's rebellion bears a striking similarity, on a lesser scale, to the Taiping Rebellion of mid-nineteenth-century China.

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over, an understanding of the political basis of guerrilla warfare should dictate against Western governments' further militarizing certain conflicts by granting unrestricted arms support for already discredited regimes. However, in cases where guerrilla conflict is unavoidable, a sensitivity to civilian loyalties in guerrilla warfare should facilitate the effective employment of troops, thereby minimizing the tendency this all too commonly has to drive the guerrillas and civilians closer together.

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Review Articles

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

By GEORGE MODELSKI

Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, 560 pp. $10.00.

I

THE contemporary relevance and obvious topicality of the study of international relations have proved a mixed blessing to the discipline. While supplying much of the emotional drive behind students in the field and public interest in their work, these qualities have prompted criticism from those for whom excessive preoccupation with current problems and the frequent shifts of perspective that this entails connote a certain lack of academic worthiness and of enduring, permanent principles of analysis. Indeed, it may be granted that no intellectually respectable discipline or framework of generalizations can be built solely or chiefly upon the journalistic study of contemporary world crises.

There are, in the main, two (and, as will be shown later, closely linked) ways out of the narrow confines of day-to-day events: the development of theory and the exploitation of history. Both are now being pursued with increasing profit to international relations. As to the first, the readers of this journal need not be reminded of the awakening of interest that has occurred along several fronts in the field of theory in the past few years. The volumes edited by Fox,[1] Hoffmann,[2] and Knorr and Verba[3] have established the theory of international relations as a distinct and important branch of the subject; we may expect that additional work along these lines will give international relations a level of theoretical development approximating that of the other social sciences. The most conspicuous merit of *Politics and Culture in International History* is that it marks an

[1] W. T. R. Fox, ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, Notre Dame, Ind., 1959.

[2] Stanley H. Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960.

[3] Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, Princeton, N.J., 1961.

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important step forward along the second avenue of emancipation, the increasing exploitation of history. For, in Gabriel Almond's words on the book jacket, this work "provides the historical dimension for teaching International Relations, which has been badly needed."

Textbooks and other general works have on the whole ignored the wealth of experience in the management of international relations waiting to be quarried from past ages and civilizations. Some of them discuss, in an introductory chapter, the growth of the Western state system since the Middle Ages and give a brief account of the background of the foreign policies of selected great powers; most of them contain no more historical material than narratives of events and reconstructions of relationships of the past few decades.[4] Textbook references have remained scanty because most monographic and historical studies are narrative rather than analytical and therefore unusable for the purposes of international relations. Moreover, the pre-Copernican egocentrism of European international politics judged the historical experience of other than Western systems to be irrelevant, uninteresting and, at best, "exotic."

We would, by contrast, contend that an awareness, in broad outlines, of the processes and systems of international relations of the past should be part of the mental equipment of every student of international relations.[5] To some extent this is required for the utilitarian and short-term purpose of gaining an understanding in depth of individual international issues and structures[6]—an understanding most readily achieved by those already sensitized to the general contours of the historical background. But we can place this point in a broader perspective when we say that, with the aid of a historical dimension, students of international relations will gain (1) a deeper awareness of the effect of the past upon the present and the future, including an

[4] There are some notable exceptions, all pre-World War II. Frederick Schuman's veteran *International Politics* (1st edn., 1933) is built upon the conception of the Western state system and presents, in Book I, outlines of the Near Eastern and Greco-Roman precursors of the Western world. Frank M. Russell's basic *Theories of International Relations* (1936) contains, in addition, chapters on ancient China and India. Quincy Wright's now classic *A Study of War* (1942) does full justice to premodern warfare. The standard Soviet textbook of international history, *Istoriia Diplomatii* (W. P. Potemkin, ed., Moscow, 2nd edn., 1959), has in Part I a sound discussion of the diplomacy of antiquity, but ignores India and the Far East.

[5] While dismissing outright the view that international relations is no more than the most up-to-date part of history, another name for contemporary history; the study of international relations stands in the same relation to international history as political science does to political history and economics to economic history.

[6] Quite obviously, a student of, say, the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the ownership of the temple of Pra Viharn, or of international disarmament conferences, cannot account for the status or prospects of such issues without going into their historical antecedents.

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awareness of the diverse historical traditions of non-European cultures, and (2) competence for the comparative study of international systems. An assessment of the historical experience in international relations up to 1500 A.D., *Politics and Culture* helps us in both respects.

II

The need for an awareness of the past is seldom contested on the grounds of principle, but is less often seen in relation to individual problems. There is therefore little harm in reminding ourselves that "all problems in social science have an essential historical dimension."[7] Because the social system is a dynamic system, in all dynamic explanations at least some of the explanatory variables used antedate the variables to be explained. The explanation of social and international processes should thus proceed in terms of the "initial conditions" associated with some arbitrary initial period and of the subsequent external influences upon the system. These "initial conditions" and, in particular, certain stable endogenous variables of the system (such as the population or culture) are in every sense a product of history. For familiarity with an important range of these variables, especially for those that cannot easily be conveyed in figures or in capsule form—for instance, the cultural traditions of an international system—a sense of history and acquaintance with its broad outlines are therefore well-nigh indispensable.

Hence Professor Bozeman's work helps to remind us of such important "genealogical" data bearing upon international relations as the impact of Buddhist missionary activity upon China, the influence of the Roman law of contract upon international law, the role of Byzantium in the formation of Russian and Venetian diplomacy, or the importance of the fifteenth-century Council of Constance for the practice of international congresses. Valuable as such reminders are, they may at times become unconvincing—like the author's attempt to trace French and North African projects in the 1950's for federal organization in the Maghreb to medieval trade relations in the Western Mediterranean (p. 405)—or else inconclusive—like her attempt to deduce the nature of Soviet diplomacy and foreign trade organization from the heritage of Byzantium, while pointing out at the same time

[7] John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science," *Behavioral Science*, v (April 1960), p. 139. I would prefer to say that all social science problems have a *time* dimension, because the historians' history customarily deals in macroscopic time sequences, while for social scientists the earlier periods may frequently be shorter and of a kind not usually subject to historical methods of investigation.

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that equally strong Byzantine influence had, through Venice, been brought to bear upon the international arrangements of Western Europe.

But over and above the genealogical value of history in the strict sense, the historical dimension of international relations must give us as complete as possible a survey of the records of human action in the international field. This we need not only as a matter of intellectual completeness but also to shed light on the diverse traditions that may underlie contemporary politics in Southeast Asia or Central and South America, now that all of these areas have regained independent status and a role in international organization. Systems of international relations have in past millennia been a property not only of the familiar European and Mediterranean areas but of virtually all the other corners of the globe.

Although the need to study historical international systems is now increasingly well recognized,[8] progress in this direction has been slow, since the enterprise, though challenging, is vast and demanding. Professor Bozeman is to be congratulated for having succeeded in conveying not only the mechanics of the operation but also some of the peculiar flavor of a number of systems of world politics of earlier ages. Interesting, for example, is her account of the Near Eastern system of states of the second millennium B.C., because it shows how well certain familiar structures of international relations such as an international language or trade were developed as long as four thousand years ago. Equally interesting is the discussion of Byzantine statecraft, a subject all too long neglected by Western scholars, or of the Hellenistic system and the role of the small naval power of Rhodes in providing certain services indispensable to its operation (by maintaining freedom of international trade, developing rules of sea law, and undertaking functions of mediation and arbitration).

However, the international relations of historical India and China come in for too scanty a treatment. In regard to India, this reticence is in part explicable by the shortage of historical records concerning the scores of political entities which once flourished in that vast and populous area. But even though no explicit doctrine of an Indian family of states seems to have survived in the documents, some elementary form of international organization must surely have been in existence. Kautilya's remarkable concept of the Circle of States is as close to that of an international system as we could wish, and allows us to

[8] The argument for such study is well put in Hoffmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 174ff.

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infer the existence at least of rudimentary structures of authority.[9] Even more disappointing is the treatment of the Chinese experience, particularly since in this case extremely detailed and comprehensive records exist in the form of dynastic histories and other materials. The wealth of sources on the international relations of the system of states centered upon the Chinese area cannot be exhausted by a discussion of the doctrines of Confucius and of a number of related schools of Chinese philosophy. The exciting period of the Warring States is dismissed in two pages (pp. 140-42). Altogether omitted are interesting later international experiences, such as the Sino-Mongolian (Hsiung-Nu) bipolar situation of the Han period, with its fascinating by-play in the subsystem of the Tarim Basin; the systems created by the break-up of the Han Empire and, later, by the dissolution of Tang rule; and, finally, the Mongol, Ming, and Manchu periods of Chinese history, fine examples of an international system dominated by one great power but containing nevertheless a considerable number of small, tributary, yet factually independent states in Northeast, Central, and Southeast Asia. More detailed and analytical work on the historical international relations of South and East Asia still remains to be accomplished.

Students of international relations appreciate highly the historical experience of each historical system because the total number of recorded historical systems is small compared with that of all other social systems analyzed by social scientists (the larger that number, the more reliable the generalizations that can be made about the behavior of international systems). That is why in a work portraying history as a universally shared fund of experience, especially in the management of peace and order, the complete omission of a number of systems of international relations is disappointing—for instance, the failure to mention any of those that operated in pre-Columbian America: the Aztec, the Maya, and the Inca-centered international societies in the Central and Southern portions of that continent. These too are areas whose pre-Spanish cultural traditions are likely to assert themselves more strongly in the future, and even if the international experience of the Aztec Empire, for instance, cannot be described as markedly peaceful, a study of its institutions nevertheless deserves to be carried out, if only to suggest reasons why non-violent methods remained in abeyance in that particular instance. The Mayan case, by contrast, seems to indicate the existence of a system of city-states notable, in its first period at

[9] See *Kautilya's Arthasastra*, trans. by R. Shamasastry, 4th edn., Mysore, 1951, esp. pp. 344-46, 385.

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any rate, for the lack of evidence of organized warfare. In her endeavor to stress ideas and institutions "conducive to peace and order," Professor Bozeman seems to shy away from incidents—like the Punic Wars of the Mediterranean world, the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, or the experience of Sparta, for example—that would shed light on events and circumstances in which peace and order can become overwhelmingly difficult to maintain. Yet one cannot reason about peace without pondering about war, its origins, and the means of its termination.

Other notable clusters of international affairs that receive less than passing mention are the state systems of West Africa from the seventh to the eighteenth century (for part of the time and to some extent they belonged to the Moslem system) and the large variety of systems of the more primitive varieties, such as those of Central and East Africa, of Madagascar, and of the rest of the island world in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.[10] Attention centers instead on the historical societies of the "civilized world," largely those that attained an agrarian form of economic organization, developed a considerable division of labor (especially through urbanization), and left behind at least some record of their activities. There is justification in thus limiting the field because, for the pre-1500 period in particular, the data on other societies is scarce, and yet some portion at least of the structure and operation of primitive international systems should be part of our mental make-up, even in this context, if only because a good deal of the story we are asked to take in concerns relations between agrarian civilizations and primitive (barbarian) populations at times merely pressing in great waves upon these civilizations and at other times revolutionizing or overthrowing them. Encounters between international systems of diverse cultural levels are an important part of international relations and while, for example, they are analyzed in some detail in the case of Byzantine methods of organizing a ring of client states, the discussion could pay greater heed to the point of view of those who were being "civilized." Experiences of "acculturation" (or "socialization")—for instance, through missionary activities or through geographical exploration—are of theoretical as well as practical importance.

Professor Bozeman scrutinizes in greater detail one particular type

[10] "In the most primitive societies the relations between tribes or villages have many of the features of international relations. Unfortunately they have never been studied systematically, which is a pity," says the author of a textbook on international organization (Paul Reuter, *International Institutions*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1958, p. 35).

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of encounter of civilizations: that between cultures of approximately equal level. She tells us a great deal about the relationships between the Moslem world and Western Europe, between Rome and China, and between India and the Far East. She emphasizes the role of trade in broadening the horizons of culture-bound political elites, and delights in pointing out, for instance, the wide-ranging economic and sometimes even diplomatic contacts of the Near East around 1000 B.C. and of Rome or Byzantium. The burden of her observations suggests that external influences upon international systems, including those emanating from other international societies, have been strong and persistent. Moreover, she points out that the patterns of coexistence of two systems of states—for instance, of Moslem and Latin Christian states, of Chinese and Indian (say, in the fifth century) or the West European and Mongol-Chinese areas (in the thirteenth century)—may be varied and include a multitude of processes ranging from crusades and holy wars, through coexistence based on mutual ignorance and inability to communicate, to polite and peaceful relations.

Facts such as these help correct any confusion between the abstract model of the isolated and self-contained international system that students of the subject might develop and the variety of types of international systems actually found in historical experience. The model of an international system conceived as existing in empty space, as it were, is as much of an abstraction as the concept of a body moving in a vacuum and may be equally crucial in crystallizing issues. But only a few international systems (possibly only the pre-Columbian systems of America; this is one reason why they are interesting) have in fact existed in a "vacuum," and for the others full account has to be taken of the external influences. However, a close reader of *Politics and Culture* may wish that its reconstructions of intercultural intercourse were based on data permitting surer judgments. For instance, in all matters of trade relations, the intensity of exchanges is as important as the mere fact of their occurrence; examples of intercourse of varied kinds may be easy enough to adduce but may be intrinsically quite insignificant. What proportion of the external trade of Roman Egypt in the second century A.D. consisted of imports originating in China: 50 per cent, 5 per cent, or 0.5 per cent? Unless answers are given indicating at least an order of magnitude, we are powerless to judge the significance of such commerce. Elsewhere Professor Bozeman points out that trade between Europe and China, carried on for a dozen centuries but limited to concrete objects, was generally sterile in creating wider social relationships. Do similar

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reflections apply to intercultural relations in the Mediterranean after the seventh century A.D., especially to those between the Moslem world and Western Europe? The *Arabian Nights*, adduced as evidence by Professor Bozeman, indeed tells of relations with Christians and, in one or two instances, refers to alliances that cut across religious lines. But a perusal of the *Arabian Nights* fails to support the contention that such relations were friendly or even frequent. Her one example of such an alliance between Moslem and Christian rulers (p. 389) seems no more than an exception, confirming the general rule that alliances outside the confines of an international system encounter unusual obstacles, and that international systems are systems of action within which the great majority of activities are in fact system-centered.

III

Politics and Culture presents to us "the world as a whole, in which numerous distinctive civilizations and nations have become progressively more closely interrelated."[11] But the historical dimension, as was implied above, should afford us another view of international relations: one of a procession of distinct and isolated civilizations, each with its own system of international politics, each therefore a potential field of observation for those who wish to learn more about such systems. Since generalization on the basis of observation of a single instance is not possible and since, moreover, the contemporary world affords us only one instance of a system of world politics (whereas political scientists can compare several score of contemporaneous political systems), students of international relations must rely entirely upon international history to supply them with the other "systems of international politics" on which to test propositions about the behavior of systems.[12] In this sense, history is the only source of subject-matter for the comparative study of international systems. What is the contribution of *Politics and Culture* to this second aspect of a historical dimension of international relations?

The value of the comparative method for the scholarly study of social phenomena is widely enough appreciated not to require detailed explanation. It can be argued that the essence of all scientific method is the observation and analysis of perceived analogies. The

[11] Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations*, New York, 1955, p. 89.

[12] Hypothetical or constructed (e.g., future) systems and simulated systems (e.g., games) of international relations should be regarded as a source of plausible analogies rather than as a field for controlled experiments. However, the working of partial, less inclusive systems (such as foreign policies or alliances) can be observed contemporaneously.

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crucial prerequisite of such procedure is, indeed, the perception of an analogy (that the falling of an apple is similar to the motions of the moon), but once this step is surmounted, we can see that an analogy is always an instance of recognized similarities and differences, hence in essence a comparison. Controlled experimentation is no more than a special case of more precise comparison; where experimentation is not possible, as in international relations, observation and comparison pure and simple have to be used.

Comparison, thus, is at the basis of scientific method. However, another prerequisite of comparison is a classificatory scheme, a taxonomy, a conceptual framework. The difficulty in using history for purposes of international relations has been less in the availability of material than in the absence of useful classifications and taxonomies. Progress in the exploitation of history thus depends upon developments in the field of theory, and theory in its turn awaits from history both inspiration (history as a source of suggestive analogies) and confirmation.

The value of *Politics and Culture* as a contribution to comparative study would have been enhanced if the taxonomy and the conceptual framework implicit in it were more systematic. Terms that should be the key concepts of international relations analysis are used here in an essentially *ad hoc* and occasionally inappropriate manner. For instance, to refer to members of the Near Eastern system of states of the second millennium B.C. (Babylonia, Egypt, or Crete) as nations (p. 23), pursuing national interests (p. 32) through national wars (p. 23), verges on the misleading. "Nation" is a term used appropriately in the context of modern world politics, but its connotations of complete political homogeneity are inapplicable to most of the states considered in this volume. It may be a writer's privilege to use terms as they suit a particular occasion, but at least one reader wishes Professor Bozeman had plied Occam's Razor more firmly when empires like Persia or Rome are also called "international states" (which seems a contradiction in terms), "international societies" or "world states" (the world has not, so far, known a "world state"—only different degrees of influence at times exercised by one great power over its neighbors). Deficiencies in the conceptual framework seem also responsible for the failure to cope with some of the problems raised. For instance, summing up the effect of the spread of Buddhism on China's international affairs, the author concludes that the new faith did not have a decisive impact "on the making of foreign policy" (p. 159). However that may be (and on general grounds at least some effect would be expected), students of international relations would also like to ask

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questions about effects other than those on the making of foreign policy. For example, what was the effect on communications, or on the state of solidarity within that international system? Did relations between Buddhist states differ from those with countries of other religions? Was China's ascendancy over Central, East, and Southeast Asia significantly eased by the common experience of Buddhism?

Professor Bozeman uses the terms "states system" and "international system" to describe the early international relations in the Near East, the international regime of the Hellenistic period, and the pattern of relations that arose in Europe at the close of the Middle Ages. Such usage is traditional and does full justice to the processes it accounts for. One would wish, though, that the concept of an international system had been given an altogether more central place. International history is, essentially, the history of international systems and only derivatively the history of the states dominant within them. This is so even though few historians have yet accounted for international events in terms of the history of international systems. The very notion of an international system has remained in doubt.[13] To identify the empirical referent of this notion, a number of pragmatic procedures still have to be performed, since Arnold Toynbee's list of civilizations (each civilization containing an international system) does not always fit the facts. In each single case, the size, scope, membership, and other qualities of an international system and, most importantly, its boundaries must be empirically determined in the light of the available data. The identification of the international system is not necessarily a problem that admits of an easy answer. For certain periods that interest Professor Bozeman, for instance, the question of boundaries of international systems is a peculiarly complex one. Which system of states did Byzantium belong to? How do we describe India after Alexander the Great? Did the Moslem world form a states system of its own?

In the answer to questions such as these may lie the promise of surer knowledge about the enduring features of all international systems. At what point does one system lose its character and change into another (as the Roman passed into the Byzantine)? When does it altogether disappear (as the Aztec or Inca system did)? Under what conditions may two systems be said to coexist, and how do we define their respective boundaries (e.g., those of the Moslem and the Latin

[13] "In dealing with the affairs of one country, the concept of the nation as constituting a political entity . . . permits a synthesis with a clearly defined focus of interests. It scarcely requires to be pointed out that there is no corresponding entity which includes all the political units of the world and peoples of the world." (Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory and Processes of History*, Berkeley, Calif., 1960, p. 44.)

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Christian worlds)? Having thus determined the entities we are to deal with, we might ask questions about their relative performance: How was authority exercised within them? How was internal communication established and maintained? What influenced their integration and solidarity? What resources were allocated to system-wide functions?

The domestic political history of traditional states has usually been portrayed as a succession of ruling dynasties, and that of modern states in terms of the regimes or parties that have successively held power. Key questions about international systems also concern the organization of authority within them; their history can be told by tracing the destinies of the powers that have held sway, and this is why international historians from Thucydides onward have been fascinated by the facts of authority, hegemony, and dominance. Professor Bozeman's account, too, sheds much light on past wielders of authority (powers great, and small—such as Rhodes) and the way they have exercised it. But other questions remain. Can we, for purposes of comparative analysis, distinguish between, say, permissive and authoritarian, progressive and conservative, egalitarian and stratified systems? How would these characteristics relate to other variables? And what about the legitimation of authority?

A student of international history with a penchant for comparative study would seek to investigate other similarities and differences in international systems of earlier ages. For example, Professor Bozeman carries her discourse up to the time conventionally regarded as the onset of the modern European states system. By implication, those systems that she *does* discuss are non-modern, presumably traditional. I would myself argue that all the systems she reviews were similar to the extent that they can all be classified as "agrarian"; if so, what have been the features that distinguished these agrarian systems from one another? Was it, for instance, culture? Or type of authority? However, not much that bears explicitly upon the problem of similarities and differences can emerge unless these questions are clearly posed from the outset.

Politics and Culture highlights in a singularly interesting way the functions performed in international systems by other than governmental elites. For instance, the priestly castes of Mesopotamia (the "theological international"—p. 21) carried out functions of communication and integration in that early system of city-states (3000 B.C.). In the later Near Eastern system an important role was played by the commercial class and system-wide functions were accomplished by

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the small trading cities of Phoenicia (pp. 40-41). Jurists had a key role to play in maintaining solidarity in the Moslem system. Knights, merchants, and scholars deserve the attention given to them in the analysis of cross-cultural contacts in the Mediterranean. But these themes could have been discussed even more systematically. Granted the importance of the priestly castes in the Mesopotamian system, what was the role of priests in other systems? For instance, the Indian or the Chinese? Or else, how were the functions first assumed by religious groups carried on in other contexts of international politics? To take another example: Part One has a special section on "The International Language"—unquestionably a crucial communication structure of any international system; yet the rest of the book says little about international language in relation to the later periods and areas.

I would thus conclude that in respect of the second aspect of the historical dimension of international relations—the comparative analysis of international systems—much still remains to be accomplished. Let us recognize, however, that this second task cannot be adequately performed at the same time as the first—the genealogical account of international history. They are mutually conflicting endeavors—the one designed to show the interrelationship of systems and their cultures, the other viewing each system on its own and in splendid isolation, as one genus of a species. It is surprising how much of these two conflicting tasks has been accomplished in a single volume.

IV

Culture, a group of subjects much derided by power-theorists, plays a star role in this book. The invention of writing, Zoroastrianism, Stoicism, and the Roman law of contract, the Catholic Church, medieval universities, and the Florentine style of diplomacy—law, language, religion, education, philosophy, ideology, and literature—all are there. Culture is well on the way to becoming a major explanatory variable, in rank similar to the economy.

That culture is a structural element of all international systems is now well established; yet the precise influence that it exercises and the channels through which it is carried are still a matter for continued study. Helpful in this context seems to be the notion of an "international culture," a set of norms, values, and beliefs pertaining to the operation of the international system and the behavior of its members. International law and international ethics, diplomacy, diplomatic cus-

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tom and etiquette, styles of international behavior, diplomatic language, international studies, the formation of world opinion, and world ideologies are among the most important of its manifestations. International culture can be seen to be autonomous in relation to general world culture, yet obviously related to it and serving as a channel through which world politics influences world culture. International culture is both a product of, and also a determinant of, systems of international relations.

Professor Bozeman presents a judicious selection of a number of historically important international culture patterns and also goes into the often less thoroughly studied problem of mechanisms for creating and maintaining these patterns. Her work would seem to suggest evidence for the hypothesis of one dominant culture pattern within each international system, side by side with a number of competing or emergent subcultures. Historical experience also supports the hypothesis of the coincidence of an international system with the zone of culture (that political authority tends to follow the zone of diffusion of a culture). Anthropologists have not yet completely solved the problem of describing systematically the whole of even the simple cultures, let alone analyzing their structures and interpreting them. International culture presents tasks at least equally complex. Yet problems of such complexity apply to the whole field of comparative analysis of international systems.

Professor Fox's recent conclusion that "the comparative study of multi-sovereignty systems" is "the one direction in which the American study of international relations has not moved and for which there does not yet seem to be much call on either side of the Atlantic"[14] may already need some revision. Appearing at a moment when the need for reliable knowledge about historical systems is being increasingly felt, Professor Bozeman's contribution has eased the task of students of international relations who are launching with justifiedly high expectations upon a new field of enquiry. Paralleling recent developments in political science, the application of the comparative method should make the study of international systems one of the flourishing branches of international relations.

[14] W. T. R. Fox and A. B. Fox, "The Teaching of International Relations in the United States," *World Politics*, XIII (April 1961), p. 359.

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THE GAME OF POLITICS

By ROBERT J. AUMANN

Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1960, 400 pp. $6.95.

THE last decade has seen a tremendous outpouring of work on the applications of mathematics to the non-exact sciences. In the accepted jargon, this activity is called "model-building"; mathematical models have been built in disciplines ranging from biology and psychology to economics, sociology, linguistics, and even politics. One of the most engaging of these models is the whimsically named "theory of games." More to the point would have been to call it a "theory of conflict and cooperation"; but mathematicians like to christen their babies according to their appearance, not according to the job they are expected to do. Mathematically, wars and games look alike,[1] and if one wants to build a model for bargaining, then it doesn't matter whether the subject is disarmament or coffee breaks.

Professor Rapoport has really written not one but three books on three utterly different approaches to the problems of conflict and cooperation. The "fights" part of his book deals with "social physics"—i.e., with mathematical models for mass action, action on which the individual has no influence. The "games" part describes game theory—the mathematical model based on individual rationality. The "debates" part constitutes a psychological analysis of the art of winning over other people to your point of view; its main burden is that in order to win them over, you first have to get them to *listen* to you. Unlike the first two, this third part uses no mathematical tools. The three parts of the book all deal with conflict and cooperation in one form or another, but otherwise they have nothing in common; wisely, the author has not attempted to establish any spurious connections. This reviewer feels competent and willing to discuss only the "games" part of the book.

This constitutes by far the best existing popularization of game theory.[2] It is lucid, informative, and exciting; it offers significant in-

[1] They also look alike in the Bible: "Abner said to Joab, 'Let the young men . . . play before us.'. . . And they caught every one his fellow by the head, and thrust his sword in his fellow's side. . . . There was a very sore battle that day." (II Samuel 2: 14-17.)

[2] The book by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (*Games and Decisions*, New York, 1957) is more accurate and complete, and, like the book before us, makes excellent reading. But it is not a popularization; it cannot be thoroughly understood by readers with no previous mathematical training.

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sights into the philosophical background and consequences of the theory, and suggests interesting possible new departures. A feature of the book are the numerous examples taken from all walks of life and literature (quite a few from *War and Peace*). The author uses these examples to illuminate the ideas he introduces, and conversely these ideas throw new light on the examples. Urbane, witty, and sophisticated, his work is altogether a delight to read. For the reader who wants to know what the shouting is all about, it is excellent. This reviewer does have some serious reservations; but inaccuracies are inevitable in any non-technical exposition of a highly technical and sophisticated subject. On the whole, the book cannot be too highly recommended, and I warmly congratulate Professor Rapoport for being the first to make the basic ideas of game theory available to the world at large.

I

Social physics, the subject of the "fights" part of the book, is a *descriptive* theory; that is, the conclusions drawn from this theory are (or should be) subject to empirical verification. Nothing is assumed about how people ought to behave, or how they would behave if they were sensible; that is irrelevant. For example, one part of social physics concerns arms races; the equations that are developed are meant to describe the development of actual arms races, in the same sense that the equations of thermodynamics are meant to describe the actual behavior of gases. Thus the general aims of social physics are similar in spirit to those of natural science.

Not so with game theory; this is a *normative* theory. It gives advice, describes the behavior (in conflict-cooperation situations) of theoretical beings called "rational persons," suggests arbitration schemes, defines "fair outcomes," and so on. It does *not* purport to describe actual behavior of any kind, this being notoriously irrational. The general aims of game theory are comparable to those of certain parts of applied statistics, such as quality control, or to those of operations research.[3] It is more complicated than these because it must take conflicting interests into account, but like them it seeks to give good, "efficient" advice, notwithstanding the inefficient behavior that is usually observed.

Which approach is more suited to international politics? It depends on what your interest in international politics is. If you are a political scientist who is primarily interested in describing politics as practiced, then social physics or some other purely descriptive approach is the

[3] Decision theory is an inclusive name for all these disciplines (it includes game theory).

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right one. On the other hand, if you are advising a policy-maker, or if you *are* a policy-maker,[4] the game-theoretic approach is the more appropriate. To be sure, even then social physics is not irrelevant, because it may give you some idea as to what to expect from groups other than yours. Basically, though, the policy-maker needs a normative rather than a descriptive theory—to the extent that he needs or can use theories at all.

II

Preferences are the basic entities with which any normative theory of conflict and cooperation must deal; if an individual doesn't know what he wants, not even a mathematician can help him. To deal with preferences efficiently, it is desirable to translate them into numerical terms. This is what is accomplished by the theory of *utility*. Chapter VI, the first chapter of the "games" part of Rapoport's book, is an exposition of utility theory. I must emphasize that the utility concept is a tool useful and, indeed, indispensable to the mathematician for proving his results, but no more than that; contrary to a prevalent misconception (which the book does not dispel), all the results of game theory that are usually stated in terms of utility can be stated in terms of preferences only, without ever mentioning the word "utility."

Chapters VII and IX deal with "strictly competitive games"—i.e., conflicts between two individuals whose aims are in direct opposition, so that there would be no point in cooperating. Conceptually this is the relatively easy part of game theory; under the assumption that both players are rational, it is possible to give good, convincing advice in such situations.[5] Chapter VIII describes the important concept of "strategy"; this term is used in game theory in a sense somewhat different from (though related to) its everyday sense.

Chapter X deals with non-cooperative games that are not strictly competitive. Here "non-cooperative" does not mean that the players do not want to cooperate or that it would not be advantageous for them to do so, but that they are prevented from cooperating because there is no possibility of communicating or no enforcement mechanism for

[4] The word "politician," which would have been more fitting, has become a "no-word."

[5] I feel obliged to express strong disagreement with the contents of the last two sections of Chapter IX (pp. 161-65), and especially with the first of these (pp. 161-63), in which the author philosophizes about the advice that is given by game theory to the players in a strictly competitive game. In fact, the reasoning behind this advice is a good deal sounder than is apparent from the discussion in these sections, which is based on serious misunderstandings of utility theory.

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agreements.[6] Chapters XI and XII describe cooperative games—i.e., games in which cooperation is both profitable and feasible; here the main problem is how to divide the spoils, and this can be a sore problem indeed. Chapter XI deals with arbitration procedures—i.e., "fair" methods of dividing the spoils ("fair" in relation to the relative strengths of the players); Chapter XII is concerned with the problems of coalition formation.

Chapter XIII deals with experimentation in game theory, of which more below; Chapter XIV discusses critiques of game theory, by other authors and by Rapoport himself. This ends the "games" part of the book.

The previous four paragraphs were meant to serve as a table of contents only. Obviously this is no place to review the theory of games; for this the reader is referred to the book itself, which in any event does the job a good deal better than this reviewer could do it. Instead, I will discuss three questions of a general nature that are raised by a reading of the book: the relevance of experimental work to a normative theory, the role of mathematics in a mathematical model, and the applicability of game theory (or mathematical models in general) to political science (or extremely "inexact" sciences in general).

III

A considerable amount of "experimental work in game theory" has been performed, and some of it is described in the book before us. According to the above characterization of game theory as normative, the phrase in quotes is a contradiction in terms, and it is no wonder that many such studies yield results "contrary to the conclusions of game theory." Suppose you were interested in enclosing a maximum area with a given length of fencing. You would not poll a hundred farmers to find out how to do it; you would work it out by the methods of geometry. If you did poll the farmers, and they all gave the wrong answer, what relevance would this have to your problem? It would say something of interest about the farmers, but nothing about your problem.

Rapoport reports on an experiment (performed by Vinacke and Arkoff) in which three players were given a sum of money to divide as they saw fit; the mode of division was decided by majority vote, but each of the players had a different number of votes available to him (in much the same way that each state political boss has a different

[6] See the end of section III below for an example of this (the overproducing farmers).

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number of votes available to him at a political convention).[7] Six combinations were tried, as follows:

Players	A B C	A B C	A B C	A B C	A B C	A B C
Number of votes of each player	1 1 1	3 2 2	1 2 2	3 1 1	4 3 2	4 2 1
Combination No.	I	II	III	IV	V	VI

Now, in spite of the window dressing, there are clearly only two different kinds of games here. In I, II, III, and V, any two players form a majority; all these games are completely symmetrical, and all players are equally "strong" in these games. In IV and VI player A forms an absolute majority alone, and both B and C are completely powerless. One does not have to be a game theorist to realize this; it is just common sense.

The results were quite fantastic. Suffice it to say that in a considerable number of games of types IV and VI, player A did *not* simply take all the proceeds for himself, but formed a coalition with one of the other players. In games of types I, II, III, and V, the players were also guided by the "window dressing" rather than by their actual strength. Incidentally, Vinacke and Arkoff were well aware that their subjects were behaving irrationally. Their study was a psychological-sociological one—i.e., it was descriptive and had no normative overtones whatsoever.

When then is the relevance—if any—of experimentation to game theory? Rapoport suggests that a descriptive theory be attempted, parallel to social physics but dealing with cooperation and conflict in small groups[8] (such as in the above experiment). He asks whether general probabilistic laws could be observed governing behavior in game-like situations, and whether such observed laws could be derived from some set of basic postulates—as Kepler's observed laws for the motion of the planets can be derived from Newton's basic laws of motion. According to Rapoport, "the experimental scientist should take over to explore the norms actually operating in human affairs" (p. 225).[9] There is much to be said for this point of view, but the

[7] The game was disguised somewhat by means of a set of rather complicated rules which, however, were quite transparent. Cf. W. E. Vinacke and A. Arkoff, "An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (1957), pp. 406-15.

[8] These need not be groups of people, but can also, for example, be groups of nations.

[9] If one interprets "norm" as in "normative"—i.e., as a standard according to which people *should* behave—then the phrase "norms actually operating" is devoid of sense. A physician was once asked at a murder trial how long a normal person lives. His answer was that a normal person doesn't die; medically, there is something wrong with everyone who dies.

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program must be executed with great caution; there are many pitfalls. First, it must be recognized that such an experimental, descriptive science would in no sense constitute a reorientation or a replacement of classical (i.e., normative) game theory, and indeed the two would not be related. In view of this, great pains should be taken not to introduce any rationality postulates into such a theory, but only to fit the postulates to the observations. Next, it stands to reason that the behavior of students in small groups, playing games for insignificant amounts of money with little time or incentive to think things through, is in no sense representative of, say, the behavior of nations in the international arena. It is absurd to suppose that when important decisions are to be made, the players of the international game would commit the comic errors that seem to be characteristic of the subjects in game experiments.[10] If one wants to "explore the norms actually operating in human affairs," then one must decide whether to study trivial or significant affairs, and take care not to reach conclusions of significance from observations of triviality.

For example, it turns out that the theory of games, normative though it is, is at least in parts not so far off the beam as a *description* of international behavior. One of the important notions of game theory is that of "equilibrium"—a situation in which no individual player can improve his position by unilateral action alone. There are games[11] in which rational behavior by the players leads inexorably to equilibrium outcomes that are close to the *worst possible* for *all* players; an enlightening practical example of this kind is offered by Luce and Raiffa: Consider a market with many small producers (such as farmers), where the total productive capacity far exceeds the demand. It is to the interest of all the producers to limit production. Nevertheless, the actions of any one producer cannot affect the price, so no matter what the other producers decide, it is to the advantage of each individual producer to produce as much as he can. It follows that the only equilibrium is the one at which each producer produces at his maximum capacity, and therefore all go into bankruptcy. Rapoport dismisses these equilibria because they are "not very relevant to the interests of the players" (p. 224). In fact, neither is the cold war very relevant to the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union; it apparently represents a situation close to equilibrium (in the above technical sense), which would explain its stubborn persistence.[12] This

[10] Though sometimes one is forced to wonder.

[11] Such as the Prisoner's Dilemma.

[12] Professor R. D. Luce suggested at the Princeton University Conference on Arms

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suggests that normative considerations of individual rationality are not entirely irrelevant to "human affairs" as actually conducted, and cannot be lightly dismissed—whether the conclusions be pleasant or unpleasant.

IV

I have quoted Rapoport's suggestion that experimental evidence be used to set up a descriptive theory parallel to the normative theory of games. It is my belief that experimental work can be of direct relevance to normative game theory itself, but before I can say how, we must discuss our second point—namely, the role of mathematics in a mathematical model. I believe it was Bertrand Russell who characterized mathematics as the subject in which "we don't know what we're talking about,[13] nor whether what we're saying is true." The first phrase refers to the fact that the basic entities of mathematical theories are undefined terms, like "point" in geometry. What he meant by the second phrase is that mathematics deals only with *deductions*, so that one can never know whether the conclusion is true unless one knows about the hypothesis. In order to make applied mathematics out of mathematics, one must give real-life interpretations to the basic entities of the theory, and one must make real-life assumptions. By means of mathematics alone, one can never "prove" anything, nor even recommend anything, concerning a subject that has to do with the real world. The assumptions of game theory are "rationality" assumptions—an example is "If you prefer[14] possibility *a* to *b*, and possibility *b* to *c*, then you prefer *a* to *c*"; here the conclusion must be interpreted to mean that you *should* prefer *a* to *c* if you want to be "consistent," it being a known fact that people do not always behave in accordance with this assumption. The distinction between normative and descriptive theories lies in whether the assumptions are taken as recommendations or as truths, but does not lie in the mathematics itself. Now the simple-minded kind of assumption of which the above is an example suffices to build a theory that enables us to give recommendations for action in "strictly competitive games" (cf. section II above); but most kinds of conflict-cooperation situations are too complex and subtle to be handled satisfactorily in this way, and other, more contro-

Control and Limitation in October 1960 that it might be worthwhile to look for more benign equilibria in this situation.

[13] No applause, please.

[14] The term "prefer" is an example of an undefined entity in the mathematical model; to give the theory real-life significance, it must be translated (into its everyday meaning).

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versial assumptions must be introduced in order to reach results. It is not really the mathematician's business to resolve the controversy by choosing a set of assumptions, but it usually has been left for him to do so.[15] In no case, however, can one speak (as Rapoport does) of a "purely mathematical solution" or of "relationships dictated by mathematical considerations"; at most one can say that one does not consider a certain set of assumptions useful, though they may lead to a mathematically elegant theory. I should emphasize here that beyond the field of strictly competitive games, game theory consists not of one monolithic body of work, but of various "theories" based on different sets of assumptions.

Traditionally, basic assumptions in game theory have been based on *individual* rationality; that is to say, though the individual may have had to modify his demands by the realities of his situation, still the basic assumptions have always involved each player's maximizing his payoff—i.e., playing to get as much as he can. One of the most provocative of Professor Rapoport's suggestions is that we examine consequences of assumptions which set the welfare of society above the welfare of the individual—more specifically, which set the moderate welfare of all individuals above the extreme welfare of oneself. Referring to the overproducing farmers whom we discussed above, this approach would lead to voluntary acreage restrictions on the part of all the farmers, *without enforcement or even previous communication.*[16] This may sound unduly utopian, but the author cites examples of similar assumptions in everyday (American) life: "The argument that a single vote 'makes no appreciable difference' is countered with 'Yes, but if everyone thought so, the will of the collective would find no expression.' This is the rationale behind any cooperative effort. It is conceivable that the (minimal) danger inherent in submitting to vaccination actually exceeds the (still more minimal) danger of remaining unvaccinated. But if *everyone* minimized the danger to himself alone, everyone would be subjected to the much greater danger of a smallpox epidemic. . . . The reason this appears paradoxical, I suspect, is that we have been too long accustomed to the uncritical acceptance of the laissez faire principle, namely, that a totality of individuals seek-

[15] The significant exception is the collaboration of the economist Oskar Morgenstern with the mathematician John von Neumann in their book, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, Princeton, N.J., 1944.

[16] Government-imposed or otherwise enforced acreage restrictions would be nothing new in game theory; they are the result of "arbitration" or "cooperative" procedures. The novelty of Rapoport's suggestion lies in that he obtains this result in the *non-cooperative* case.

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ing their respective self-interests by *shortsighted*[17] calculations actually will move toward the realization of this self-interest by the operation of economic laws derived from the assumptions of a free competitive market economy" (p. 177). This is a powerfully appealing idea, though it is not clear to me how it can be turned into a general theory. Unfortunately, it has no application to international politics; there self-interest (enlightened or otherwise) reigns supreme.

Let us now return to the subject of experimentation. In spite of what was said above about the inherent inapplicability of experimental evidence to a normative theory, there is a feeling among those interested in games that the theory is too much up in the air, too detached from reality. Game-theorists sit in office chairs and decide that such and such a procedure is "rational," much like the popular image of Aristotle sitting in an armchair and deciding that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones. In science, experimentation is generally used to test theories. My feeling is that in game theory, under the right conditions, experimentation can be used for the converse purpose—that is, to suggest reasonable starting points (i.e., assumptions). The "right conditions" are that the subjects be intelligent, that the decisions they are asked to make be important to them, and that they be given time to think them over—plenty of it, as behooves important decisions. This would serve three related purposes: it would enable investigators to get a "feel" for real-life conflicts; it might bring to light important factors that the theorists have overlooked; or possibly it could indicate entirely new approaches. Alternatively, experimentation *could* be used to *test* a theory of conflict, in the following way: all the subjects would be made thoroughly aware of the assumptions and conclusions being tested, and also aware that the other subjects are aware; in addition, the "right conditions" referred to above should obtain. If the theory is then followed, we may feel justified in calling it "empirically consistent" (although nothing has been "proved" in the traditional sense of empirical science); if not, then this indicates a serious flaw in the proposed theory, and a follow-up investigation should be conducted to see what "went wrong." This is of course radically different from experimental procedures for the confirmation of descriptive theories, in which informing the subjects of the proposed theory would be unforgivable. For normative theories, on the other hand, the above method seems eminently suitable.

Returning to the first application of experimentation to game theory,

[17] This word doesn't really belong there. The point is not shortsightedness, but selfishness; also in the long run it is better for every *individual* not to be vaccinated.

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(i.e., as a method for suggesting appropriate assumptions), it would appear that political history and business records should serve as a good "laboratory"—at least, if used selectively. Indeed, I feel that a study of these sources from a game-theoretic viewpoint should be undertaken. The trouble with these sources is that they are often too "messy" for a neat mathematical framework; and this brings us to the last point we wanted to discuss, the applicability of game theory to politics.

V

I must start by confessing my ignorance of political theory. The following should therefore be taken as the tentative remarks of a layman, based on a cursory reading of the newspapers and some small experience with the application of mathematical methods to areas (other than politics) in which subjective factors loom large. Also, it constitutes a highly personal view, not necessarily shared by others interested in the theory of games.

Game theory can be used in two ways: first, to get a general, qualitative "feel" for a situation, like that conveyed by the equilibrium nature of the cold war, as mentioned above;[18] second, to give specific advice in a specific situation. The importance of the first kind of application should not be underestimated; much of theory in the social sciences is of this nature. In the case of political science or, more accurately, of politics, game theory is in principle certainly applicable in this first sense. I say "in principle" because, aside from remarks here and there (some of which are quite valuable), I know of no serious, systematic attempt to apply game-theoretic reasoning to political science. Potentially, game-theoretic insights could assume a significance in the conduct of international affairs similar to that of a knowledge and understanding of history.

The second kind of application—specific advice in a specific situation—is another matter. Such an application of mathematical methods, be it in physics or politics, demands that the significant factors be apparent and in some sense measurable. Above all, it demands that the specific situation in question be "structured," that it have some handle that the mathematician can grasp. Now these demands are more or less satisfied in certain military, business, and economic problems, and indeed game theory can in principle give specific advice in many such real-life problems; here "in principle" means the same

[18] Game theory abounds in such insights. For those familiar with the von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions, another example is that of discriminatory solutions; still another one is Shapley's index of power.

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as previously—i.e., such advice has not actually been given to any large extent (outside of the military field). Political situations, on the other hand, seem too amorphous for mathematical treatment; personalities take on a decisive importance,[19] the significant factors cannot be assessed and are too numerous, the unanticipated (as distinguished from the merely unexpected) is always happening, the relationships are too involved and difficult to define. Often the problem itself is quite vague, with the alternatives unclearly stated or not stated at all; on the contrary, the problem may be to *find* the alternatives. It is useless to think of game theory in connection with questions like "How can we gain the confidence of the new African nations?" Such questions simply lack the framework necessary for mathematical reasoning.

But we must not lightly dismiss the mathematical approach, even though at first it seems inapplicable. Mathematics has a way of becoming useful in the most unlikely places. For example, in complex decisions that must be made intuitively because of the lack of appropriate systematic tools, a high degree of haphazardness is often inescapable. In such situations mathematical models can sometimes be developed by suppressing all but a few of the important factors, even though the suppressed factors may be highly significant. The suppression of admittedly significant factors seems unallowable; but the choice may be between the mathematical model, which is bad because it suppresses *some* factors, and the intuitive decision, which is terrible because it is utterly haphazard, suppressing almost all the significant factors.[20]

An example—which has nothing to do either with game theory or with politics—is clinical experimentation in medicine, to determine the desirability of a given treatment. At first glance this seems utterly inaccessible to the methods of mathematical statistics: random sampling is difficult, if not impossible; there is no uniformity among the subjects as regards effectiveness of the treatment or seriousness of the side-effects; the importance of side-effects differs from patient to patient (should a seriously abscessed arm be amputated? It makes a difference whether the patient is a pianist or a professor); when a promising new treatment is being tested, ethical considerations (which

[19] We are discussing decision-making in a specific situation; I think even Tolstoyites (and Marxists) would agree about the importance of personality factors in the short run.

[20] This recalls the man who, as he was emerging from the subway, complained to his companion: "Damn it, it's raining again"; whereupon the companion answered, "Better than nothing."

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are difficult, if not impossible, to assess mathematically in a meaningful way) play havoc with the rigid controls demanded by statistical theory; costs (in money and time) are certainly not irrelevant, but to what extent should they be taken into account? Statistical methods can be applied only if fairly arbitrary decisions are made on the above questions, or if they are ignored completely. Nevertheless statistics has had considerable success in this field; indeed the only alternative is chaos, each physician deciding for himself what treatment to administer, on what can only be a haphazard, intuitive basis.

I have presented this dichotomy as though the application of statistical methods were obviously preferable. But there *is* something to be said for the other side. "Chaos" means that all clinical researchers publish case histories only, with no attempt at planned experiments. A physician who read all this literature and digested and remembered it all might conceivably do better by treating a particular, individual patient on the basis of an intuitive judgment than by following recommendations based on a statistically planned experiment.

To sum up: Game theory should definitely be applicable to political *theory*. As for game-theoretic advice in specific political situations, at present I see no prospect for anything really useful in this direction. But others disagree, and this kind of application could become a reality in the future. Possibly a start should be made on something like labor-management bargaining, which is similar in some ways to international bargaining, yet is more sharply defined and standardized, and hence more amenable to mathematical treatment (note that I have not said "amenable," only "more amenable"). In any case, though it may be difficult, an effort to develop tools for the application of game theory to specific political problems would be highly interesting and worthwhile.

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MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR THE GENESIS OF WAR

By JOHN C. HARSANYI

Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, edited by Quincy Wright and C. C. Lienau, Pittsburgh, Pa., The Boxwood Press, and Chicago, Ill., Quadrangle Books, 1960, 373 pp. $12.50.

Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War*, edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco, Pittsburgh, Pa., The Boxwood Press, and Chicago, Ill., Quadrangle Books, 1960, 307 pp. $10.00.

I

THE author of these two pioneering books on mathematical models for explaining the genesis of war, Lewis Fry Richardson (1881-1953), was a distinguished English physicist, a Fellow of the Royal Society. He was one of the founders of dynamic meteorology, which tries to explain and predict the weather by means of mathematical models of the atmosphere, based on the general principles of theoretical physics. He made important contributions not only to our theoretical understanding of the physical processes occurring in the atmosphere but also to the development of the actual methods of computation (approximation methods) needed for practical weather prediction. The practical significance of his methods has greatly increased recently with the advent of high-speed electronic computers and with the availability of more precise observations about conditions in the upper atmosphere. The mathematical and analytical facility he acquired in his meteorological research later aided him considerably in his mathematical and statistical study of war.

Richardson was a Quaker, and always fully shared the humanitarian and pacifist attitudes of the Society of Friends. During the First World War he was a conscientious objector, but he volunteered to serve in the Friends' ambulance unit in France. His experiences there further confirmed his aversion to war and all forms of violence. His study of war was motivated by the hope that better understanding of its causes might eventually lead to its elimination. He published his first study on this subject, "The Mathematical Psychology of War," in 1919. He could find no publisher for it, so he had 300 copies made by multigraph at his own expense. But his work attracted little attention.

In 1919 he returned to the Meteorological Office of the British

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government, where he had already served in 1913-1916. He resigned in 1920, however, when the Office was transferred to the Air Ministry, because he did not want to work for a defense department even in peacetime. From 1920 to 1940 he held teaching and administrative positions in technical colleges. In spite of his great contributions to meteorology (which brought him important scientific honors), he was not offered a university post because of his wartime record as a conscientious objector.

While doing outstanding research in meteorology, in which he had a passionate interest, Richardson felt it his duty to devote an increasing proportion of his time to social-science studies and to practical humanitarian work (e.g., for German refugees). In 1929 he took a degree in psychology and in the 1930's resumed his study of war on a more extensive scale. In 1940 he retired prematurely from his technical-college administrative position in order to devote his full time to these studies. He published a number of papers in this field and also summarized his main results in the two books under review, which now have been published posthumously.

Each book includes a short introduction by the editors. *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* also contains a bibliography of Richardson's papers on war as well as the *Royal Society Obituary Notice* for Richardson written by E. Gold.

II

Statistics of Deadly Quarrels brings together a vast amount of historical information concerning wars, civil wars, riots, murders, executions, and other acts of violence resulting in loss of human life. All these are lumped together under the common term "deadly quarrels." These historical facts are then subjected to statistical analysis with a view to finding quantitative regularities in their occurrence.

Richardson's first problem is to find a satisfactory numerical measure for the magnitude of a given war or other acts of violence. After rejecting various alternatives, he chooses as his measure the *logarithm* to base 10 of the *number of people who died* as a result of a given war or other type of "quarrel." Thus a war with a million fatalities would be assigned the magnitude 6.0; a riot causing one hundred deaths would be of magnitude 2.0; the murder of a single person would be of magnitude 0. (The murder of two persons, or the murder of a single person if the murderer was later executed—as either case would involve two deaths—would be a quarrel of magnitude 0.3.)

At first sight, it may look more natural to measure the magnitude

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of a given conflict in terms of the total number of people participating in it, rather than in terms of the number of people who died as a result. But the number of participants would give no indication of the intensity of the fight. Moreover, it would be hard to decide where to draw the line between "participants" and "non-participants." (For instance, is the whole population of a country to be counted as "participants" in a major war? Or only members of the armed forces? What about persons employed in the armament industries? And so forth.)

It is preferable to use the *logarithm* of the number of war deaths rather than this number itself, because the former is less sensitive to inevitable errors in statistical data. Moreover, it turns out that the most important statistical regularities take a simpler (often roughly linear) form if expressed in terms of this logarithm measure.

On the basis of painstaking research, Richardson lists over 300 wars and armed conflicts, indicating their most important characteristics. His data concern the period 1820-1949; information about the period 1929-1949, which is less complete, is listed separately. His criterion for selection is whether a given war *ended* in the period under consideration, irrespective of when it started. He expresses confidence that his list is reasonably complete for all wars of magnitude 3.5 or larger (i.e., with more than 3,162 war deaths), at least for the period 1820-1929.

By analysis of these data Richardson finds the following statistical relationships:

Distribution in time (Chap. III). The number of large wars is too small for statistical analysis. But if we consider wars of magnitude 3.5 to 4.5 (i.e., with 3,163 to 31,622 war deaths), we find that in the period from 1820-1929 there were less than two wars of this size per year (59 wars in 110 years). Thus, technically, wars can be regarded as "rare events." As is usually the case with "rare events," the fluctuations in the number of wars in different years follow the *Poisson distribution* with very good fit.

Distribution by magnitude (Chap. IV). In recent years a number of objects or events of quite different sorts, if classified according to size, have been found to possess frequency distributions of the same general type.[1] Let $f(m)$ be the number of objects or events whose

[1] Cf. Anatol Rapoport, "The Stochastic and the 'Teleological' Rationales of Certain Distributions and the So-called Principle of Least Effort," *Behavioral Science*, II (April 1957), pp. 147-61; Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man*, New York, 1957, ch. 9, pp. 145-64; George Kingsley Zipf, *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort*, New York, 1949.

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size is between m and $(m + \Delta m)$. For example, $f(m)$ may be in a given country the number of cities with m to $(m + \Delta m)$ inhabitants. Then approximately:

$$(1) \qquad f(m) = \frac{a}{m^k} \cdot \Delta m$$

The number of business firms having m employees, the number of different words occurring m times in a given text, the number of income recipients earning m dollars in a given year, etc., seem to follow a roughly similar frequency distribution. In the case of city sizes, the parameter k is close to 2.0; in other cases, it takes different values.

If equation (1) were exactly true, then by plotting $f(m)$ against m on double-logarithmic paper—i.e., plotting $\phi = \log f(m)$ against $\mu = \log (m)$—we would obtain a straight line. In actual fact, in most cases the graph does show some curvature, indicating that the exact relationship is somewhat more complicated than equation (1).

Richardson finds that a corresponding graph for wars and other deadly quarrels is also close to a straight line but does have a mild curvature (see Figure 1). Here the horizontal axis measures μ, the logarithm of the number of deaths caused by a given "quarrel." Thus μ is actually the measure Richardson uses for the "magnitude" of a given quarrel. The vertical axis measures ϕ, the logarithm of the number of "quarrels" with a given number of deaths. More exactly, ϕ is the logarithm of the number of quarrels with m to $(m + \Delta m)$ deaths, divided by the range Δm.

In drawing this graph, for quarrels of magnitude above 3.5 (i.e., with more than 3,162 deaths), Richardson uses his list of individual wars. For quarrels of magnitude below 0.5 (with three deaths or less), he uses murder statistics. But for quarrels in the range 0.5 to 3.5, no direct statistics are available, and he has to rely on rather speculative indirect inferences.[2]

Richardson does not offer a specific theoretical interpretation for this frequency distribution, apart from some vague remarks to the effect that it expresses a "general tendency concerning [social] aggregation for aggression" (p. 118). But the simplest interpretation would be this. First assume that, for any particular war which has already caused a given number of deaths, there is some constant probability p that this war will end before the total number of its victims has increased by

[2] These are based on the size distribution of street gangs in Chicago during the great depression, and on the size distribution of raiding bands in Manchukuo during the Japanese occupation.

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

FIGURE 1

Source: *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, p. 149. (Reproduced by courtesy of the publishers, Quadrangle Books, Inc.)

some specific percentage (say, by 10 per cent).[3] Under this assumption, the size distribution of wars would exactly follow equation (1)—i.e., Richardson's graph would be a straight line with a constant slope. In actual fact, the graph is *less steep* in the range of *large-scale* quarrels

[3] Assuming a stationary distribution, this would be the case, e.g., if in any particular war the number of fatalities per time period were roughly constant, and if the duration of wars followed an exponential distribution independent of the number of fatalities per time period (i.e., if large-scale and small-scale wars followed roughly the same exponential distribution).

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(i.e., wars) than it is in the range of *small-scale* quarrels (i.e., murders, riots, etc.). This seems to show that, say, in the case of a riot which has already caused 100 deaths, there are better chances that it will be suppressed before adding a further 10 per cent (i.e., 10 more deaths) to its death-roll than there are chances in the case of a war which has already caused 1,000,000 deaths that it will be terminated before adding a further 10 per cent (i.e., 100,000 more deaths) to its death-roll. The explanation may be that our methods of controlling small (and usually intra-national) disputes by police action, etc., are more effective than our methods of controlling large (and usually international) disputes by diplomacy, etc. Moreover, the mere fact that a given conflict has already caused a large number of deaths may in itself build up strong resistance against a peaceful solution.

In the rest of the book Richardson examines a number of hypotheses about possible factors that may increase or decrease the frequency of wars. He usually constructs a simple model to predict the frequency of wars on the assumption that some particular factor has no noticeable influence (null hypothesis), and then compares the observed frequencies with these predictions. He shows great ingenuity in using this method (in particular, in constructing null-hypothesis models). But no very startling conclusions emerge, though he does succeed in disproving some popular views about the causes of wars, and in presenting some confirmatory evidence for others.

For instance, over a given short period there may be considerable differences between countries in their degree of belligerence. But Richardson shows that any given country does not tend to persist in a belligerent attitude for very long, and in the long run no one country, including Germany (Prussia) and Japan, seems to have had a much worse record than the others. However, countries having a larger number of common frontiers with other countries do seem to have a higher chance of getting involved in wars (Chap. v).

Social groups with given sizes and at given geographical distances from each other are more likely to wage a war if they live under different governments than if they live under the same government. That is, other things being equal, international wars arise more easily than do civil wars. This provides some hope that armed conflicts may become less frequent if a world government can be established. Even the looser bond of a wartime alliance decreases the probability of a war between former allies, though this effect tends to weaken over time. On the other hand, the memory of having fought on opposite sides increases the probability of war between two countries, but this effect also grows weaker with the passage of time (Chap. vi).

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Richardson claims that in the period 1820-1929, out of 244 wars of magnitude 3.5 or larger, only 71 (i.e., about 29 per cent) were due to economic causes. But his discussion here is rather superficial (Chap. VII).

By and large, similarity of language or religion does not seem to decrease the probability of war, and dissimilarity of language or religion does not seem to increase it. But among those peoples who speak the Chinese language (who largely coincide with the adherents of the Confucian religion) war has been significantly less frequent than among the rest of mankind. On the other hand, among Spanish-speaking peoples, in spite of their common language, the frequency of war has been unusually high; and the same is probably true (though this is less clear) about war among Christian peoples, in spite of their common religion. Finally, difference in religion may be partly responsible for the high frequency of war between Christians and Moslems (Chaps. VIII, IX).

The historical facts are largely consistent with the simple-minded hypothesis that international disputes have arisen at random over the globe and always affected exactly eight nations; and that the probability of war between any two such interested nations in connection with any given dispute has always been exactly 0.35 (Chap. X, p. 273).

There is also clear evidence that the more opportunities for contact two nations have as a result of their geographical position, the greater the probability of war between them tends to be—though contact through sea is less conducive to war than is contact through land (Chaps. XI, XII).

III

While in *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* Richardson deals only with broad statistical regularities concerning wars, in *Arms and Insecurity* he goes more deeply into the analysis of the dynamic processes giving rise to them.

He proposes models based on the assumption that wars are due to arms races. His simplest model involves only two countries. Let x and y denote the armaments expenditures of country 1 and country 2 respectively. Let t denote time. Then, according to this model (p. 16):

$$dx/dt = ky - \alpha x + g \tag{2}$$

$$dy/dt = lx - \beta y + h \tag{3}$$

These equations express the assumption that the higher one country's

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armaments expenditure, the less secure the other country will feel and the more she will tend to increase her own armaments expenditure. On the other hand, the higher a country's own armaments expenditure, the more secure she will feel but also the more exhausted economically: thus the higher this expenditure already is, the less she will tend to increase it even further. Equations (2) and (3) are the simplest possible differential equations embodying these assumptions.

The *defense coefficients* k and l in the two equations express the insecurity-inducing effect of the *other* country's military preparations. The *fatigue coefficients* α and β express the economic exhaustion (as well as the feeling of greater security) caused by the country's *own* military preparations. Finally, the *grievance coefficients* g and h are added to express the effect of the grievances (if they are positive) or of the friendliness (if they are negative) that a given country feels toward the other, for reasons other than the two countries' military preparations.

Assuming that all these coefficients remain constant over time, Richardson shows (p. 24) that this model will be *unstable* (i.e., will give rise to a cumulative arms race with armaments expenditures increasing beyond any limit) if the defense coefficients k and l are large in relation to the fatigue coefficients α and β—more exactly, if

$$(4) \qquad kl > \alpha\beta$$

In contrast, the model will be *stable*, with armaments expenditures settling down at constant levels, if the inequality is reversed. He argues that wars are due to runaway arms races such as arise in the unstable case.

Richardson does not specify *how* such arms races give rise to wars; in this respect, his model is incomplete. But a number of possible mechanisms could be suggested. For instance, we may assume that the higher the levels of military preparations by the two countries, the higher the level of international tension and the greater the probability that any given "incident," even a minor one, will start a war. Once military preparations have reached very high levels—as incidents of one sort or another are bound to happen—war becomes a virtual certainty. (Note that under this hypothesis international incidents may lead to war, though this is less likely to happen, when military preparations are at quite low levels. Hence wars can occur even if equations (2) and (3) form a stable system.)

Alternatively we may assume that in cases where an arms race forces a given country to undertake intolerably high armaments expenditures,

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she will tend to start a war deliberately because she will prefer a war of (presumably) limited duration to the continual burden of armaments expenditures at that high level (the "let's get it over" theory).

Richardson applied his two-country model to the arms race of 1909-1914 preceding the First World War and obtained a very good fit.

To analyze the arms race of 1932-1939 preceding the Second World War, he extended his two-country model to n countries. This was necessary because he first undertook this study before the Second World War had actually started and when it was still uncertain which country would join which alliance, making it impracticable to lump together the countries on each opposing side as "one country." But mathematically the basic properties of the n-country model are essentially the same as those of the two-country model. However, under certain assumptions which look reasonable, the n-country model has a stronger bias toward instability. Even if any *pair* of two countries considered in isolation would come under the stable case, the whole system of n countries may still be unstable. This is true already in the three-country case (p. 155). Thus the existence of several independent countries makes a runaway arms race even more likely.

The n-country model gives reasonably good predictions for the arms race of 1932-1939.

IV

In spite of the fairly good fits between Richardson's models and the statistical data concerning the arms races prior to the two world wars, we cannot confidently make inferences about the validity of his models on the basis of this limited statistical evidence. The good fits with the data show only the existence of strong exponential trends in the armaments expenditures of both periods; and such trends could be equally well explained by many alternative models.

In any case, as has been already pointed out, Richardson's models at best explain only arms races, but do not explain how arms races actually lead to wars. Nor do they explain the genesis of wars not preceded by arms races.

At the same time, as far as arms races as such are concerned, in the judgment of this reviewer it is nevertheless quite likely that Richardson's models do capture at least one of the important mechanisms operative in arms races, though they can hardly tell the full story.

Mathematically this means that even though the coefficients in equations (2) and (3) as well as in their n-country analogues may have shown reasonable constancy in 1909-1914 and in 1932-1939, there is no

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guarantee that they will remain fairly constant also in future arms races. To make definite predictions about their behavior over time (or about their variations from country to country), we would need observations about a much larger number of independent cases than history actually provides. Or alternatively we would need a much more specific and complete general theory of international political decisions than Richardson or anybody else has been able to offer so far.

It is of course a very common difficulty in the social sciences that in some particular field the number of possible independent observations is much too small in relation to the great complexity of the phenomena to be explained. Yet the number of independent observations always sets an upper limit to the complexity of the explanatory model (i.e., to the number of independent parameters in the model) that can be *meaningfully tested* against these observations. Hence, on the basis of the insufficient number of observations available in that particular field itself, we are bound to construct a grossly oversimplified model—though of course construction of such an oversimplified model may be a very worthwhile undertaking so long as nothing better is available. But development of a more complex and more realistic model will have to await the emergence of a more general theory whose area of application extends far beyond that particular field, and which therefore can be tested against a much more extensive and much more diversified set of observations. (Thus, for instance, in testing a general theory of foreign policy decision-making—let alone in testing a still broader theory of political decision-making in general—our empirical data would not be restricted to the narrow class of observations concerning armaments-expenditure decisions.)

This may mean that, contrary to prevalent opinion, we may often have to produce more general theories before we can produce reasonably specific and realistic theories of medium range. It may happen that we must learn to run before we can learn to walk.

V

Apart from their merits and limitations in specific detail, Richardson's arms-race models also raise a more fundamental problem of great theoretical and practical importance. They are *mechanical-response* models as distinguished from *rational-behavior* (rational-decision) models. They are meant to describe "what people would do if they did not stop to think. Why are so many nations reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they were mechanically compelled to do so? Because . . . they follow their traditions . . . and their instincts

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. . . and because they have not yet made a sufficiently strenuous intellectual and moral effort to control the situation" (p. 12).

The underlying assumption seems to be that for any country to increase her military preparations, even in response to increases in the military preparations of other countries, is always irrational; and that it would never be undertaken if the consequences of such a policy were correctly understood by the government leaders of the country concerned. Hence, in order to abolish war, all we need is a convincing demonstration by social scientists as to what the actual consequences of increased military preparations are: that they hardly ever succeed in intimidating the other side but only lead to war, disastrous to all concerned.

But this theory, it seems to me, is a dangerous oversimplification. It appears to rest on confusion between *social efficiency* from the standpoint of mankind as a whole, and *individual rationality* from the standpoint of each particular country.

War involves a waste of human lives and of economic resources. Even an arms race involves great economic waste, and also involves a great risk of war. Therefore, a war or an arms race cannot be a socially efficient (Pareto-optimal) form of behavior. Disregarding the case where some countries may actually enjoy war or military preparations for their own sake, there must always exist a peaceful solution that would make both sides better off.

But, so long as more effective methods of settling international disputes are not available, a given country under certain conditions may choose an increase in her military preparations or even an actual war as a lesser evil than, e.g., losing her independence; and this decision may be perfectly rational in the sense of being made in full awareness of the costs entailed. Indeed, under conditions of mutual distrust—and it may very well happen that all participants are fully justified in mistrusting each other's intentions—an arms race or even an actual war may be a necessary result of rational individual behavior by all participants, so long as no way is found to decrease mutual ill-will and distrust or to establish an effective international peace-enforcing authority.

From a practical point of view, if wars were due merely to the fact that "people did not stop to think," we could eliminate war merely by pointing out the disastrous consequences of wars and arms races. But if wars and increased military preparations are often the results of political decisions quite rational in terms of the international situation of the time and in terms of the decision-makers' own political objectives, then our task is the much harder one of creating much more posi-

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tive attitudes all over the world toward international co-operation, law observance, and law enforcement.

In game-theoretical terminology, a situation of well-founded mutual distrust is called a Prisoner's Dilemma situation.[4] It corresponds to a non-cooperative game in which all equilibrium points represent highly inefficient and wasteful joint strategies (e.g., "squealing" in the original Prisoner's Dilemma, and arms races or wars in our case). But the players are unable to agree on a mutually preferable co-operative joint strategy because the game contains no mechanism to enforce agreements, and because unenforceable agreements would not be kept by the players.

Consider, e.g., the following game matrix (adapted from Luce and Raiffa):

	B_1	B_2
A_1	(5, 5)	(−4, 6)
A_2	(6, −4)	(−3, −3)

A_1 and A_2 are the two strategies available to country 1, while B_1 and B_2 are the two strategies available to country 2. A_1 and B_1 are peaceful co-operative strategies, whereas A_2 and B_2 are aggressive strategies involving increased military preparations or even actual war. Both countries would be better off if they used their peaceful strategies A_1 and B_1. But this would represent an unstable situation, because if either country used her peaceful strategy, then the other country could and *would* take advantage of the opponent by using her aggressive strategy against it.

Thus a general theory of war must equally cover cases where war is a result of miscalculation (or even of unthinking emotional behavior) and where it is the result of more or less rational individual choices by some participants. Though mechanical-response models like Richardson's may have their uses in particular cases, a more general theory will have to rely primarily on rational-behavior models—and in particular on those provided by the theory of games, which analyzes conflicts of interests among rational participants.[5] But of course the assumption of *perfect* rationality customary in game theory again goes too far, and methods have to be developed for making appropriate allowances for the participants' imperfect information, their limited information-

[4] R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions*, New York, 1957, p. 95.

[5] Rapoport argues for the same point on a somewhat different basis in "Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," *Conflict Resolution*, 1 (September 1957), pp. 249-99.

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processing ability, and even for the possibility of impulsive emotional behavior.

To conclude, the main importance of Richardson's pioneering work on the theory of war does not lie in his specific conclusions. It rather lies in his example of combining a deep humanitarian concern about a vexing social problem with theoretical analysis of this problem at a high level of scientific objectivity, methodological sophistication, analytical skill, and untiring patient attention to detail.

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AFRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By EDWARD A. TIRYAKIAN

David Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1961, 498 pp. $10.00.

Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity*, trans. from the French by Mercer Cook, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961, 145 pp. $4.85; paperback edition, $1.85.

Kalu Ezera, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria*, Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1960, 274 pp. $5.50.

Millar MacLure and Douglas G. Anglin, eds., *Africa: The Political Pattern*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961, 62 pp. $2.50.

Hugh H. and Mabel M. Smythe, *The New Nigerian Elite*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1960, 196 pp. $5.00.

I

TO assess political developments in sub-Saharan Africa is an awesome and challenging task. We might begin by distinguishing their major historical phases. The first was the pre-colonial era, when sub-Saharan Africa was relatively immune from extensive contacts with Europe; we might arbitrarily say that this period lasted until the early part of the nineteenth century—save for South Africa, which acquired a permanently settled white population shortly after the Europeanization of North America. In this early phase, which historians are just beginning to document, political development showed no central tendencies: diffuse and scattered local tribal political systems in East and Central Africa, waxing and waning kingdoms in West Africa (e.g., those of Mali, Ghana, Songhai)—all were superimposed upon extensive inter-African population movements and political conquests of various sorts.

Following this indigenous phase, long in duration, there occurred in the nineteenth century the European scramble for Africa, a minor transitional phase from a historical point of view, characterized by an odd mixture of philanthropic and commercial aims on the part of the Europeans. The nineteenth century was the first important period of discovery and awareness of Africa by the rest of the world. The prototype of the Western expert on Africa during this phase was the missionary-explorer.

The European scramble for Africa became stabilized and regulated mainly as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1885, which may be said to have inaugurated another major period of African political

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history: the colonial era. This phase was marked by the stability of the colonial regime, the repression or suppression of native social and political developments, the economic exploitation of Africa for the benefit of the *métropole*, and—with the exception of local rebellions, often religiously inspired—a general tenor of quiet and monotony. During this major phase, the prototype of the Western expert on Africa may be said to have been the civil servant.

The colonial epoch has just about ended throughout Africa. In West Africa it is all over but the shouting, and East and Central Africa are following the same course with great rapidity. The nineteenth-century missionary cry of "Africa for the Africans!" has become the universal shibboleth of today, both within and without Africa, although white settlers of European background uneasily wonder whether this slogan is intended to include or exclude them. The post-colonial situation is an extremely recent one: its background sources are less than a generation old, its major impetus was World War II, which ineluctably weakened Europe's domination of Africa, and its formal beginning was Ghana's achievement of independence a mere five years ago.

The patterns of the post-colonial phase have not crystallized, for the social, political, cultural, and economic consequences of political independence have created in sub-Saharan Africa a dynamic flux unparalleled in world history. Another scramble for Africa is under way. One of its major aspects is the political scramble (which horrifies Africans) on the part of three major competitors: the West, the Communist East (which will eventually develop into a competitive struggle between Russia and China), and Islamic North Africa. There is also a more tactful scramble for Africa involving scholars of various disciplines; the cultural hegemony of anthropologists that existed in the colonial period has broken down as economists, political scientists, historians, and sociologists have become fascinated by the cultural riches of modern African development. Although I am a sociologist, I must admit without reservations that the dominant African expert in the West today is the political scientist.

Why Africa has captured the imagination and the pen (or typewriter) of the political scientist is no puzzle. Since 1945 half of all the countries newly admitted to the United Nations have been African states, which are creating for themselves an ever-increasing position in the forum of the world. More important, whereas it may be said that, by and large, the crucial political issues and the major forms of government have become stabilized in other parts of the world, or,

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more generally, that social life in the rest of the world tends to assume the routinization and monotony of the colonial situation, such is not the case in sub-Saharan Africa. Reflecting contrasting social currents, Africa has not settled its key political problems: the boundary relations between states, the nature of government, the locus of political power within a state, the relation of traditional sources of political authority to modern national rulers, the relation of the central government to politico-cultural regions, the relation of the party in power to the opposition, the nature and operation of modern political parties, and the form of political suffrage. Besides, for the African people politics *is* what is exciting, novel, and tangible about independence. The exuberance that attends political development in sub-Saharan Africa is extremely contagious; political scientists have willingly, even gratefully, caught the fever, along with Africans.

Although each African country has its own set of concrete political problems, certain common denominators may be found. With the exception of Liberia, all sub-Saharan countries (including South Africa) have been subjected to some form of European colonial domination, to the overseas influence of a *métropole* that attempted in varying degrees to dictate the tenor of political, economic, and cultural activities. The colonial situation has left a legacy that is evident in both the *internal* and the *external* political developments of African nations.

The European colonial powers created in the nineteenth century artificial political entities that did not correspond to indigenous socio-political demarcations. Thus, a cultural entity like the Bakongo tribe found itself, like ancient Gaul, divided into three parts—one segment in the French Congo, another in the Belgian Congo, and a third in Portuguese Angola. Internally, a colonial entity might be composed of various tribes, speaking different languages, with entirely different historical backgrounds and contrasting forms of social organization. Especially in British territories, but elsewhere as well, the colonial administration temporarily "froze" these differences and made no attempt at national cultural unification. This presents a set of major dilemmas for countries achieving political independence today. Should there be an intensive endeavor toward national unification, or should there be a restoration of pre-colonial socio-political bodies? Can former colonial possessions whose economic *raison d'être* lay in their ties with the *métropole* become sufficiently viable as presently constituted, or must they seek political agglomeration with other states? What is the best way of unifying a country that is cul-

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turally diverse, where often there is hostility between the major social bodies? The colonial fragmentation of Africa is certainly a lamentable legacy; nonetheless, it is a salient feature of reality and one that has given rise to the ideal of "African unity," a laudable ideal whose practical implementation is quite difficult.

The second European legacy is the African peoples' common experience of having been culturally, politically, economically, and racially humiliated and degraded—of having been treated as children and wards of a European state. With their newly found freedom, African countries see their role in international politics as focusing upon two major objectives. The first is to protect Africa from any subsequent infringement on the part of alien powers, to avoid entangling alliances that might curtail political independence, to be solidary with one another, and at the same time to carve out for Africa a place from which it can make positive contributions to world peace. This first set of desires is, by and large, contained in the notion of "positive neutralism," a doctrine of international relations which, this writer would suggest, was the *leitmotiv* in the external relations of just one major non-African country: the United States from 1789 until the advent of World War I. The second, and more immediately crucial, objective of sub-Saharan Africa in international affairs is the eradication of racial discrimination in all countries wherever people of "color" are still subject to political and civic inequities. It is in their general agreement over Africa's role in international relations that newly independent African countries have found a genuine cohesive force that mitigates internal, politically divisive forces.

II

The books that form the basis of this review article are written from such different perspectives and focus upon so many aspects of African political development that no single treatment of them is possible. Taken together, however, they form a highly stimulating collection with appeal to the specialist in African studies, to the political scientist interested in comparative materials, and to the general reader.

Africa: The Political Pattern consists of five brief essays originally given as public lectures at Carleton University in Canada. In the first, the Hon. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, expresses his country's position in international relations. Though Nigeria may have important political differ-

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ences of opinion at home, it is unified as to its external policies: it seeks freedom to maneuver outside of existing power blocs, increased participation of the Afro-Asian countries in key agencies of the United Nations, and championing of racial equality everywhere. In connection with the last-named pillar of Nigerian foreign policy, Mr. Wachuku declares: "Nowhere in the world . . . will Nigeria countenance humiliations to people of African descent; and we will not consider any action on our part as interference in the internal affairs of another state" (pp. 68-69). This is a statement that all independent African countries affirm, a statement of intention that applies most readily to South Africa and Portuguese Africa, but not inconceivably to the United States as well.

Also in this book Thomas Hodgkin does an admirable job of distilling in a few pages the main trends and problems of political development in West Africa, focusing particularly upon the relationships between the various states and peoples. Taking into account a number of background factors, Hodgkin wisely discerns that the major contemporary issue is that of fragmentation or "Balkanization" versus a West African union integrated about the "Pan-African" cluster of ideas.

In the essay on "South Africa: Racialism and Republicanism," Arthur Keppel-Jones, a distinguished South African historian who went to Canada in 1959 in self-imposed exile, objectively analyzes a much-overlooked aspect of South African political life: the conflict between the English-speaking and the Afrikaans-speaking whites. In respect to national unity, this conflict has been historically much more of a divisive force than racial conflict, although the latter has in recent years received greater world attention. An important structural aspect of this conflict is that the locus of political power has resided in the Afrikaans-speaking group, while the locus of economic power has resided in the English-speaking group; moreover, the numerically predominant Afrikaners were made to feel culturally inferior to the English.

The two other essays in this collection are also of high caliber. Bryan Keith-Lucas gives a lucid account of political developments in one of West Africa's newest independent countries, tiny Sierra Leone; he finds that in spite of economic problems the prospects for independence are promising, given the present political leadership. Finally, Cranford Pratt offers in "East Africa: Political Development" a succinct and clear exposition of variations in the steps toward inde-

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pendence of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika (omitting reference to Zanzibar).

My one criticism of this volume, and a mild one at that, is that the price charged by the University of Toronto Press ($2.50 for 62 pages!) smacks a bit of economic exploitation of Africa!

Mamadou Dia's *The African Nations and World Solidarity*, written by the distinguished Prime Minister of Senegal, is to my mind one of the most admirable books to come out of Africa. It is a sober, hard-hitting analysis of Africa's position in the world today, one which successfully combines global comprehension, astute realism, and lofty idealism. It represents the fruitful synthesis of the modern African outlook with French culture. This does not imply that Mr. Dia is "pro-French"—make no mistake about it, he is thoroughly and completely "pro-African"—but he writes in quite a different vein from that of an English-speaking African. Dia is a modern African revolutionary in the most sophisticated sense of the word; he is a spokesman of the *Tiers-Monde*[1] and does not disguise the anti-colonialist character of the modern African revolution. He fully realizes, unlike some other African leaders, that there can be no final solution to colonialism until African countries achieve economic liberation; political independence while a country retains its economic dependency on more highly industrialized nations is not genuine liberation from the colonial situation. Mr. Dia is equally critical of the capitalist system and the economic system of the Soviet Union, for the latter's success in development is contingent upon the economic dependency of her satellites. Africa, he believes, must choose a new path, democratic socialism, based on the spontaneous solidarity of its people, and a key concept of which is "the nation as a collective vocation." Africa's political development, Mr. Dia feels, has to be linked not only to an economic development but to a moral one as well. Its collective solidarity will enable Africa to make contributions to other parts of the world through observance of the common human ideals of justice, dignity, and genuine co-operation.

Space limitation prevents a discussion of Dia's analysis of specific economic regions and his treatment of the Mali experiment. This book, I can only say, is a very important one that well depicts the problems and the vision of the new African statesmen (not just the politicians). The publishers are to be congratulated for making it available in English.

[1] The term *Tiers-Monde* refers to the proletarian, underdeveloped group of nations unwilling to commit themselves to either of the two major camps on the international scene.

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III

Nigeria, which achieved independence in 1960, and Uganda, scheduled to attain it in October 1962, are separated by a very great physical distance, yet they manifest important similarities. Each is the creation of English colonial administration. Originally consisting of heterogeneous cultural regions, they were both welded by the forceful personalities of significant colonial figures: Lord Lugard in Nigeria and Sir Harry Johnston in Uganda. The cornerstone of the colonial policy by which they were administered was the doctrine of "indirect rule," wherein traditional African authority structures in various regions were allowed to maintain themselves while the central executive authority was in the hands of the colonial civil service staff. In each country the regions show different levels of social and economic development and an absence of national consciousness. For each country, the attempted solution has been that of federation, rather than either a unitary government or fragmentation into distinct political bodies. In Nigeria it is the most backward economic region that has secured effective political control of the federal government, because of the numerical majority of its population; in Uganda, although the situation at present is still far from settled, it appears that the most advanced region will take the helm. Paradoxically, however, in both cases the region that is to be the leader of political development for the country as a whole is the one that has historically fought hardest against federation, in favor of political separation. This background offers intriguing materials for political analysis.

Dr. Kalu Ezera's *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria* is a scholarly, objective endeavor to trace the main lines of evolution in the political administration of his country, from Lord Lugard's amalgamation of the various provinces in 1914 up to the dawn of independence in 1960. The major political problems dealt with are those of unification and the gradual transfer of power from English administrators to African leaders. Though various strains developed along the way, Dr. Ezera's analysis suggests that in Nigeria there occurred a rather fruitful collaboration between two "adversaries," European colonial administrators and African nationalists. British policy went through many modifications, particularly in the post-World War II period, and was embodied in a series of constitutions (the Richards Constitution of 1946, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, the Revised Constitution of 1954) that cumulatively increased the role of Africans in political administration.

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Dr. Ezera pays attention not only to the provisions of each constitution, but also to the political factors responsible for these constitutional changes. Major problems in this process were the extent and nature of political representation and the co-ordination of various political bodies: the European-staffed colonial administration, regional and federal legislative councils, and local native administration systems. Dr. Ezera examines the problems involved in the relationship between the regional and the central legislatures and also discusses the emergence of political pressure groups and parties.

He suggests that four contrasting political philosophies are to be found in Nigeria: (1) the egalitarian, nationalistic, Pan-African school of Azikiwe, the present Governor-General of Nigeria and titular head of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), a party having its main strength in the Ibo country of the Eastern Province, but also powerful in the urban areas of the Western Province; (2) the elitist school of Chief Awolowo, head of the Action Group based in the Western Province and favoring cultural pluralism, with political and economic leadership contained in a narrow cadre; (3) the "liberal conservative" viewpoint of the Northern People's Congress, which favors gradual social evolution, instrumented by traditional authority figures, and the maintenance of regional pluralism; and (4) the "Kemalist" school of the Dynamic Party (which presently has a very small following), whose emphasis is upon rapid modernization on a mass basis, with effective leadership supplied in the form of "benevolent dictatorship by a dedicated corps of enlightened and patriotic Nigerians" (p. 103).

In view of these contrasting philosophies, extensive opposition to a single national state, and pronounced social and cultural differences, the present parliamentary federal form of government was probably the best possible political compromise for Nigeria. It remains to be seen whether this form of government, which embodies British notions of constitutional democracy in an African setting, can withstand the test of time and become the political instrument of national unification, or whether the centrifugal forces operating in Nigeria will cause it to take another form. Because of its size and economic wealth, Nigeria is probably the most important test case for federation in modern Africa.

The New Nigerian Elite is a sociological attempt to study the characteristics of the new Nigerian leaders. Hugh and Mabel Smythe conducted a sociological survey in 1958 that involved interviewing a sample of high-status persons (whose names were obtained from a variety of sources) and observing social correlates of these "elite" individuals.

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Aside from suggesting indirectly that the new Nigerian elite has on the whole the same characteristics and motivations as the new American Negro bourgeois class, this study suffers from several methodological and substantive shortcomings that curtail its significance for political scientists. First, the sample studied has several limitations as to representativeness and adequacy. The small sample of 156 individuals contained only five women, although women in Nigeria have a very important economic role in urban areas. How this sample was selected from an original list of 276 names is not specified, nor do the authors tell us what they did with "shorter conversations with about 500 people." They estimate the size of the top elite group in Nigeria as "between 1,500 and 3,000 people" out of a total elite of "at least 20,000" (p. 92); whether their sample is a representative cross-section is a matter of conjecture. The authors state that their aim was to study "the new elite group" and that they were also concerned with "individual and group leadership roles" (p. 6). Yet, they acknowledge that "the traditional elite probably supplied a somewhat greater share of interviews than their proportion among the elite would justify" (p. 11)—in fact, about one third of the sample came from old elite families (p. 87). Analysis of the leadership roles of the elite is glossed over in favor of examining their style of life. We are left guessing as to whether there is a new elite group forming in non-urban areas; we are not given quantitative breakdowns within the elite group as to religious affiliation, political affiliation, and income levels. Furthermore, there is no adequate definition of the elite concept; the sample consists of secure, high-status individuals, but are they in fact the effective social leaders in all major aspects of institutional life in Nigeria? Although the authors write in one place that "there is not a single elite group" (p. 74), they elsewhere mention that "the government elite is *the* elite in contemporary Nigeria" (p. 80).

As an exploratory study, this study offers some interesting empirical data. On the whole, though, it adds little insight to the problems and dynamics of leadership already dealt with in James Coleman's briefer treatment of the Nigerian elite group.[2]

IV

For political science, the *pièce de résistance* of the works reviewed here is undoubtedly David E. Apter's *The Political Kingdom in Uganda.* Professor Apter's earlier work, *The Gold Coast in Transition*,[3]

[2] James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958, chs. 5 and 6.

[3] Princeton, N.J., 1955.

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has become a landmark in the field of African political science and established its author's reputation as one who has the rare gift of combining a sensitive grasp of empirical conditions with a broader theoretical interest. The present book well deserves to become a definitive reference work on pre-independent Uganda, but I must express a certain general dissatisfaction with Professor Apter's methodological treatment of his subject. Although there have been several other traditional kingdoms in Uganda, he examines in great detail just one, that of Buganda; this, of course, is justifiable on the grounds that Buganda is the largest and most powerful political entity in Uganda. At the same time, one wishes he had given a little more attention to the socio-political relationships between Buganda and other regions of the country. What bothered me in reading this voluminous work was a feeling that the author was wasting his analytical and theoretical talents by devoting so much space to minute historical details and countless names, all of which makes it difficult to grasp the essentials; the historico-political development of Uganda has already been sufficiently chronicled in other works.[4]

To summarize the main features of the country's political development, the British colonial administration never succeeded in making palatable to the Baganda either national unification with the rest of Uganda or federation with other East African territories (Kenya and Tanganyika). Ruled by their monarch, the Kabaka, who has a sort of mystical appeal and relation to his people analogous to the traditional role of the Emperor of Japan, the Baganda have always expressed the desire to "go it alone." Internally, the Kabaka and the traditional authority structure have so far kept a secure grip on Buganda, although the common people have increased their participation in local politics and in the Lukiko (the Baganda legislature). This is the essence of the situation.

For those interested in comparative analysis (rather than political ethnography) the first chapter and the latter half of the book (starting with Chapter 14) will prove most challenging and fruitful. The structural-functional requisite analysis that provided a methodological approach for the earlier study of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) has disappeared from sight. In its place the author adopts some concepts by means of which he seeks to develop a highly general model for the analysis of political authority systems. He distinguishes between *con-*

[4] Kenneth Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1958; D. Anthony Low and R. Cranford Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955*, London, Oxford University Press, 1960.

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summatory and *instrumental* values (a dichotomy taken from Talcott Parsons' action theory) and between *pyramidal* and *hierarchical* authority structures. This leads to four general types, with the traditional Buganda system being classified as hierarchical-instrumental. Moreover, Buganda is characterized as a "modernizing autocracy," which contrasts with other types of African political regimes: the *mobilization* type (e.g., Guinea) and the *consociational* type characterized by accepted competition between parties (e.g., Nigeria). As an ensemble, these concepts offer great promise for a fruitful comparative analysis of political systems and social structure at a general level.

My major methodological criticism is that Professor Apter gives insufficient attention to demonstrating the congruence between his conceptual framework and the empirical data. Thus, why or in what sense Buganda is deemed to have an instrumental value orientation is not shown. From such statements as "participation in politics is not marred by caste or aristocratic elements" (p. 88), "hierarchy thus came to be based on merit rather than family" (p. 110), and "no classes have formed in the strict sense of the term" (p. 457), one might infer that Buganda has a predominantly egalitarian achievement orientation, but the empirical referents of an instrumental value orientation are hardly commented upon by Apter. Further, I am not certain that the appellation of a "modernizing autocracy" is appropriate for Buganda. What has been "modernized"? Uganda (Buganda included) still has a predominantly agricultural subsistence economy, an absence of urbanization, an absence of political ideology, and, until very recently, no system of direct elections (pp. 307f.). Rather than accepting political responsibility in building a modern nation with other parts of Uganda (as has been the case with the NPC modernizing autocracy in Nigeria), Buganda is still marked to a large degree by parochialism. In view of all this, to equate limited internal political reforms with modernization seems to be an overgeneralization. Whatever has been modernized seems more the result of the British Protectorate government's efforts than of those of the Kabaka or the Lukiko (pp. 448f.), and the one apparently modernizing figure in Buganda, Sir Apolo Kagwa, was dropped, like Bismarck, as the pilot of the ship of state.

Finally, I have reservations about Apter's designating the social structure as "atomistic" when we also read that "the identity of a Baganda is in terms of his clan" (p. 141) and that a man's personality, influence, and support are contingent on his "old boys' associations,

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church, and other associations to which he belongs" (p. 408). Buganda seems to be a pluralistic society in terms of religion, clan, and other affiliations; surely this is the very opposite of "social atomization on an individual level" (p. 128).

What is the prospect for political development in Uganda? Since political circumstances are still very much in flux in East Africa, it is hard for anyone to predict which way Uganda will eventually go. In terms of modern African models, Uganda has two major alternatives: on the one hand, it can adopt the federal model of Nigeria, a consociational system; on the other, that of Ghana, a centralized, mobilizing system. Professor Apter suggests cautiously that under present conditions the federal solution represents the "best" solution. Though I share his sympathy for the democratic consociational system, I also wonder whether the Guinea-Ghana model does not lend itself better to the Uganda situation, and this for two reasons: first, Apter himself suggests that the modernizing autocracy has more in common with the mobilization than the consociational system (p. 475); and, second, in view of Uganda's limited size and resources, rapid socio-economic development is more likely to be obtained through the mobilization system.

In summary, although I feel that this study manifests a certain disjuncture between concepts and facts, or at least an inconclusive fit between them, the analytical tools found in *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* are very promising for future comparative analysis, and confirm Professor Apter's position as the outstanding American political scientist who perceives the need to apply general theory to African political development.

Sub-Saharan Africa represents a highly exciting and dynamic laboratory of political experimentation. There is today an intermingling of Western democratic political ideology, Marxist ideology, and traditional African political structures; out of all these elements will emerge distinctive modern African forms of government and political life. What should now capture political scientists is not so much the desire to turn out monographs or case studies as the desire to focus on comparative analysis so that African political development may be related to general political theory. The relatively few attempts at comparative analysis already made indicate how fruitful such an approach can be.[5] Just as important, the study of African political

[5] Donald S. Rothchild, *Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa*, foreword by Gwendolen Carter, Washington, D.C., 1960; W. J. M. Mackenzie

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development must be closely related to the whole social milieu in which it has occurred and is occurring, and this includes the traditional, the colonial, and the modern setting.[6] Since the social and political history of modern Africa is so closely tied to its previous relations with Europe, political scientists must give full attention to the theoretical and actual significance of what Georges Balandier has aptly termed the global aspect of the "colonial situation."[7] It is within this broader context, the global and the comparative, that African political development deserves to be studied.

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and Kenneth Robinson, *Five Elections in Africa: A Group of Electoral Studies*, London, Oxford University Press, 1960; James S. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, N.J., 1960, pp. 247-368; Thomas Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, Penguin Books edn., 1961.

[6] The best work to date in this regard is Fernand van Langenhove, *Consciences Tribales et Nationales en Afrique Noire*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, for the Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1960.

[7] Georges Balandier, "La Situation Coloniale: Approche Théorique," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XI (1951), pp. 44-79.

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

By FRED CHARLES IKLÉ

Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age* (Studies in International Security, No. 2, Institute for Strategic Studies), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961, 215 pp. $3.95.

Donald G. Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (with the sponsorship of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), New York, George Braziller, 1961, 475 pp. $6.00.

Louis Henkin, ed., *Arms Control: Issues for the Public*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., for the American Assembly, 1961, 207 pp. $3.50.

I

IF one browses in the stacks of a large public library among the shelves on disarmament, one can discover three periods during which most of the books were published: the first around the turn of the century, the second in the late 1920's and early 1930's, and the third from about 1959 until today. The first phase was related to the Hague Peace Conferences, partly preceding the First Hague Conference and thereby stimulating the initial public interest in disarmament negotiations. The second phase accompanied the League of Nations disarmament conferences. And the current interest in disarmament, of course, stems from the threatening growth of weapons technology and the accumulating means of mass destruction. But the peculiar concentration of publications during the last two years seems to have been triggered by the initial phase of the nuclear test ban conference, when many scientists became interested or personally involved in the detailed problems posed by arms controls. This interest spread through informal contacts, committees, and conferences to the larger academic community.

It is likely that the number of books published on disarmament will again decrease for awhile, if for no other reason than that publishers will be discouraged by the many volumes that have recently filled the shelves. However, we need not fear that thought and research on disarmament will now dry up; the many study centers on defense problems and the research program of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should assure the continuity that is so important in this field. Future writings on disarmament will obviously have to take account of the vast literature of the last few years. In addition, however,

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future contributors might gain a better historical perspective if they familiarize themselves with the earlier two peaks in the world disarmament literature: the League of Nations phase and the pre-World War I period. Although military technology has changed completely during the course of the century, important political and international-institutional aspects of disarmament have changed little, and the empty ritual and unhappy fate of large disarmament conferences, tragically, has remained much the same.

Around 1895, French jurists debated whether political conflicts had to be settled before real disarmament was possible, whether a world government with an international army might become tyrannical, and whether the great powers would agree to limit their sovereignty in favor of an international peace force. About the same time a German writer pointed out that while the Western powers could not build armaments without public parliamentary discussion, Russia, behind an impenetrable screen, could do pretty much as she liked.[1] Andrew White, in his charming account of his experiences as the chief U.S. delegate to the First Hague Conference, relates that some delegates suspected Russia had called this conference merely to secure time for strengthening her armaments.[2] White's initial expectation, that the Conference might do something on arbitration but nothing effective on disarmament, turned out to be correct. The influence of peace groups, according to White's account, was perhaps even more important than at recent disarmament conferences; their pressures and influence enabled White to win over the reluctant German government to the agreement on arbitration.

From the disarmament phase of the League of Nations several books are still worth reading (for example, *Disarmament* by Salvador de Madariaga). But of greater technical interest are some of the League's own documents. The monumental League of Nations study on budgetary disarmament and budgetary controls is still a must for students of this aspect of disarmament. Important lessons for our era can also be drawn from the League's extensive but unsuccessful effort to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons.[3]

[1] A good survey of the disarmament literature of this period can be found in Merze Tate, *The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907*, New York, 1942.

[2] Andrew D. White, *The First Hague Conference*, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1912.

[3] This effort has been analyzed in Marion W. Boggs, *Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy and Strategy*, University of Missouri Studies, XVI, No. 1, Columbia, Mo., 1941.

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II

Hedley Bull's *The Control of the Arms Race* shows that the author is thoroughly familiar with the older disarmament literature. This background contributes a wider perspective and a better understanding of the political issues of disarmament. But this historical perspective might also be responsible for a certain skepticism that permeates Bull's book, a skepticism that seems to trouble those who feel that the danger from our *unique* military technology should—and could—be met by *unique* political solutions. Thus, John Strachey complains in his postscript to the book that Bull's approach is "too negative," and that his rejection of the possibility of an international authority with military force (i.e., world government) fails to appreciate "the minimum conditions for survival in the nuclear age."

Bull maintains that arms control systems cannot guarantee their own perpetuity, but that they depend on the continuance of a political agreement among the opponents, and require "a measure of political *détente*." Arms control, Bull argues, "does not provide a technique of insulating a military situation from the future will of states to change it." He points out that the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its sequel, the London Naval Treaty of 1930, collapsed when Japan was determined to overthrow the political and territorial *status quo* in the Pacific. We might add that, in spite of eventual failure, these naval treaties deserve to be viewed more favorably than is customarily done. Given the necessary political conditions, they might have become as great a success as the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 between the United States and Canada. Today, when the West places so much emphasis on international inspection systems, it is worth recalling that the naval disarmament treaty of 1922 contained no provisions for inspection. As Bull puts it, signatories "relied on their own resources of military intelligence and espionage." And the treaty did not break down because of cheating; it was denounced openly. (Of course, the building of large naval vessels is relatively easy to detect, and in the 1930's Japan was less of a closed society than the Soviet Union is today.)

Bull takes a situation of a balance of power or mutual deterrence as given, and wants to see arms controls added to make deterrence more stable and less dangerous. A Soviet review of Bull's book in *International Affairs* (Moscow) attacks primarily this position.[4] For the

[4] S. Yefimov, "Disarmament or the Arms Race?", *International Affairs*, No. 2 (February 1962), pp. 3-8. This review also criticizes the volume edited by Brennan as being generally opposed to disarmament.

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last few years official Soviet statements have categorically rejected *arms control* arrangements as being designed to perpetuate large military establishments. What the Soviet proponents of total *dis*armament, however, have never answered—the insistent prodding by Western scientists at Pugwash meetings notwithstanding—is the question as to what would deter rearmament in a disarmed world from which deterrence has supposedly been banished.[5] The official Western position (not shared by France) accepted total disarmament of national forces as an ultimate goal, but added—albeit somewhat shyly—the idea of a limited world government to fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of national power. The fact that such a millenarian vision has stirred up so little discussion in the West perhaps indicates the shaky foundation on which it rests. With a few exceptions—notable among which is the book by Clark and Sohn[6]—Western writers tend to dismiss the idea that world government is the solution to our disarmament problem. Thus Bull says: "If nations were defenceless, there could hardly be a political order worthy of the name unless there were an armed, central authority. . . . If a universal authority or world government were to be established in any other way than by conquest, and if, once established, it were to maintain itself in any other way than by the constant suppression of dissidence, the bitter political conflicts which now divide the world would have to have subsided" (p. 36).

Bull's book is best in the general chapters that set forth the political problems and basic objectives of arms control. Here it clearly benefits from the fact that it was written by a single author who thinks incisively and has mastered an elegant style. His chapters on specific arms control measures (against the spread of nuclear weapons, surprise attack, and in outer space), on the other hand, inevitably reflect the fact that a short treatment by one author cannot bring out all the complexities, variants, and qualifications that have to be considered by the policy-maker.

In his discussion of the reconnaissance satellite, in the context of arms controls for outer space, Bull seems to be asking for the American reviewer to criticize him. So here this shall be done. Bull effectively disposes of the notion that outer space possesses a metaphysical purity: "We should not regard the arms race in space as a trespass on the sanctuary of the gods"; the important thing is to avoid war on earth. There

[5] This crucial question about total disarmament has been developed incisively in Thomas C. Schelling's recent article, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (April 1962), pp. 392-406.

[6] Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

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are more valid reasons for giving a certain priority to arms control in outer space (some of which Bull also mentions): the great costs and uncertainties of the arms race in space, the relatively easy verifiability of space controls, and the absence of strong political implications (in contrast to, say, disengagement in Europe). But Bull's additional point, that attacks on reconnaissance satellites might have dangerous political consequences, does not seem a discriminating reason for giving priority to space disarmament. If one accepted this argument, one would have to give precedence to the demilitarization of the high seas, because an attack on a "spy radar-ship" would have even more serious political consequences.

Yet this is a minor point. More serious is Bull's somewhat cavalier dismissal of "the peculiarly American ideology of the 'open world.'" If one is anxious about making some progress in arms control or disarmament, one must be deeply concerned about a reduction of Soviet secrecy. For no matter how we try to invent "inoffensive" inspection methods, or disarmament measures that the West could accept without new means of verification (of which there are only a few), inevitably we come up against the wall of secrecy as one of the principal roadblocks to disarmament. It is true that the Russians are very sensitive about their secrecy (is it partly from a bad conscience?). But this sensitivity extends to all the many non-military aspects of Communist secrecy: the jamming of foreign broadcasts, travel restrictions for Soviet citizens, the suppression of accident statistics, or censorship in art and literature. A great many manifestations of Communist secrecy do not contribute to the stability of deterrence by protecting the Soviet second-strike capability (as some Western apologists of Soviet secrecy are fond of arguing); their purpose is purely political: to perpetuate the government's tutelage over its own citizens.

III

The volume *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* is based on the *Daedalus* issue of Fall 1960; it consists of twenty-three chapters by individual contributors and has been most ably edited and integrated by Donald Brennan. The papers for the *Daedalus* issue (which have been revised and enlarged for this book version) were first discussed at a large two-day conference in May 1960 in Boston, at the House of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Of the many conferences held during the last two years to discuss arms control and disarmament, this was probably by far the best. Some

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of the later imitations have turned into a modern rite that academicians and public-spirited citizens are fond of performing—at which the same participants keep meeting the same old faces and re-read old papers that they have quickly reshuffled on the airplane while flying to the conference site, preferably a lovely mansion or faraway resort town.

The conference that served to prepare the papers for this book was different. It was skillfully organized by Gerald Holton, Jerome Wiesner, and Donald Brennan. The participants had their papers ready in advance and had something new to say. But most impressive were the conflict of approaches and the clash of basic philosophies that occurred—without, however, breaking up the integrated character of the conference. No one present during those two days can forget the sense of drama that developed as the participants confronted each other with opposing views. Although the disagreement could not be resolved, all were united by a feeling of awe and a deep sense of respect for the enormity of the problem.

It would take too much space to do justice here to all the component papers of this book. We shall select only a few points for our comments. Donald Brennan, in his excellent introduction, at one point raises a question that is fundamental to arms control and disarmament and yet is usually passed over in silence: what are the effects of parity, or more basically, is military parity between East and West a desirable goal? Brennan warns that "to reduce our strategic forces to a level comparable to the Soviet forces might well impair our ability to reduce the destructiveness of Soviet attacks in the event general war were to break out. . . . This effect might have secondary political effects, arising principally from a corresponding reduction in our ability to stand up to nuclear blackmail threats . . ." (p. 28). Against these short-term costs we must balance the possible long-term gains from a general reduction in destructive capability and from improved East-West co-operation. We should add that what has received insufficient attention in the recent arms control literature is the nexus between the willingness to settle for parity and a *status-quo* orientation. Do we know whether the Soviets want parity and nothing more; and how does China fit into East-West parity?

In the chapter "Constructing Rules That Affect Governments," Roger Fisher gives us a preview of his interesting work on the question of why governments comply with rules that do not have the threat of force behind them. Fisher says that "governments comply with treaties and other international rules as they do with constitu-

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tions and other domestic rules by a process of composite self-restraint" (p. 57). In this paper Fisher did not yet sufficiently develop discriminating criteria as to when governments do comply with such rules and when they don't, but it is to be hoped that his future publications will carry his interesting approach farther.

The chapter by A. Doak Barnett on the inclusion of Communist China in arms controls offers a thorough political evaluation and helps to dispel many misconceptions. For the last few years, particularly while the test ban negotiations were more active, self-contradictory propositions about the inclusion of Communist China were quite widely held. It was argued that (1) China was potentially more aggressive than the Soviet Union, (2) that it wanted to become an atomic power, (3) that it should be prevented from doing so, (4) that the Soviets were also anxious to prevent China's acquisition of nuclear weapons and therefore (5) would bring China into a test ban. What has dropped out at the end of the argument is the main point that went in at the beginning: China's aggressiveness. If China has aggressive designs, why should she forgo atomic weapons? The prospect that China would actually do so, according to Barnett, seems rather dubious. More than that, Barnett warns that the Chinese Communists might "bargain for sizable political gains as the price of even agreeing to negotiate . . . [and] raise not only issues such as United Nations membership and recognition, but also their territorial claims to the offshore islands and Taiwan. . . . The character and evolution of Sino-Soviet relations over the past decade provide little basis for hope that Moscow could or would force the Chinese Communists to cooperate on arms control if Peking were to decide firmly to be obstructionist" (p. 301).

IV

Arms Control: Issues for the Public was prepared for the Arden House meeting of the American Assembly in May 1961. It also consists of a collection of papers by individual authors, some of whom had already contributed to the before-mentioned volume edited by Brennan. Louis Henkin, the editor of this American Assembly book, leads into the subject with a useful, well-rounded introduction.

William R. Frye's chapter gives a brief history of the disarmament negotiations since World War II. The story of these fruitless negotiations does not make happy reading. Frye's curt verdict on general and complete disarmament as "a patently impractical goal" may

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sound too brief now, since the United States plan has also espoused this ultimate goal. Today Frye would probably feel compelled to argue his case more fully. All the same, the recent record in Geneva does not give ground for greater optimism.

Frye points out that much of the East-West negotiations has been diplomatic shadow-boxing. He might have carried his able analysis further to show that, in addition to this shadow-boxing, erroneous premises have often led to misdirected efforts. It is useful to recall past occasions when our major premises were at fault in order to re-examine present positions that we take for granted. Thus, the Baruch plan placed great emphasis on the industrial uses of atomic energy, and the Soviets, too, seemed greatly concerned about Western control of these economic potentials—worries that our hindsight of sixteen years reveals to have been quite out of place. Similarly, the "atoms-for-peace" plan that led to the International Atomic Energy Agency may yet come to haunt us as a move that significantly accelerated the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. Expensive reactors in such countries as Laos and the Congo contribute neither to peace nor to economic development (several of these installations in underdeveloped areas had to be shut down for lack of personnel). But in many additional countries a capability for nuclear technology will be built up gradually, and in the end the paper controls of the IAEA or of our bilateral agreements will not be able to stop a future dictator from diverting this capability to a military program.

Frye may have made too much out of Dulles' intervention at the London disarmament conference of 1957. It is highly questionable whether Stassen would have been successful in working out the fine details of actual inspection agreements—efforts in which James Wadsworth and Arthur Dean later had no success. The London conference, however, did set the stage for the nuclear test moratorium and test ban negotiations.[7]

The second contribution in this volume is a paper by Robert R. Bowie on the relation of disarmament to United States foreign policy. Bowie stresses that the present hostility stands in the way of total disarmament, and that the parties to an agreement will have to depend ultimately on self-help to correct or deter violations. This leads to the necessity for balanced reductions or restrictions among the

[7] This connection has been analyzed in Ciro E. Zoppo, *The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the London Disarmament Conference of 1957: A Study in East-West Negotiation*, Santa Monica, Calif., The RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum 2821, 1961.

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major powers, raising the problem of parity to which we alluded before.

James E. King begins his essay with an excellent synopsis of modern military strategy, and places arms control squarely in the context of current American strategy aimed at deterrence, stability of deterrence, and support of our allies against local aggression. To the extent that there has been a dispute between the "arms controllers" and the "disarmers," this essay puts King on the side of arms controls, perhaps more emphatically than he intended.

Jerome B. Wiesner's contribution correctly stresses the importance of the interaction of several verification systems in a more comprehensive scheme. He gives an extensive survey of inspection methods. But he attributes the lack of agreement on verification systems too readily to the inadequate understanding of the capabilities and tolerances of such systems. "Only with this understanding," he says, "can we resolve the conflict between the United States' fear of providing inadequate detection and Soviet reluctance to accept large, costly, and intrusive inspection systems" (p. 114). Would that it were only a matter of misunderstanding!

The concluding two chapters on the Soviet interest in arms control (by M. Mackintosh and H. Willets) and on European views (by J. Freymond) help to avoid the parochial approach from which American writings on disarmament often suffer. The chapter on the Soviet interest, in particular, correctly foretells the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations that we have witnessed again during the last year.

Does the disarmament literature of the last few years show progress through the accumulation of knowledge and an increasing understanding of the problems? The three books under review followed each other too closely to indicate any trend. Nonetheless, the volume edited by Henkin, which is the most recent of the three, clearly did benefit from the many studies that went into Brennan's volume. However, if we compare the current phase in disarmament literature with the phases of the League of Nations and the 1890's, progress in this field seems to be more spotty. To be sure, the extension of all the refined concepts of deterrence into arms control and disarmament is new, and the fantastic revolutions in technology have been at least partially absorbed (it is hard to detect any progress on the question

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of chemical and bacteriological weapons). But one wonders whether the problems of law and world order under disarmament were not better understood in 1890 than today, and whether there is any greater clarity today than in the League of Nations period about the relative merits of total versus partial disarmament, or about the separation of offensive actions and postures from defensive ones.

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